Joel Hechter

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an omnibus motion under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude three categories of evidence obtained through various s. 8 Charter breaches: a PDF of a lock found on a cellphone, banking records, and internet search queries found on a laptop.

The court applied the Grant framework to each category.

The court admitted the PDF evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and the breach was at the lower end of the seriousness scale.

The court excluded the banking records, finding the production order was overbroad and based on a misleading Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also excluded the internet search queries, finding a pattern of police misconduct, including misleading testimony, alteration of investigative records, and failure to disclose unauthorized access to the applicants' email accounts, which severely impacted the applicants' Charter-protected interests and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if admitted.

This ruling addresses whether the applicants, Melissa Merritt and Christopher Fattore, had a reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in data stored on a 'loaner phone' provided by police after their original phone was seized.

The court applied the totality of circumstances test, considering the subject matter (data), the applicants' interest in it, their subjective expectation, and its objective reasonableness.

The court found that the applicants did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal data on the loaner phone, primarily because police had previously informed Ms. Merritt that a warrant would be required to access data on their seized family phone, fostering a reasonable belief that the same protection would apply to the replacement device.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of his 15-hour post-arrest video-recorded statement to police.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel, his s. 7 right to silence, and argued the confession was involuntary due to police oppression and inducements regarding his common-law spouse and children.

The court found no s. 10(b) breach, as the accused accepted duty counsel advice without requesting a specific lawyer.

Applying the Oickle framework, the court held the confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

The police did not offer a quid pro quo or overbear the accused's will; rather, the accused made a calculated choice to confess in hopes of assisting his spouse, a motive that was largely self-generated.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a preliminary screening motion to determine whether they could adduce evidence of additional alleged Charter violations on their upcoming s. 24(2) application.

They sought to introduce evidence of violations of third parties' rights, other violations of their own rights, and unconstitutional police practices in unrelated investigations to establish a 'pattern of abuse' under Grant.

The court held the applicants lacked standing to assert third-party rights and rejected evidence of unrelated police practices.

For the applicants' own rights, the court permitted evidence of additional violations only where they met the Goldhart nexus test or had sufficient probative value to demonstrate a pattern of abuse without consuming disproportionate judicial resources.

The applicants, charged with multiple murders, brought an application to exclude electronic intercepts and tracking warrant evidence, alleging violations of section 8 of the Charter.

The application challenged the necessity of judicial authorization for police email exchanges in an undercover operation, the police's actions in repacking belongings containing listening devices, and the validity of a tracking warrant based on alleged material errors and omissions in the information to obtain.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the email communications, that police actions regarding the trailer were within the scope of implied invitation, and that the tracking warrant was valid.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Charter application alleging s. 8 violations regarding the search of a trailer on their property and the subsequent warrantless seizure and technological examination of laptops and USB drives found inside.

The court held that the initial search of the trailer was lawfully executed because police took control of the premises within the time specified in the warrant.

The warrantless seizure of the electronic devices was justified under s. 489 of the Criminal Code as the officers had reasonable grounds to believe they would afford evidence.

However, the court found s. 8 violations occurred when an officer conducted a warrantless preview of a USB drive, when the subsequent search warrant failed to authorize a technological examination, and when detention orders were improperly extended.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by police from Walmart and CIBC.

The police obtained CCTV footage and a transaction receipt from Walmart without a warrant, and basic account information from CIBC prior to obtaining a production order.

The court found the applicants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CCTV footage, the transaction receipt, or the limited banking information provided to police.

However, the court found the subsequent production order issued to CIBC was overbroad and invalid.

The court declined to sever the valid portions of the production order, concluding that the records produced by CIBC were obtained in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless seizure of their garbage, which included items containing DNA evidence.

The applicants argued they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage and, alternatively, in the DNA information embedded on the items.

Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court found that the applicants had abandoned the garbage by placing it out for municipal collection.

The court further held that the abandonment of the garbage effectively constituted the abandonment of any privacy interest in the DNA information it contained.

The application to exclude the evidence under section 8 of the Charter was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone seized from one of the accused without a warrant during a police interview.

The accused alleged violations of ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was not detained during the interview, so s. 10(b) was not violated.

The warrantless seizure of the cell phone was lawful under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code due to exigent circumstances.

The court also held that the accused lacked standing to challenge searches of the deceased's cell phone and email, and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in basic subscriber information.

However, the court found that the search warrant subsequently obtained to examine the contents of the seized cell phone was facially invalid because it did not authorize a technological search, resulting in a s. 8 violation.

The court concluded that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was sufficient to have supported a proper warrant.

The determination of whether to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was deferred.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements made by two deceased victims in a first-degree murder trial.

The statements were evaluated under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court ruled that three statements made by one victim were inadmissible because necessity was not established, as better quality evidence was available, and their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

However, a statement made by the second victim was ruled admissible, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability without undue prejudicial effect.

In a voir dire during a first-degree murder trial, the court considered the admissibility of several pre-arrest statements made by the two accused to police.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary because the accused were suspects and should have been given a primary caution, and that police used trickery by telling them they were not suspects.

The court found that the accused were not suspects at the time of the interviews based on the objective standard of reasonable suspicion.

The court held that even if they were suspects, the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, as there were no threats, promises, or oppressive circumstances, and the accused had operating minds.

The court also rejected arguments that section 7 of the Charter was violated, noting it does not apply prior to detention.

All pre-arrest statements were ruled admissible.

The applicants, facing multiple murder charges, brought a last-minute application to seal emails seized under a general warrant and prohibit Crown and police access, alleging facial invalidity and abuse of process.

This application followed an earlier agreement to return non-privileged emails to the Crown.

The court, acting as the trial judge on the eve of trial, deferred the full review of the warrant's validity to pretrial motions, emphasizing trial management and procedural fairness.

The court also found the warrant not facially invalid on a preliminary review and noted the defence's failure to adhere to the prior agreement regarding email return.

The applicant sought to challenge the constitutionality of s. 674 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated her Charter rights by barring an appeal of a dismissed directed verdict application after her first trial ended in a mistrial.

However, prior to the hearing of the constitutional application, the Crown withdrew all charges against the applicant.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a freestanding Charter challenge once the underlying criminal charges had been withdrawn.

The appellant appealed a conviction for breaching a recognizance under s. 810 of the Criminal Code by allowing his dogs to be outside unattended.

The trial judge focused on whether the appellant had made arrangements for others to care for the dogs and applied the “air of reality” analysis relating to exceptions to court orders.

On appeal, the court held that this approach misapprehended the defence evidence, which was a denial of the actus reus rather than reliance on an exception.

The trial judge improperly rejected a defence that had never been advanced and failed to address the core issue of whether the appellant had allowed the dogs to be outside.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault with a weapon after a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred in admitting an out‑of‑court statement of a witness for the truth of its contents and that the verdict was unreasonable absent reliance on that statement.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge properly applied the legal principles governing hearsay admissibility and threshold reliability.

Although the trial judge misstated certain words from the witness’s recorded statement, the appellate court found the misstatement related only to detail and not substance.

The evidence, taken as a whole, supported the inference that the witness observed the assault.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the nearly two‑year period between the laying of charges and sentencing violated the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the analytical framework from R. v. Morin, the court examined the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Most of the delay was attributable to neutral intake time, systemic delay, or the inherent time requirements of litigating an automatism defence with expert evidence.

Only a brief period of delay was attributable to the Crown and it remained within constitutionally acceptable limits.

The court concluded the accused suffered only modest prejudice and that the societal interest in adjudicating the sexual assault charge outweighed the delay concerns.

On a bail review, the Crown sought to vacate an interim release order for an accused charged with armed robbery, disguise, firearm offences, and breach of recognizance.

The court held that the justice of the peace provided no reasoned analysis on the secondary and tertiary grounds, conflated the detention grounds, and failed to address critical evidence concerning prior breaches and surety suitability.

On a de novo review, the court found the proposed supervision plan inadequate, the medical evidence largely irrelevant to detention, and a substantial likelihood of further offending if released.

Detention was ordered on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused applied for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case in a jury trial involving multiple firearm offences arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun and other weapons in an apartment.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial and relied on evidence connecting both accused to the premises and the location of the firearm within a shared laundry hamper.

The court reviewed the directed verdict test and principles governing circumstantial evidence, constructive possession, and joint possession.

It held that the circumstantial evidence could support reasonable inferences of knowledge and control sufficient for a properly instructed jury to convict on the firearm-related counts.

However, there was no evidence supporting the mental element required for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace regarding a stun gun.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry on sexual assault charges involving a complainant under 16.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry judge breached natural justice by refusing to require the complainant to enter the courtroom for cross‑examination after testifying via closed‑circuit television under s. 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing court held that certiorari is limited to jurisdictional error and that restrictions on cross‑examination must constitute a substantial interference with the accused’s rights to amount to such an error.

The court found the accused had already conducted extensive cross‑examination, including on identification, and the refusal to require an in‑court identification did not substantially impair the defence.

The decision was a proper exercise of discretion and did not amount to a breach of natural justice.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and unlawful entry into a dwelling.

After being found guilty at trial, the defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial lasted approximately 20 months from charge to judgment.

The court conducted a detailed attribution analysis of the delay periods and concluded that only 7.5 months of delay was attributable to the Crown or systemic factors, which fell below the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

The court found that the defendant suffered only modest prejudice and that society's interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the delay concerns.

The application was dismissed.