John Kaldas

The accused, an inmate at the Toronto South Detention Centre, was charged with aggravated assault after attacking another inmate in a protective custody unit.

The incident was captured on security cameras.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence, alleging the complainant had threatened him and made a 'gun' gesture.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's testimony lacked credibility and was contradicted by the video footage, which showed the accused as the unprovoked aggressor.

The court concluded the accused's actions were not reasonable in the circumstances and found him guilty of aggravated assault.

The offender pled guilty to breaching his Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by leaving his halfway house for ten days, and to breaching his recognizance of bail.

This was his third conviction for breaching the LTSO.

The Crown sought a sentence of 36 to 42 months, while the defence sought time served.

The court weighed the offender's history of non-compliance against his completion of the LTSO and lack of new substantive offences.

The court imposed a high-end reformatory sentence of 20 months (satisfied by time served plus one day) and 12 months of probation.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder for killing his mother.

The jury rejected his claim that he was not criminally responsible (NCR) but recommended no increase in parole ineligibility.

The court found that the offender's mental illness played a central causal role in the murder, substantially diminishing his moral blameworthiness and reducing the importance of deterrence and denunciation.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The accused applied for a mistrial during his second-degree murder trial following a violent outburst in the courtroom while the Crown was delivering its closing address to the jury.

The accused yelled profanities, damaged the prisoner's box, and had to be removed by security.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the outburst was likely a manifestation of mental illness rather than a calculated attempt to derail the trial, but that it did not cause irreparable prejudice.

The court relied on the strong presumption of jury integrity and concluded that the incident did not meet the high standard required for a mistrial.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various photographs in a second-degree murder trial where the accused admitted to killing his mother, and the sole issue was intent.

The court admitted scene and autopsy photographs, finding their probative value in illustrating the crime scene, supporting expert testimony, and detailing injuries outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, a "before" photograph of the deceased and a "harrowing" "after" photograph of her severely injured face were deemed inadmissible due to their inflammatory nature and low probative value compared to the pathologist's verbal testimony, which was considered the primary source of information regarding the extent of force used.

During a criminal trial, the judge issued a ruling regarding the Crown's closing arguments.

The Crown had invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the accused's post-arrest silence concerning the accidental nature of his mother's death.

The court found this argument to be a clear violation of the accused's right to silence, as established by a long line of judicial authority.

The judge determined that using omissions in a police statement to infer guilt directly was a serious error that jeopardized trial fairness.

Consequently, the judge crafted a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the improper Crown argument.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by a witness regarding the deceased's ambiguous response ("Oh Nadira") to a question about the accused hitting her, arguing it constituted an adoptive admission by silence.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The judge reasoned that the extra inferential step required for an adoptive admission, combined with the vagueness of the statement, significantly attenuated its probative value and posed a serious risk of wide-ranging speculation by the jury.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct to prove the mental element for murder, as the defence conceded the act of killing but disputed intent.

Applying the R. v. Handy framework, the court ruled that evidence from a long-time friend of the deceased (Ms. Dindyal) detailing the troubled mother-son relationship, disrespect, and property damage was admissible.

This evidence provided necessary context for the accused's mental state and the "reservoir of anger" leading to the killing.

However, 911 calls and testimony from other witnesses (Mr. Peters, Ms. Vella, Ms. Allen) were deemed inadmissible due to being too remote in time (accused was an adolescent), lacking sufficient probative value, or being cumulative and overly prejudicial.

The court emphasized balancing the need for historical context against the risk of prejudice, particularly from cumulative evidence.

The applicant brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence, arguing violations of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The police obtained a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant, which the applicant challenged through a 'step six' Garofoli application.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds, as the informant's tip was minimally compelling and uncorroborated, and failed to establish currency for the presence of drugs.

Additionally, the police violated the applicant's s. 10(b) rights by delaying his access to counsel and failing to hold off questioning.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the Charter breaches were serious and had a significant impact on the applicant's privacy and right to counsel.

Consequently, the firearms and drugs seized, along with the applicant's statements, were excluded from evidence.

The applicants, charged with arson and production of controlled substances, sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel at their upcoming preliminary hearing after being refused Legal Aid.

The court found that while the applicants met the first criterion of being refused Legal Aid, there was uncertainty regarding their financial means due to support from family and friends.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application on the third criterion, concluding that representation at a preliminary hearing is not essential to a fair trial, and that a Rowbotham order at this stage is only available in exceptional circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the admissibility of his confession obtained through a police undercover operation styled as an insurance fraud scheme.

The operation involved undercover officers posing as a private investigator and a terminally ill man seeking to confess to the murder in exchange for insurance proceeds.

The appellant argued the confession was obtained through a "Mr. Big" operation that did not meet the admissibility criteria established in R. v. Hart and that the trial judge's jury charge was inadequate under R. v. Mack.

The Court of Appeal held that although the operation was a modified version of a classic Mr. Big scheme, the Hart test applied.

The confession met the threshold reliability requirements, the probative value outweighed prejudicial effect, and there was no abuse of process.

The jury charge adequately addressed the Hart and Mack criteria.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Freskela Malual, was charged with common assault, mischief, aggravated assault, and breach of probation arising from an altercation with her live-in partner, Gerald Annis.

The court found Annis's testimony unreliable due to intoxication and inconsistencies.

The Crown conceded an acquittal on the mischief charge due to shared property ownership.

The court acquitted Malual on the common assault charge due to insufficient evidence regarding the incident outside the bar.

For aggravated assault and breach of probation (possession of a knife), the court found reasonable doubt regarding intent and self-defence, concluding that the injuries could have been accidental or in self-defence against Annis's aggression.

Malual was acquitted on all counts.

A preliminary inquiry into eight charges arising from the shooting of a victim in a Toronto parking lot on July 16, 2014.

Three co-accused were charged with attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, firearm offences, and assault with a weapon.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the victim's testimony and circumstantial evidence including phone records and security camera footage.

Defence counsel conceded the sufficiency of evidence identifying each accused's role at the scene.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence to commit all three accused to trial on all charges.

The accused struck and killed a highly intoxicated pedestrian who was wandering on Highway 401 after being abandoned by a taxi driver.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and 'over 80' causing death.

While the Crown proved the accused was impaired and had a blood-alcohol level over the legal limit, the court found the accused was not the legal cause of the death.

The pedestrian's unpredictable presence on the live lanes of the highway created an unavoidable hazard.

The accused was acquitted of the 'causing death' offences but convicted of the included offences of impaired driving and operating a vehicle while 'over 80'.

The appellant, an 18-year-old first offender, appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter arising from a home invasion robbery where his partner shot the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: failing to properly consider the appellant's rehabilitative potential, and failing to address his level of culpability regarding foresight of the risk that the gun would be used.

The Court found the appellant had objective, but not actual, foresight of the risk, representing a lower level of culpability.

The sentence was reduced to 7 years, resulting in an effective sentence of 3 years and 8 months after pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his sentence of life imprisonment.

The appellant attacked his former partner with a baseball bat.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, by leaving aiding and abetting as an alternative basis for liability, and by discharging a juror without a formal inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the juror discharge proper.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the brutal domestic attack and the appellant's lengthy criminal record justified a life sentence based on denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator to an undercover police officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the co-conspirator's statements fell within the 'rare case' exception where a traditional hearsay exception must yield to the principled approach.

Because the co-conspirator was available to testify and the statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the necessity and reliability requirements were not met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.