John I. Laskin

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board regarding Bartosz Gajewski, raising two grounds: (1) that a condition allowing indirectly supervised or unaccompanied entry into the community for up to seven days was unreasonable and did not protect public safety, and (2) that the Board's failure to include the victim's father (J.N.) in a 500-metre boundary condition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground, finding the Board's disposition reasonably supported by the evidence and noting that the Crown had not opposed the condition at the hearing.

The Court allowed the second ground in part, ordering that J.N. be included in the 500-metre boundary condition.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable as an occupier of a municipal sidewalk under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The respondent slipped and fell on ice at the entrance to the appellant's patio, which opened onto the sidewalk.

The trial judge found the appellant was an occupier of the sidewalk portion at the patio threshold based on its exclusive use of the patio, maintenance of the entrance area, and direction of customer traffic.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding on a narrower basis, confirming that the appellant was an occupier of only the threshold portion where the fall occurred, not the entire sidewalk area.

The court rejected arguments that the finding undermined the principle that mere snow and ice clearing does not create occupier status, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision granting a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) to send seized evidence to Belgium.

The appellants sought to include terms and conditions in the sending order to restrict disclosure of commercially sensitive information about cyclotron design and manufacture to a state-owned competitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sending judge did not err in refusing to impose such restrictions.

The court found that the Treaty between Canada and Belgium, combined with MLACMA, adequately protects against improper use and disclosure through the Minister's supervisory role and the Treaty's restrictions on use and disclosure.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for defrauding three victims.

Duty counsel raised two main grounds: that the trial judge failed to give effect to evidence of remorse, and that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without affording defence counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge should have provided the defence an opportunity to address the proposed sentence, the imposed sentence was fit and perhaps even lenient given the serious nature of the frauds, the consequences to the victims, the appellant's guilty plea only after victims testified at the preliminary inquiry, and the appellant's prior probation for previous frauds.

The appellant was convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police entered his home without a warrant, ostensibly to check on the welfare of his autistic son who had wandered to a nearby intersection.

The police discovered a marijuana grow operation in the basement.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the police's initial warrantless entry into the home breached section 8 of the Charter and that the trial judge erred in applying R. v. Godoy beyond its limited scope.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under section 24(2), as the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor who was between 13 and 16 years old during the period 1988 to 1991, when the appellant was the complainant's Big Brother.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting Big Brothers organization records as evidence of the truth of their contents when filed in reply after the close of the defence, and (2) the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because he failed to explain why he rejected corroborating evidence from the appellant's sister.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the records and finding the trial judge's reasons adequate when read as a whole in context.

An employee of the Ontario Psychological Association appealed a motion judge's decision striking out paragraphs of her counterclaim that sought contribution and indemnity against six named defendants who were officers and/or directors of the Association.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the six individuals owed no duty of care to the employee.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that the individuals failed to supervise her properly and that they owed a duty to the Association that, if breached, would result in liability for the appellant's conversion of the Association's money.

Leave to amend was denied.

The appellant moved to review an order dismissing his motion for a stay pending appeal of a Superior Court order that had dismissed his motion to pay monies into court or obtain an injunction preventing the sale of property in Tyendinaga Township by HSBC.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the property sale arose from proceedings between the appellant and HSBC that had been fully and finally resolved on consent.

The appellant's claim based on Simcoe Treaty 3.5 and alleged Métis rights was found to be unsupported by adequate evidence.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter involving division of net family property, child support, and spousal support.

The trial judge ordered an equal division of net family property (proceeds from the matrimonial home), denied child support on the basis that the respondent's income was insufficient and the children had repudiated their relationship with their mother, and ordered the appellant to pay spousal support of $500 per month based on imputed income of $40,000.

The appellant appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias, erroneous denial of child support, improper imputation of income, and failure to order unequal division of family property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and the application for fresh evidence.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a family law matter arising from a 40-year marriage.

The trial judge ordered an equalization payment of $140,000 from the wife to the husband, dismissed the wife's claim for an unequal division of net family property, and awarded costs of $109,248 to the husband.

The wife appealed on three grounds: rejection of her expert evidence regarding farm equipment valuation, failure to award an unequal share of net family property based on alleged reckless depletion, and the quantum of costs awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of expert evidence, his analysis of the net family property claim, or his costs award.

An employee was terminated after eight years and four months of employment when her employer sold its assets.

The employment agreement contained a termination clause providing two weeks' notice per year of employment or pay in lieu thereof, stated to be inclusive of all statutory entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The employer paid the employee thirteen weeks' working notice plus a lump sum equivalent to eight weeks' pay, and made benefit contributions during the notice period.

The employee sought damages equivalent to twelve months' notice, arguing the termination clause was unenforceable.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the clause enforceable but determining that if wrong, reasonable notice would be nine months.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the termination clause unenforceable because it excluded the employer's statutory obligation to contribute to the employee's benefit plans during the notice period and did not clearly satisfy the employer's statutory obligation to pay severance pay.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of his daughter-in-law.

At trial, he advanced a non-insane automatism defence, claiming he was in a dissociative state when he shot the victim.

The sole ground of appeal concerned Crown counsel's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown violated the principle in Browne v. Dunn by failing to confront defence witnesses with inferences and arguments later urged to the jury.

The trial judge found one Browne v. Dunn violation and two material misstatements of evidence but rejected seven other defence arguments.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's rulings, finding the corrective instructions adequate and the other Crown submissions not improper.

The appellant appealed his conviction for making a threatening gesture (throat-cutting gesture) and his sentence of eight months imprisonment followed by 18 months' probation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant made a throat-cutting gesture was fully supported by evidence, including the complainant's testimony and the appellant's own statement.

The gesture was made with the requisite intent to threaten.

The sentence was upheld as appropriate given the seriousness of the offence, the vulnerability of the witness, and the need to protect the judicial process.

An applicant convicted of two counts of first degree murder sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying his application for appointed counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued material changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial denial.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated material changes, including: the inmate duty counsel program's refusal to assist; provision of previously missing financial documents to Legal Aid; and evidence addressing concerns about a property foreclosure proceeding.

The court determined both criteria under s. 684(1) were satisfied: it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the complexity and arguability of the appeal, and the applicant lacked sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

Counsel was appointed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the victim's identification evidence—based on his knowledge of the appellant, recognition of his voice, identification of a can of bear mace previously in the appellant's possession, and recognition of the appellant when his mask was pulled off—provided a reasonable basis for conviction.

The court also found the trial judge's reasons adequate, demonstrating a proper understanding of the evidentiary record and the dangers of identification evidence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 20, 2016.

The hospital had recommended a conditional discharge, but the Board imposed a detention order with conditions.

The appellant challenged the Board's decision on multiple grounds, including the refusal to order a conditional discharge and the failure to order a second opinion or independent assessment in light of a potential treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in the Board's reasoning regarding the appellant's non-compliance with essential drug treatment and the requirement for hospital-approved residence.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the trial judge properly emphasized denunciation and the harm caused by drug trafficking in the community.

The court noted that the trial judge appropriately gave considerable weight to the fact that the appellant had trafficked while on bail for a prior trafficking offense.

Although rehabilitation was not entirely disregarded, it played a secondary role in the sentencing decision.

The sentence was found to be fit, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending the Minister's surrender decision in an extradition matter.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Illinois in 2004 for drug trafficking and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

He fled to Jamaica and subsequently immigrated to Canada in 2006, becoming a Canadian citizen in 2009.

Upon attempting to renew his passport to attend his mother's funeral in 2016, he was arrested under the Extradition Act.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant met the three-part test under section 679 of the Criminal Code as applied to extradition proceedings: the application was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender when ordered, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice granting possession of Lot 15 on the Whitefish River First Nation reserve to the respondent and ordering the appellant's eviction.

The appellant claimed she was denied a fair hearing because the application judge unreasonably refused an adjournment and his conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the substantial indemnity costs award of approximately $24,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal regarding fair hearing but granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the award to $15,000 partial indemnity costs.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that quashed convictions for minor traffic offences on the ground that officers had amended certificates of offence after serving offence notices but before filing the certificates with the court.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Provincial Offences Act does not expressly authorize such amendments, nothing in the statute precludes officers from correcting information on certificates before filing.

The validity of proceedings is preserved under section 90 of the Provincial Offences Act where the defendant has not been misled or prejudiced by minor clerical corrections.

The convictions were restored.