Jeffrey Radnoff

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his professional negligence claim against a tax lawyer.

The appellant had retained the tax lawyer to advise on tax implications of a matrimonial settlement involving the purchase of his ex-spouse's shares in a family corporation.

The tax lawyer provided advice on two approaches: a direct purchase (which would trigger significant personal tax liability) and a redemption approach (which would avoid the tax hit).

The appellant ultimately settled using the direct purchase approach with a negotiated "tax discount" rather than the recommended redemption approach.

The appellant subsequently incurred approximately $1.3 million in tax liability and sued for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the tax advice was correct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate in these circumstances and that serious issues remained regarding the lawyer's professional obligations to ensure advice was communicated to and understood by the client.

The respondents successfully appealed the lower court decision.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, fixing costs at $40,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The court found that the suit had the markings of a true SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) and did not apply the presumption in section 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act on appeal, but considered the nature of the suit in fixing costs.

The applicant brought a motion opposing the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's certificate of assessment of her former solicitors' accounts.

The applicant had retained the solicitors for a potential oppression claim related to a family law proceeding.

The Assessment Officer reduced the accounts slightly but largely upheld them, finding the matter was of above-average complexity and the fees were reasonable.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding no palpable and overriding errors or errors in principle in the Assessment Officer's application of the relevant factors or factual findings.

The certificate of assessment was confirmed.

The appellant, a major language services company, appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against the respondents under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondents had posted comments on an online bulletin board criticizing the appellant's business practices in the context of a federal election candidate's suitability for office.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the posts related to a matter of public interest and that the public interest in protecting freedom of expression outweighed the public interest in permitting the claim to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and refused leave to appeal the costs award of $30,000 on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to extend the voting period in the respondent political party's leadership contest, alleging that he and others had not received the necessary verification numbers to vote electronically.

The court dismissed the application on two grounds.

First, the applicant failed to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the party's election rules before seeking court intervention.

Second, applying the tripartite test for an interlocutory injunction, the court found that the balance of convenience heavily favoured the respondents, as extending the voting period at the eleventh hour would prejudice the tens of thousands of members who had already voted and disrupt the scheduled leadership convention.

The defendant law firm, Perras Mongenais, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence claim against it.

The plaintiff alleged the firm provided negligent tax advice during his family law settlement negotiations.

The court found that the firm's advice was correct, clearly communicated, and strictly limited to the specific questions asked by the plaintiff's family lawyer.

The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the availability of partial summary judgment post-Hryniak, concluding that resolving the claim against this key party was proportionate and posed little risk of inconsistent findings.

The motion was granted and the action against Perras Mongenais was dismissed.

The applicant brought an application under the Solicitors Act for an order directing the assessment of the accounts of her former law firm.

The applicant had paid the final bill and brought the application more than one month after its delivery, requiring her to establish special circumstances.

The court found that special circumstances existed, noting the applicant's lack of sophistication in litigation, the large amount of the accounts, her expressions of concern regarding the bills, and her reasonable belief that she had to pay the accounts for her file to be transferred.

The application was granted and the accounts were ordered to be assessed.

Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought summary judgment for possession of a property and dismissal of a counterclaim against Waheed Michael.

Michael alleged fraud regarding a Power of Attorney (POA) used by his ex-spouse, Nabila Nashid, to transfer the property and secure an RBC mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment to RBC, finding the POA validly exercised as against third parties without notice of limitations, and that Michael was bound by Nashid's acts as agent.

The court also ordered the net proceeds from the sale of another property to be paid towards RBC's judgment against Nashid, with any balance to Michael.

The respondent law firm brought a motion seeking a declaration that three releases, signed by the applicants as part of various commercial agreements, precluded the assessment of legal accounts rendered by the respondent to Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada.

The applicants opposed, arguing the releases constituted contracting out of the protections of the Solicitors Act and that the respondent was estopped by res judicata or issue estoppel from challenging a Registrar's Order for assessment.

The court found that the releases were valid commercial agreements between sophisticated parties, represented by counsel, and did not fall within the public policy concerns of the Solicitors Act as articulated in Jean Estate.

The court also determined that res judicata and issue estoppel did not apply because the validity of the Registrar's Order was not previously litigated.

The respondent's motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a blog post made during a federal election.

The blog post criticized a political candidate's association with the plaintiff corporation.

The court found the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to establish that its claim had substantial merit, that the defendants had no valid defence, or that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed with full indemnity costs awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her statement of claim to include particulars of an oppression remedy related to her shareholding, following a partial settlement of prior employment-related claims.

The defendants opposed the inclusion of paragraphs that referred to the previously settled employment issues, arguing they were contractually barred.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of claim for the oppression remedy but ordered the excision of paragraphs relating to the settled employment claims, finding them to be surplusage and contractually barred.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff.

Following the release of reasons for decision on summary judgment motions, the plaintiff requested costs of $10,889 on a partial indemnity scale for a prior motion to set aside a default judgment, seeking to set off this amount against the judgment owed to the defendant.

The defendant opposed the request.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's request, noting that the global costs award of $16,000 previously granted to the defendant had already taken into account the plaintiff's success on the motion to set aside the default judgment.

The plaintiff clinic sued a chiropractor and her husband for removing patient files and loss of income.

The chiropractor counterclaimed for unpaid fees and loss of income resulting from the disruption of her practice.

At the summary judgment hearing, the clinic abandoned its main claim.

The court found that the clinic breached its business arrangement with the chiropractor, causing her a loss of income.

The court awarded the chiropractor damages for loss of income and unpaid fees, plus costs, against the clinic, but dismissed the counterclaim against the clinic's principal personally.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a mortgage registered against his property, alleging that the defendant mortgagee never advanced the funds.

The plaintiff also claimed against the lawyer who provided him with independent legal advice, alleging negligence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding the mortgage discharge, finding that the conflicting evidence regarding the advance of funds required a trial.

The court granted the lawyer's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claim against him on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and alternatively, that the lawyer did not breach his duty of care.

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision addressing two Requests for Orders During Proceedings (RFOP) filed shortly before the hearing.

The respondents were ordered to produce requested medical documents.

The Tribunal permitted the applicant to rely on a late-filed witness statement, finding that any prejudice could be cured by adjusting the order of testimony.

The applicant was ordered to provide particulars regarding the witness's testimony, and the Tribunal limited the scope of the witness's permitted evidence to relevant factual matters regarding accommodation practices.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's lawyer of record, arguing the lawyer was in a conflict of interest and a potential witness.

The plaintiff opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a timetable.

The court found no evidence of a conflict of interest and concluded the motion was premature regarding the lawyer's potential status as a witness.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed without prejudice, and the cross-motion for a timetable was granted on consent.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for a defaulted vehicle lease.

The vehicle had been seized by police after the appellant's arrest, and the respondent subsequently sold it at auction.

The appellant argued that the respondent was estopped from enforcing the default based on alleged representations made to her landlord that the lease would be reinstated once criminal charges were resolved.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that no such agreement existed and that the elements of promissory estoppel were not met.

This was a costs decision following dismissal of an interlocutory injunction motion brought against former employees and their new competing company.

The successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs and relief from the usual offsetting treatment of cross-examination costs under rule 39.02(4)(b).

The court held there was no egregious litigation conduct justifying substantial indemnity costs, but exercised its discretion to award the defendants all of their reasonable partial indemnity costs, including cross-examination costs without offset.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 all inclusive, payable forthwith.