Julie Kay Parla

The applicant, Covanta, brought an application to set aside an arbitrator's decision to join two subcontractors to an ongoing arbitration between Covanta and the general contractor.

The arbitrator had joined the subcontractors under Article 17(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Covanta argued the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction because the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the arbitrator's decision was jurisdictional in nature and subject to review on a standard of correctness.

The Court found that the subcontractors were not parties to the arbitration agreement, as the subcontract did not properly incorporate the arbitration clause by reference.

The Court set aside the arbitrator's ruling and awarded costs of $50,000 to the applicant.

In a certified class action concerning a copyright dispute, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

The defendant filed its motion prior to certification, while the plaintiff filed its motion post-certification.

The court held that the plaintiff's post-certification motion should proceed first to ensure the common issues are decided as certified and bind the entire class.

The court also permitted the plaintiff to supplement its motion record with three additional affidavits.

The applicants sought judicial review of interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which declined to dismiss human rights applications under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicants argued that prior proceedings under the Police Services Act and the Regulated Health Professions Act should bar the human rights complaints based on issue estoppel and finality principles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Tribunal reasonably applied the Supreme Court's fairness principles from Penner to conclude that it would be unfair to dismiss the human rights applications, given the different purposes, lack of financial stakes, and statutory contexts of the prior proceedings.

The respondent, Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), brought a motion to strike the applicant's application for declaratory relief, arguing that as a non-corporate statutory entity, it lacked the capacity to be sued.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing prior case law that barred actions for damages against FSCO.

The court held that because the applicant sought declaratory relief rather than damages, the application could proceed.

The appellant, Teranet Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision certifying a class action brought by the respondent land surveyor for copyright infringement.

The respondent alleged that the appellant's provision of electronic copies of land surveys to the public for a fee infringed the surveyors' copyright.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in allowing the respondent to revise its class definition and common issues on appeal, as the changes were not fundamental and did not prejudice the appellant.

The Court further upheld the certification, concluding that the revised class definition was not merits-based, the common issues would significantly advance the litigation, and the respondent was a suitable representative plaintiff despite not relying on the appellant's services.

Following a successful appeal that certified a class proceeding after the appellant re-cast its case, the court determined the costs of the appeal and the motion below.

The appellant was awarded $45,000 for the appeal as the successful party.

However, because the appellant completely re-formulated its case on appeal, prejudicing the respondent at the motion stage, the court set aside the motion judge's $200,000 costs award to the respondent and ordered that neither party receive costs for the motion below.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its motion to certify a class action against the defendant, which manages Ontario's electronic land registry system.

The proposed class action alleged that the defendant's database constituted copyright infringement of plans of survey.

On appeal, the plaintiff recast its case by revising the class definition and common issues.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff could recast its case absent non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court held that the motion judge erred in requiring evidence that two or more persons were desirous of pursuing the claim to satisfy the identifiable class criterion.

The revised class definition and common issues met the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to certify a class action regarding copyright in land surveyors' plans, the parties could not agree on costs.

The successful defendant sought approximately $496,000, while the plaintiff argued for no costs or a maximum of $80,000, citing the novel point of law and public interest involved.

The court found that while the case raised a novel point of law, it did not involve a matter of public interest.

Applying the principles for fixing costs on a certification motion, the court awarded the defendant $200,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.

The self-represented appellants appealed an order striking their amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleading contained overly broad, conclusory allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and negligence without supporting material facts.

The Court also noted that many allegations were attempts to re-litigate previously determined issues, and the defects could not be cured by further amendment.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify two actions as class proceedings for settlement purposes under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 in relation to alleged price-fixing of DRAM (dynamic random access memory) devices.

The actions alleged breach of Part IV of the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with economic interests against numerous international semiconductor manufacturers.

Following earlier settlement with one defendant, additional settlements were reached with several defendants totaling substantial monetary payments and cooperation commitments.

The court held that the criteria for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied and approved certification for settlement purposes.

The court further determined that no additional opt‑out period was required because class members had already been provided a valid opportunity to opt out during the earlier settlement process.

The plaintiff surveying firm sought certification of a proposed class action alleging that the operator of Ontario’s electronic land registry system infringed surveyors’ copyright in registered plans of survey by scanning, storing, and selling digital copies through online portals.

The motion was brought under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court held that although a cause of action for copyright infringement was adequately pleaded (with the exception of allegations based on “translation” into digital formats), the plaintiff failed to satisfy the remaining certification criteria.

The proposed class definition was merits‑based and there was no evidence that two or more persons wished to pursue the claim.

The court also found that the proposed common issues were largely individualized, particularly regarding ownership of copyright and consent, and that a class proceeding would not be the preferable procedure.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs totalling $143,891.09.

The plaintiff did not dispute liability for costs, the hours spent, the disbursements, or the hourly rates, but argued that proportionality required a reduction of professional fees to $75,000.

The court applied the governing principles of reasonableness and proportionality in assessing costs under rule 57.01(1).

Considering the five‑day trial, the complexity of the litigation, the parties’ settlement offers, and reasonable expectations, the court found the defendants’ claimed fees excessive.

Costs were fixed at $80,000 in fees plus $40,533.09 in disbursements.

In a certified class proceeding alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the market for DRAM (dynamic random access memory) devices contrary to Part IV of the Competition Act and related torts, the representative plaintiffs sought court approval of a negotiated settlement with one defendant.

The settlement required the settling defendant to pay $5.75 million for the benefit of class members in Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec and to provide extensive cooperation in the ongoing litigation against non-settling defendants.

The agreement also included a bar order preventing contribution and indemnity claims against the settling defendant while permitting discovery cooperation and proportional liability determinations at trial.

Applying established class action settlement approval principles, the court concluded the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The settlement approval order was granted.

The plaintiff alleged unjust enrichment after the defendants adopted a name she proposed in a response to a request for proposals for retail space at a casino complex.

The plaintiff asserted that she created the phrase used for the retail area and that the defendants later adopted it after rejecting her proposal.

The court found that the phrase originated from the historical and cultural terminology of the First Nation and was not an original creation of the plaintiff.

It also held that the name provided no financial or commercial benefit to the defendants and was offered gratuitously during the proposal process.

The plaintiff therefore failed to establish enrichment, deprivation, or absence of juristic reason as required for unjust enrichment.

The appellants commenced a medical malpractice action in 1995 following a motorcycle accident in 1994.

Fifteen years later, the respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inexcusable delay and presumed prejudice, particularly given the availability of medical records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the 15-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice given the potential loss of evidence from unrecorded team discussions.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting an oppression remedy to the respondent, a former tenant whose lease was wrongfully terminated.

Before the respondent's damages were quantified, the appellant sold the corporation's sole asset and paid the net proceeds to herself, leaving the corporation judgment-proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party with a judgment for unquantified damages is a 'creditor' under the OBCA and that the appellant's asset-stripping conduct was oppressive.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding pre- and post-judgment interest at a compounded rate of 5.59% semi-annually for breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant knew the funds would be reinvested to earn a compound return was supported by the evidence.

The court affirmed that compound interest is an appropriate measure of damages where the parties knew or should have known the disputed money would bear compound interest.

The appellant psychiatrist appealed a jury finding of medical malpractice after she changed a patient's status from involuntary to voluntary under the Mental Health Act.

Seven weeks after his release, the patient murdered his sister.

The respondents, the victim's family, successfully sued the psychiatrist for negligence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the honest and intelligent exercise of medical judgment, the reputable body of medical opinion doctrine, and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and concluding it was open to the jury to find that the murder would not have occurred but for the patient's release.