John Laskin

Following the release of the court's written endorsement on the appeal, the appellant settled the issue of costs with several respondents.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the remaining respondent, Zanzibar Tavern Inc., costs of the appeal fixed at $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The United States sought to extradite the respondent for his alleged role in a fraudulent scheme involving ATM skimming devices.

The extradition judge dismissed the application, finding the identification evidence manifestly unreliable and insufficient evidence of possession or knowledge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the extradition judge's conclusions unreasonable.

The Court held that the identification evidence, when viewed in conjunction with supplemental records, was sufficiently reliable, and that circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference of possession and knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was committed for surrender.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondent vendors for alleged misrepresentation regarding an easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no misrepresentation, noting the appellant was fully aware of the easement's use prior to closing and failed to adduce any evidence of damages caused by the vendors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant pharmacist challenged the constitutional validity of the mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code after engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a patient.

He argued the provisions intruded into federal criminal law jurisdiction by regulating morality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions are in pith and substance the regulation of health care professionals under provincial jurisdiction, aimed at protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the professional-patient relationship.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment finding he failed to pay rent and that the landlord's distraint, which included changing the locks, did not constitute a forfeiture of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record and that changing the locks does not alone render an otherwise lawful distraint a forfeiture.

The appellants, owners of private cottages on leased land in a provincial park, appealed a decision declaring them obligated to pay a portion of the grant in lieu of taxes paid by the Crown to the municipality under the Municipal Tax Assistance Act.

The appellants argued that prior lease agreements and correspondence constituted an agreement exempting them from this obligation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that no such agreement existed and affirming the Crown's right to enforce its statutory rights following a change in taxation policy.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim that he was hired by the respondent municipality for a fixed three-year term as CAO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was hired only as an 'Acting CAO/Clerk' on a temporary basis, noting that the documentary evidence, the municipality's past practice, and the appellant's own inconsistent positions supported this conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent municipality.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of invitation to sexual touching of a child and acquitted of sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because there was no evidence the child did not comply with the invitations, which would have constituted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no necessary logical inconsistency.

The court noted the jury may have misunderstood that the appellant's participation in the physical contact amounted to an assault, but this error would have enured to the appellant's benefit and did not undermine the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to rely on police testimony regarding the seller's location in the vehicle and physical description.

The appeal was dismissed as the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man during a drug transaction.

At trial, the judge charged the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code but not under s. 35.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the unlawful assault requirement of s. 34(2) and erred by failing to leave s. 35 with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions on s. 34(2) when read as a whole, and concluding there was no air of reality to a s. 35 defence because the appellant, as the initial aggressor drawing a loaded handgun, could not claim he commenced the assault without intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking and breaking and entering.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the drug conviction, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the large quantity of heroin and other indicia supported trafficking.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the break and enter conviction, finding the trial judge's one-sentence reasons insufficient and failing to address the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

A new trial was ordered for the break and enter count.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an on-ice collision during a recreational no-contact hockey game.

The trial judge rejected the defence's evidence that the collision was accidental, finding instead that it was a deliberate blindside hit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculative reasoning by relying on her own personal knowledge of hockey strategy and on-ice injuries to reject the defence witnesses' testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent sought to enforce a settlement agreement against the appellants, Glen Grove and Spendthrift, who were not signatories to the agreement but were related to the signatory corporation, 129.

The trial judge found the appellants liable based on a 'privity principle' and common control.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld Glen Grove's liability, finding that 129 acted as its agent in negotiating the settlement and offering security.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Spendthrift, finding insufficient evidence to bind it to the settlement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

The appellant, a 21-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of two counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle accident.

He appealed his convictions and his four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her conclusion that the appellant's driving constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence for a youthful first offender, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant condominium corporation terminated its management agreement with the respondent for cause.

The respondent sued in Small Claims Court for breach of contract, but the trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondent's conduct cumulatively amounted to gross negligence or recklessness.

The Divisional Court set aside the trial judgment, holding the reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the trial judgment, finding the Divisional Court erred by failing to read the reasons in the context of the trial record and the informal nature of the Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order enforcing the respondent's termination of a Fixed Price Services Agreement and its right to purchase shares in a solar power project due to the appellant's payment default.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence and raised new arguments on appeal regarding the respondent's alleged defaults and the mechanics of the share transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding the Palmer criteria were not met.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the appellant breached the agreement and that the respondent was entitled to purchase the shares.

A request to stay the judgment pending a counterclaim was also denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a municipal resolution and for an injunction restraining the municipality from erecting a barrier restricting access to the rear of their property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied because the appellants had previously sought and been denied an injunction to remove the barrier in 2009.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 14-year-old student.

He appealed his convictions, arguing primarily that the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to call a vice-principal as a reply witness to rebut the appellant's testimony regarding a conversation between them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reply evidence did not breach the rule against case-splitting because the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the appellant's testimony.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding inadmissible hearsay and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.