Jeffrey Radnoff

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The court applied the factors governing such relief, including the explanation for delay, whether the missed deadline was inadvertent, the timeliness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although there were periods of unexplained delay after mediation, the court found the missed set‑down deadline resulted from inadvertence and the motion to set aside was brought promptly after discovery of the dismissal.

The remaining issue concerned valuation of the plaintiff’s shares in the corporate defendant, which would largely depend on financial records and expert evidence.

Finding no evidence of actual prejudice and that the plaintiff satisfied the applicable factors, the court set aside the dismissal order as against the corporate defendant only.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction restraining two former employees and their new company from providing services to two major customers for one year.

The plaintiff alleged that a former project manager was a fiduciary employee who breached fiduciary duties by competing with the company and that another employee knowingly assisted the breach.

Applying the three‑part test from RJR‑MacDonald, the court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the employee was a fiduciary or that any solicitation of customers occurred.

The court also found insufficient evidence of irreparable harm and determined that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants, particularly given the impact on the defendants’ ability to earn a livelihood.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was therefore dismissed.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment to dismiss a professional negligence action.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant was negligent in failing to appeal the disallowance of its secured claim in a bankruptcy.

The court assumed negligence but found the plaintiff could not prove causation or damages, as it failed to adduce evidence that the bankrupt had any rights in the funds over which the plaintiff claimed a security interest.

Without the bankrupt having rights in the collateral, the security interest could not attach under the Personal Property Security Act.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

The client sought an order referring two solicitor accounts for assessment under the Solicitors Act and requested a sealing order over the proceeding due to solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that the earlier account had been settled and paid as a final account and therefore could only be assessed upon proof of special circumstances.

No evidence of fraud, misconduct, or special circumstances was established, and the account was not an interim account connected to a continuing retainer.

The later account was referred for assessment on consent.

The court granted a sealing order because the materials contained privileged communications and detailed legal billing records whose disclosure could reveal solicitor‑client communications.

The moving party sought to set aside a prior order dismissing a consolidation motion and to set aside a notice of discontinuance in a related professional negligence action.

The motion alleged that a tolling agreement allowing the plaintiff in the other action to recommence proceedings against solicitors rendered the discontinuance a sham and an abuse of process.

The court held that although the existence of the tolling agreement ought to have been disclosed at the earlier motion, the failure to do so did not amount to fraud on the court or justify setting aside the dismissal order under Rule 59.06(2).

The court further held that the moving party lacked standing to set aside the notice of discontinuance in litigation to which she was not a party and had shown no substantive prejudice from the deferral of that action.

The motion was dismissed and the responding parties were awarded costs.

The plaintiffs sold their pharmacy business and retained the defendant law firm to act on the transaction.

Following the closing, the plaintiffs sued the law firm for professional negligence, alleging failures to advise regarding the termination of a consulting agreement, the non-assignment of a software lease, and the withholding of over $1 million in trust funds without earning interest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the defendant solicitors fell below the reasonable standard of care in all three areas by failing to provide adequate advice and communicate effectively with their client.

Judgment was awarded to the plaintiffs for $41,770.10.

The appellant appealed a summary trial decision dismissing her claim for $32,000 under an equity-splitting agreement related to the sale of the respondent's house.

The trial judge had found the agreement unenforceable because the appellant was not a licensed real estate agent under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, and because the agreement was unconscionable due to the respondent's vulnerability and unequal bargaining power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the bargain was unfair and unconscionable.

The appellant sought an interim injunction in the Superior Court of Justice to prevent the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) from collecting unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties pending a breach of contract claim.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction under s. 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 18(1) applies to all injunctions, including interim ones, and that the CRA is a federal board, commission, or other tribunal when exercising tax collection powers.

The applicant property management company collected rent on behalf of landlords and deposited the funds into trust accounts.

After the applicant accrued tax arrears, the respondent issued requirements to pay and garnished funds from the applicant’s bank accounts.

The applicant sought declarations in the Superior Court that the seized funds belonged to the landlords, that the respondent could not seize them, and an order requiring the return of the funds.

The court held that the substance of the relief sought amounted to injunctive relief against a federal board exercising statutory tax‑collection powers.

Under s. 18 of the Federal Court Act, such remedies fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court.

The Superior Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested orders.

Following a successful motion for an interlocutory injunction requiring the return of patient files and related property, the plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge as costs in the cause.

The court reviewed principles governing costs for interlocutory injunction motions, noting that because such motions do not determine the ultimate merits of the action, it is generally preferable to reserve costs to the trial judge unless exceptional circumstances justify immediate payment.

Finding no sufficient reason to depart from this approach, the court ordered that costs be costs in the cause.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a paragraph of the plaintiff’s statement of claim seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining the Canada Revenue Agency from collecting outstanding tax liabilities.

The underlying action alleged torts including misrepresentation, breach of contract, misfeasance in public office, and intentional interference with economic relations arising from the handling of a taxpayer relief application.

The court held that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court to issue injunctions against federal boards, commissions, or tribunals, including the CRA when exercising tax collection powers.

Although superior courts retain jurisdiction over damages claims against the Crown grounded in tort or contract, they cannot grant injunctive relief against such federal entities.

The impugned paragraph seeking injunctive relief was therefore struck without leave to amend.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action and success of the defendants’ counterclaim, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff had engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against neighbouring defendants and pursued unfounded allegations during the litigation.

The court held that the conduct before and during the proceeding constituted reprehensible conduct justifying an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed substantial indemnity costs in favour of the defendants, with a small reduction in relation to a withdrawn counterclaim.

The plaintiff sought enforcement of a written agreement entitling her to 50% of the net proceeds from the sale of a residential property in exchange for assisting with the sale.

The court held that the agreement was unenforceable because it constituted remuneration for services connected with a trade in real estate while the plaintiff was not registered under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002.

In the alternative, the court found the agreement unconscionable due to the defendant’s vulnerability and the grossly improvident bargain.

The plaintiff had taken advantage of the defendant’s severe depression and unequal bargaining position to obtain half the equity of the property for relatively minor work.

The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed and she was ordered to repay funds previously garnished under a default judgment, subject to limited offsets.

Following the release of the court's reasons, the parties made further written submissions on the issue of costs in the proceedings below.

The court awarded the appellant $7,500 for the appeal and $4,250 for the Divisional Court, reflecting her success on one of the two issues dealt with by that court.

No costs were awarded for the initial motion due to mixed success.

Total costs of $11,750 were awarded to the appellant.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Revenue's decision denying their request for an extension of time to file Retail Sales Tax returns.

The applicants had been assessed for unpaid taxes and failed to file a Notice of Objection within the 180-day limitation period.

Seven years later, they requested an extension to file late returns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it moot because the four-year limitation period for the Minister to reassess taxes had expired, meaning an extension would have no practical effect.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion because the applicants had failed to utilize the statutory remedies available to them.

The original minority shareholder of a closely held corporation brought an oppression action against the majority shareholder and the company.

Due to ill health, he assigned his shares, contractual rights, and the oppression claim to the appellant.

The motion judge and Divisional Court held the assignment of the cause of action was invalid.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the assignment valid, as it fell within the exception to the rule against champerty and maintenance because the cause of action was ancillary to the assigned property interest in the shares.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim regarding a parking space, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57, including the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party and the proportionality of the value of the parking space in dispute.

The defendants were awarded costs fixed at $28,000, inclusive of interest and taxes.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding a debt and share pledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's retention of shares did not extinguish the underlying debt, given his undertaking to return the shares once the principal debt was paid in full.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding notice of a guarantee.

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the appeals were from interlocutory orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to the Dewan motion, finding the order appealed from did not finally dispose of any defences, and quashed that appeal.

For the Condominium motion, the Court found that most paragraphs of the order were interlocutory, except for one paragraph that removed a defence at trial, making it a final order.

The Condominium motion was allowed in part, quashing the appeal except for the final order paragraph.

The respondents requested an adjournment of the scheduled hearing because their counsel, a sole practitioner, had a civil trial unexpectedly rescheduled to the same time.

The applicant opposed the request.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment, finding that the scheduling issues with the civil trial and the counsel's status as a sole practitioner amounted to extraordinary circumstances, and noting that the applicant had previously been granted a rescheduling request.