Jason J. Wakely

The accused was charged with conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity contrary to ss. 83.19 and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after a recorded meeting in which he discussed forming a group to support violent jihad with two individuals already engaged in a terrorist conspiracy.

The Crown relied heavily on wiretap evidence capturing the meeting and argued that the accused had agreed to join the conspiracy.

The accused testified that he only feigned agreement to avoid confrontation and had no genuine intention to participate.

The court rejected significant portions of the accused’s testimony but concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sincerely intended to join the conspiracy.

The court held that while the accused may have sympathized with jihadist causes, the evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether he had the requisite mens rea to agree to the conspiracy.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after being arrested with four kilograms of cocaine.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to issue a material witness warrant for a person he believed was the confidential informant who tipped off the police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no evidence the proposed witness was a state agent or would provide material evidence on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime, challenging the search warrant for his home.

He argued the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination of the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and that the ITO lacked sufficient information to justify the warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly restricted cross-examination to avoid a fishing expedition and that the corroborated information from a confidential informant, combined with surveillance evidence, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The applicant, facing terrorism charges, elected to be tried in the provincial court.

The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the indictment, arguing that s. 577 does not apply to an accused who elected a provincial court trial and that overriding his election violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that s. 577 broadly permits direct indictments regardless of the accused's election, and that there is no constitutional right to a trial by a judge alone in a specific court.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his arrest was unlawful and the drugs seized should be excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the initial arrest was unlawful, the police were justified in conducting an investigative detention and protective pat-down search.

This search would have inevitably led to the discovery of a digital scale and a soft bulge, which, combined with the appellant's prior record, would have provided reasonable grounds for a lawful arrest and search.

The impact on the appellant's Charter rights was minimal, and the evidence was admissible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling bad character evidence from a Crown witness and improper closing submissions by a self-represented co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's mid-trial instructions and jury charge were appropriate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence and the trial judge's refusal to make a DNA order or a delayed parole eligibility order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and parole decision but allowed the Crown's appeal in part to impose a DNA order, noting that violence is not a pre-condition for such an order.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of laundering the proceeds of crime after agreeing to launder money for an undercover officer posing as a representative of a Colombian drug cartel.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that wiretap evidence should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the wiretap authorization was validly issued.

The Crown appealed the three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and increased the sentence to five years, emphasizing that the appellant's status as a lawyer and his willingness to abuse solicitor-client privilege were significant aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the Crown's late disclosure that a co-occupant of the searched premises was incarcerated at the time of the search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that defence counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to challenge the search warrant based on the information available, and the late disclosure did not affect trial fairness.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the trial judge's use of documentary evidence and an error regarding unanalyzed drug residue, concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed her sentence for her involvement in a marijuana grow operation, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to explain why a conditional sentence could not serve the goals of deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the appellant's temptation to reoffend and the prevalence of grow operations in the community.

The court held that the short jail term, which allowed the appellant to maintain employment, was fit and that this was not a rare case where a conditional sentence would be appropriate.