Jill R. Presser

The appellant appealed her conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While backing out of a parking spot at a Costco store, the appellant's vehicle accelerated in reverse and crashed into the store's front entrance, killing two individuals and injuring two others.

The appellant claimed her foot became stuck under the brake pedal, preventing her from stopping the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as implausible and found the appellant created a dangerous situation by reversing at high speed and taking no corrective action for at least five seconds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for dangerous driving and that the verdict was reasonable.

In a criminal appeal, the court addressed whether the jury charge properly instructed jurors on how to assess a complainant's testimony about events allegedly occurring years earlier in childhood.

The intermediate appellate court had set aside convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and ordered a new trial.

The court held that, read as a whole, the trial judge's instructions conveyed the correct legal approach to credibility and memory assessment.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The Crown appealed a declaration that the restriction on enhanced pre-sentence custody credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The Court held that denying enhanced credit to offenders denied bail primarily because of prior convictions is overbroad under s. 7 because the provision captures persons unrelated to the public safety objective and affords limited meaningful review of endorsements.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1, as the measure was not minimally impairing and its deleterious liberty effects outweighed its benefits.

The Court also rejected the proposition that proportionality in sentencing process is an independent principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

The applicant, convicted of first‑degree murder and serving life imprisonment with 25 years’ parole ineligibility, sought a reduction of the ineligibility period under the “faint hope” provisions of s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The court conducted the initial judicial screening required under s. 745.61 to determine whether the application demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success before a jury.

The materials showed exceptional institutional conduct, rehabilitation efforts, and declining health, though the Crown challenged the applicant’s credibility and role in planning the murder.

Weighing the statutory factors including character, conduct during incarceration, the nature of the offence, and the victim impact evidence, the court found the threshold test met.

The application was permitted to proceed to a jury hearing.

The appellant appealed a conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit and a sentence of six months’ imprisonment with a four-year driving prohibition.

The appellant argued the roadside screening demand was not made “forthwith” under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code and alleged Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10.

The court held the demand was made promptly in the circumstances, noting the officer acted reasonably in securing the scene of a collision and arranging for an approved screening device.

However, the sentencing judge improperly treated the appellant as the cause of the collision using a balance of probabilities standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt for an aggravating factor.

The conviction appeal was dismissed but the sentence appeal was allowed and the custodial term and driving prohibition were reduced.