John Laskin

The moving party sought to review and set aside an order refusing to extend the time to have a single judge's decision reviewed by a panel of the Court of Appeal.

The underlying dispute involved the termination of the moving party's membership and occupancy rights in a housing co-operative due to unpaid housing charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with previous judges that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success.

The appellant moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his motion to extend the time for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed his motion to vary an order denying an adjournment of his motion to extend time for filing a Small Claims Court appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's reasons, noting the appellant failed to appeal in a timely manner, provided no explanation for the delay, and raised no point of law or public importance.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants' personal injury action was dismissed for delay by the registrar due to their counsel's inadvertent failure to request a status hearing.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal order, finding that the respondents were significantly prejudiced by the delay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in her assessment of prejudice, as the prejudice arose from the insolvency of co-defendants and the respondents' own failure to preserve evidence, rather than the appellants' delay.

The appeal was allowed and the action reinstated.

The appellant meat processing company sued the respondent energy retailer for rescission of a fixed price electrical contract and damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the respondent had fully explained the contract terms, including the risk that the appellant would pay more if electricity prices dropped, and that the respondent had not misled the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed their sentences for drug trafficking to avoid deportation resulting from the retrospective application of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal on Crown consent, reducing his sentence to six months less a day as it remained fit.

The Court dismissed the second appellant's appeal, finding that the requested reduction would render his sentence unfit given his criminal record and the aggravating factors, and would circumvent parliamentary intent.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference involving a child complainant.

At trial, the complainant's prior consistent statements were introduced to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination on inconsistencies.

The trial judge did not give a limiting instruction warning the jury not to use the prior consistent statements for their truth.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, as there was a real risk the jury would use the statements for an impermissible purpose to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding of adverse possession, arguing the judge failed to consider relevant evidence, make a finding on the ownership of the fence, and find sufficient usage of the disputed strip of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly stated the elements of adverse possession and made findings of fact reasonably supported by the evidence, including that both parties treated the fence line as a boundary.

Costs of $5,600 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for violent offences in 2002, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant her an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered the continuation of her conditional discharge, finding she remained a significant threat to public safety due to her history of medication non-compliance, limited insight into her mental illness, and lack of a concrete follow-up plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not misapply the test for significant threat to public safety and that its conclusion was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his conviction for the sexual exploitation of a student.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to his testimony, and erred in admitting similar act and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were fair, the admission of similar act evidence from another student was reasonable, and the post-offence conduct evidence was properly used to assess credibility and the trajectory of the relationship.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in the care of the children's aid society for over four years and consistently expressed a strong desire not to have contact with the mother, following allegations of physical and sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no triable issue regarding access, as the mother could not establish that an ongoing relationship would be meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's reliance on hearsay evidence from the child's therapists and social workers, which is expressly permitted under the governing child protection legislation.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a lower court judgment on the basis that the judgment was an interlocutory order.

The lower court had ruled that contempt proceedings against the responding party were not stayed by his filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, but adjourned the contempt motion to a later date.

The Court of Appeal held that because the lower court's ruling deprived the responding party of a substantive defence that could have resolved the proceedings, the order was final.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed an order dismissing their motion to quash a Registrar's order for the assessment of 51 accounts rendered to the respondent client.

The appellants argued the accounts were for management services, the retainer was in dispute, and the requisition was untimely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the accounts were for legal services, the retainer was not in dispute, and the overlapping nature of the interim accounts constituted special circumstances justifying the timing of the assessment.

The appellant sold his print services business to the respondents, who subsequently stopped making payments on the promissory note, leaving a balance of $94,600.

The appellant brought an application for judgment, which the application judge dismissed upon finding the appellant made a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the value of the business equipment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the evidence fell short of establishing fraudulent misrepresentation, and ordered the matter to proceed to trial due to the numerous factual disputes.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judge's finding that the respondent employee had adequately mitigated his damages following wrongful termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision was well supported by the evidence.

The respondent, who was in his fifties with limited education and had worked for the appellant for 19 years, faced diminished re-employment prospects, exacerbated by the lack of a reference letter and accusations of wrongdoing.

The Court held that the respondent made reasonable efforts to find comparable employment and was not obliged to accept non-comparable positions.

The appellant appealed an order of Crown wardship and, in the alternative, sought an order for access to the child.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against the Crown wardship order, limiting the appeal to the issue of access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Crown wardship order as abandoned so that the child could be immediately placed for adoption.

The Court reserved its decision on the issue of access.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a physical altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, causing the victim to lose consciousness and hit his head.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions on consent were inadequate and that the proceedings should have been stayed due to appellate delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that while s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the law of consent, potentially leading the jury to believe the victim had to consent to every specific act for the defence to apply.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants and the respondent insured brought motions to disqualify the law firm appointed by the insurer from continuing to represent the insured on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident where the jury found the insured solely responsible, primarily for negligent parental supervision (uncovered), but also for an unsuitable choice of unloading area (potentially covered).

The insurer-appointed counsel filed a cross-appeal challenging the only finding that could trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions, finding a reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest, and ordered the insurer to pay for independent counsel to represent the insured.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and his suspended sentence.

At trial, he admitted punching the complainant but claimed self-defence, alleging she was the aggressor.

The trial judge rejected this defence, relying on neighbours' testimony that the complainant was on the ground in a defensive position while the appellant punched her, concluding the force used was excessive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the conviction appeal.

Leave to appeal the sentence, which was exactly what the appellant had requested at trial, was refused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He also argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to credibility and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment fair and balanced, the fresh evidence incapable of affecting the verdict, and trial counsel's performance competent.