John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault of a minor victim, as well as his six-year sentence.

The victim alleged that the appellant sexually and physically assaulted her over a two-year period when she was 14-15 years old and he was 44.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault after finding the victim's evidence credible and rejecting the appellant's denials.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal on conviction: misapplication of the burden of proof, misapprehension of the significance of the victim's diary, and erroneous assessment of the victim's testimony according to standards applicable to young persons.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge relied on inadmissible evidence and failed to apply the principle of parity.

The appellate court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a fee-sharing agreement between two law firms.

The appellants raised three issues: (1) the calculation of net fees under the agreement; (2) the imposition of liability on the corporate appellant based on a constructive trust; and (3) the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings on all three issues, dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant landlord appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the parties had agreed to reinstate a commercial lease and that the landlord fundamentally breached that agreement by insisting on additional terms before allowing the tenant to re-enter the premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact, which were supported by the evidence.

The court found that the tenant had matched the landlord's terms for reinstatement and that the landlord's subsequent demand for additional payments constituted a fundamental breach of the reinstatement agreement.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault on August 27, 2010, and sexual assault on October 31, 2010.

He was acquitted on one count.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months for the August 27 assault causing bodily harm (concurrent with three months for sexual assault) and six months consecutive for the October 31 sexual assault, for a global sentence of 15 months.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the August 27 conviction but found the trial judge's reasons inadequate regarding the October 31 sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial on that count.

On sentence, the Court adjusted the sentences to account for immigration consequences not considered by the trial judge, reducing the assault causing bodily harm sentence to six months less ten days and converting the sexual assault sentence to consecutive rather than concurrent, maintaining the overall nine-month sentence for the August 27 incident.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault (acquitted on attempted murder) and his designation as a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the verdicts were irreconcilable, and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the use of bad character evidence relating to a prior assault.

The appellant also appealed the dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding the index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts were logically reconcilable, the jury received adequate instructions on character evidence, and the trial judge made sufficient factual findings to support the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant was convicted of bank robbery and related offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the robber, with evidence being circumstantial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on DNA evidence linking him to a pocket knife left at the crime scene and a t-shirt found in the getaway vehicle.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the verdict.

The majority upheld the conviction, finding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to guilt.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding that the DNA evidence lacked a temporal connection to the robbery and that alternative explanations remained reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference and were properly reasoned.

The trial judge had provided ample justification for accepting the complainant's evidence and properly assessed conflicting testimony.

The court found no differential standard of scrutiny was applied to defence evidence and that the trial judge properly cautioned himself against treating the case as merely a credibility test.

The appellant brought four related actions against various respondents arising from dealings that occurred primarily in the United States between 2001 and 2016.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of a real and substantial connection to the province.

The motion judges granted the motions and dismissed all actions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether Ontario jurisdiction existed based on: (1) consulting contracts allegedly entered into at Toronto airport; (2) products being advertised, marketed, and distributed in Ontario; and (3) respondents carrying on business in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissals, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario and affirming that mere advertising or distribution through third-party retailers does not constitute carrying on business in the jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside a master's order reinstating his action to the trial list.

The action had been dismissed for delay multiple times and reinstated on consent.

The parties agreed to a fourth timetable with a consent order under Rule 48.14(4) requiring the appellant to meet an August 18, 2016 deadline for restoration.

The appellant met the deadline and the master reinstated the action.

The appeal judge allowed the respondents' appeal, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the master correctly focused on delay subsequent to the consent order rather than the entire history of delay.

The court affirmed that the respondents' consent to the order was binding and that there was no relevant delay requiring explanation.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellant was awarded costs of the motions before the motion judge in the amount of $85,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant, a minor injured when a barista poured scalding hot water on her hands at a Starbucks location, appealed the motion judge's decision striking the Statement of Claim against the individual defendants (the barista and store manager).

The motion judge had struck the claim on two grounds: that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and that suing the individuals constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that employees can be personally liable for their own negligence while acting within the scope of employment, and that naming individual defendants for discovery purposes does not constitute an abuse of process when a proper cause of action has been pleaded against them.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a 1985 indemnity provided by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes and Reed covered the costs of complying with a 2011 Director's Order requiring remedial work at an abandoned mercury waste disposal site near Dryden, Ontario.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favour of Weyerhaeuser and Resolute, finding both were entitled to indemnification.

The appellate court was divided.

The majority (Brown and Lauwers JJ.A.) held that the 1985 indemnity did cover the costs of complying with the Director's Order, but found that Resolute had no legal interest in the indemnity because Bowater had assigned the full benefit to Weyerhaeuser in 1998.

The majority remitted the issue of Weyerhaeuser's rights as assignee to the trial court.

Justice Laskin dissented, arguing the 1985 indemnity covered only third-party pollution claims, not first-party regulatory compliance costs.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment in a matrimonial property dispute.

The trial judge found that a declaration of trust and a $300,000 second mortgage were sham documents designed to defeat the respondent wife's interest in the matrimonial condominium.

The trial judge awarded the respondent an equalization payment of $100,500 and rejected an unequal division of property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, finding no basis to interfere with the credibility assessments or the detailed reasons for finding the documents to be shams.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of five carjackings, with direct evidence linking him to one incident and similar fact evidence linking him to four others.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two grounds relating to the trial judge's jury charge on similar fact evidence, arguing the judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess such evidence and group membership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the charge faithfully followed the two-step process established in R. v. Perrier and was sufficient to ensure the jury did not improperly use group activity to identify the appellant without specific linkage to the individual acts.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action against her insurer for damages under unidentified motorist coverage.

The appellant claimed that an unidentified vehicle crossed the center line and caused her to lose control of her vehicle and roll into a ditch.

The jury answered "no" to the question of whether the unidentified driver's negligence caused the accident, but answered "yes" to whether the appellant's evidence of the involvement of an unidentified automobile was corroborated.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were inconsistent, that the trial judge erred in her charge on the standard of care in emergencies, the burden of proof, and that the charge was unbalanced.

The appellant also challenged the conduct of defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's answers were reconcilable, the trial judge's charge was adequate, and any concerns about counsel's conduct were appropriately addressed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal on three firearms charges.

The trial judge had granted the respondent's application for a directed verdict, concluding that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to consider whether the respondent possessed an operational firearm.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made three errors of law: applying the wrong test for directed verdicts, improperly weighing competing inferences in favour of the respondent, and assessing the respondent's credibility when she was not entitled to do so.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 6, 2017.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge and argued against residing in a group home, preferring to live with either his friend or stepfather.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the Board's refusal to grant a conditional discharge and its requirement that the appellant continue residing in the group home.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice on July 4, 2016.

The principal issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that a reasonable person in the officer's position would have believed reasonable and probable grounds existed to arrest the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's analysis, finding that she stated the correct test, correctly examined the totality of the circumstances, and that those circumstances supported the objective reasonableness of the search.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the offences.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence from two adult nieces of the appellant who testified to similar inappropriate touching when they were children.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous admission of similar fact evidence due to collusion; (2) failure to properly address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and over-reliance on demeanour; (3) impermissible inference of guilt from rejection of the appellant's testimony; and (4) unsafe and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.