James C. Kent

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences following two trials.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by a 56-month delay, that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence and refusing to sever the charges, and that bad character evidence was improperly admitted.

He also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own conduct and that the trial judge made no reversible errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court holding that a life sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record, incorrigibility, and the need to protect the public.

The Crown appealed the lenient sentence imposed on an 18-year-old offender with a minor record and solid work history.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the trial judge's assessment that leniency offered the best prospects for the protection of the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by presiding over the trial after having conducted the pre-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that while judges who conduct pre-trials should generally avoid conducting the trial, it is not a per se reversible error.

Absent clear objection from counsel and any prejudice, the trial judge's decision to seize herself with the trial was not an error in law.

The court also upheld the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant followed the complainant, made threatening gestures, and rammed her vehicle.

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and the resulting sentences, including a restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the identity of the vehicles involved, nor any inconsistency in the verdicts.

The court held that misrepresentations in insurance documents justified the fraud conviction and upheld the restitution order as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order requiring her to disclose a defence medical report and surveillance video obtained in a prior tort action to the respondent in her current accident benefits claim.

The motion judge had held that Rule 30.1.01 constrained the use of such evidence but not its disclosure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the deemed undertaking rule prohibits collateral disclosure as well as collateral use to protect the privacy interests of litigants.

The court directed that any request for relief from the deemed undertaking must be brought before a motions judge under subrule 30.1.01(8).

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a breach of contract for machining steel pieces.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to award damages for a scrapped forging and in apportioning liability for extra honing based on the contract price between the parties rather than the reduced price negotiated with the customer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the first ground, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the damages evidence was insufficient.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part on the second ground, holding that the trial judge misapplied the law by not basing the apportionment on the appellant's loss of profits from its customer.

The respondent's cross-appeal on factual findings and costs was dismissed.

The moving parties, the parents of a child made a Crown ward, sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for failure to perfect, and requested an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The respondent Children's Aid Society argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the child had already been placed for adoption following the Registrar's dismissal.

The Divisional Court held that the placement of the child for adoption overrides the opportunity for a review of the Registrar's order under Rule 61.16(5), subject to the child's best interests.

Finding that further delay in permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests, the court dismissed the motion.

The appellant, a photographer, appealed a trial judgment dismissing his copyright infringement action against a golf club and its CEO.

The appellant had provided the club with an album of photographs and later took additional photos for a wedding and the club's website.

The trial judge found the appellant had gifted the initial album unconditionally, creating an oral, non-exclusive license to use the photos.

The Divisional Court upheld this finding, confirming that non-exclusive licenses do not require writing under s. 13(4) of the Copyright Act.

However, the Court reversed the trial judge's finding that the club owned the copyright in the 'July to October photographs', as a handwritten note was insufficient to grant an exclusive license.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion seeking leave to introduce fresh evidence on his appeal.

He argued the new evidence would show the trial judge erred in finding that photographs were delivered unconditionally as a gift.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence was not in affidavit form, could likely have been obtained before trial with reasonable diligence, and would not be conclusive of the issue.

The appellant contractor appealed a decision limiting the respondent municipality's holdback liability under s. 17(4) of the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant argued that the municipality's holdback should be calculated as 10 percent of the estimated value of the entire subdivision agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the holdback liability under the Act is calculated based on the individual contract between the subdivider and the specific lien claimant, not the overarching subdivision agreement.

The moving party (appellant) sought leave to introduce fresh evidence on an appeal regarding a dispute over photographs.

The appellant argued the new evidence would contradict the trial judge's finding on the date the photographs were delivered, thereby undermining the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence was not in affidavit form, could likely have been obtained before trial with reasonable diligence, and would not be conclusive of the issue.

The appellant, a photographer, appealed a trial judgment dismissing his copyright infringement action against a golf club and its CEO.

The appellant had taken photographs of the club and provided them to the CEO, who later used them in promotional materials.

The trial judge found the appellant had gifted the photos and granted an oral license for their use.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding that the oral license constituted a valid defence to infringement, as non-exclusive licenses do not need to be in writing under the Copyright Act.

However, the court reversed the trial judge's finding that the respondents owned the copyright in the 'July to October photographs', as an exclusive license requires a written grant.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The respondent, an 80-year-old woman, slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk after disembarking from a city transit bus.

She sued the appellant city in both negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the negligence claims statute-barred but allowed the contract claim, holding that section 266 of the Insurance Act did not preclude it.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while section 266 does not automatically foreclose genuine actions in contract where a motor vehicle is merely incidental, the respondent's claim was essentially a disguised negligence claim.

As there was no independent contractual obligation imposing liability, the action was statute-barred and the appeal was allowed.