James A. Ramsay

The successful moving party on a prior motion for production of documents sought approximately $22,000 in costs.

The responding party argued that each side should bear its own costs because the motion raised a novel point of law and challenged the reasonableness of the moving party’s time and cross‑examination costs.

The court rejected the argument that the motion involved a novel legal issue and found the responding party’s resistance to production unreasonable.

However, the court held that the parties should bear their own costs for cross‑examinations on affidavits.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving party on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $12,500, all inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant was in contempt of court for failing to comply with an order requiring attendance and full disclosure at a judgment debtor examination.

The defendant argued that his subsequent assignment in bankruptcy stayed the contempt proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that bankruptcy does not prevent punishment for contempt committed prior to the bankruptcy and relied on prior authority confirming that such proceedings may continue.

After hearing evidence, the court rejected the defendant’s testimony as not credible and found that he deliberately refused to provide candid answers and failed to produce required documents.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally disobeyed the court order.

The accused applied for judicial interim release on charges of second degree murder and arson arising from a contract arson of a variety store that resulted in a death.

The court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be strong and the proposed release plan involving family supervision to be inadequate.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding the accused failed to show cause for release on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment on two mortgage loans, a line of credit, an overdraft loan, and a credit card.

The defendant, representing himself, raised several defences, including that he had repaid the loan with an EFT requisition, that the contract lacked consideration, and various pseudolegal arguments regarding promissory notes and bills of exchange.

The court found that the EFT requisition was dishonoured and rejected all of the defendant's legal arguments as meritless.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff with substantial indemnity costs.

On a motion for interim child support, s.7 expenses, and spousal support following marital separation, the court determined the payor’s income for child support purposes under the Child Support Guidelines and addressed whether a cost-of-living allowance paid to a Canadian Forces member stationed abroad constituted income.

The court held that the allowance compensating for the higher cost of living in the United Kingdom was not income under the Guidelines.

The court fixed child support retroactive to the date of separation and ordered a global monthly contribution toward special or extraordinary expenses after finding the moving party’s claimed expenses excessive and largely unnecessary.

Interim spousal support was refused due to the moving party’s income, lack of demonstrated need, and uncertainty regarding equalization of net family property.

A co-mortgagor brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by a lender on a mortgage securing a $50,000 loan used by the co-defendant spouse for business purposes.

The moving party argued she misunderstood the deadline to file a defence and moved promptly after retaining counsel.

The court applied the principles governing the setting aside of default judgments, including whether the default was explained, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether there was an arguable defence.

Although two proposed defences lacked merit, the court found that evidence suggesting the debt may have been paid in the co-defendant’s bankruptcy raised an arguable defence.

In the interests of justice and absent procedural prejudice to the lender, the default judgment was set aside and the defendant was permitted to file a defence.

The moving party corporation sought to set aside a default judgment in an action alleging breach of contract relating to approximately $800,000 advanced for construction of jail cells.

The corporation had initially chosen not to defend the action but later sought to file a defence and counterclaim asserting equitable set-off and alleging breach of contract and breach of trust by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles from Nobosoft Corp. v. No Borders Inc., the court considered the surrounding factual matrix, including the reasons for the delay, the absence of prejudice, and whether there was an arguable defence.

Although the proposed defence appeared weak and lacked specificity, the court held that an arguable defence existed and that the delay was not inordinate.

The default judgment was set aside on terms, including security for costs of $20,000 and payment of the plaintiff’s motion costs.

A costs decision arising from several family law motions relating to access, disclosure, and procedural compliance.

The respondent sought costs after multiple motions were determined, including unsuccessful motions by the applicant for production and involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, and a partially successful motion by the respondent regarding costs from a previous motion.

The court found the applicant’s motions unreasonable and characterized certain litigation steps as tactics to delay proceedings and exhaust the respondent.

Although some of the respondent’s motions were unsuccessful, they were found to have merit.

The respondent was deemed the successful party overall and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Following an appeal with mixed success, the court issued a brief endorsement ordering that no costs be awarded to either party.

The mother brought a motion to vary a prior child support order on the basis of changed circumstances related to increased child care, orthodontic, and tutoring expenses for the parties’ three children.

The court considered the parties’ current incomes and the children’s special needs when determining the appropriate allocation of section 7 expenses.

While the court accepted that hiring a tutor and nanny were reasonable decisions, it concluded that the father’s financial circumstances limited his ability to contribute to the full cost.

The court varied the order to reduce table child support based on the father’s updated income and ordered fixed monthly contributions toward child care and tutoring, along with payment of past orthodontic expenses and a framework for future dental and orthodontic costs.

The accused applicant sought extraordinary relief to quash a preliminary inquiry into a sexual assault charge and have it recommence before a different judge.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by expressing a tentative view on the sufficiency of the evidence and then continuing the inquiry as a discovery in his absence.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding that while expressing a tentative view alone does not create bias, proceeding as a discovery immediately afterward gave the appearance of a firm view.

Furthermore, the court held that under the Criminal Code, a preliminary inquiry judge must be present to hear the evidence and cannot allow the inquiry to proceed in their absence without consent.

The accused brought an application in the Superior Court of Justice challenging proceedings conducted before a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant sought to have the earlier proceedings set aside and to require that a preliminary inquiry be held.

The court granted the application and quashed the proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice, differently constituted, with directions that a preliminary inquiry be commenced.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of a question of law regarding the interpretation of a homeowner’s insurance policy after thefts of medical marijuana plants grown by the insured.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on liability and argued the plants were covered as personal property under the policy’s general contents coverage.

The court held that the specific policy provision addressing “trees, shrubs and plants” governed and limited recovery to $1,000 per plant.

The court rejected the argument that the plants fell under the broader contents provision and also found that the grow‑operation exclusion did not apply to the theft of the plants themselves.

As the insurer had already paid the maximum amount permitted under the policy, the plaintiffs’ additional claims were dismissed.

In a family law motion to change a prior order, the court addressed several procedural motions including disclosure, a request to invite participation by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, costs related to substituted service on a third party, a confidentiality request regarding produced materials, and a motion for temporary increased access.

The court found the responding party had already complied with disclosure obligations and dismissed the disclosure motion.

The request to invite the Office of the Children’s Lawyer was denied due to potential delay and lack of demonstrated child protection concerns.

Costs of $1,500 on a substantial indemnity basis were awarded to the moving party for a successful substituted service motion after finding the responding party had been deliberately uncooperative in locating a third party relevant to child support issues.

The motion for a temporary increase in access was dismissed, with the court preferring to leave any variation to the trial judge.

The fourth party insurer moved to strike a fourth party claim brought by mortgage defendants in an action commenced by a lender seeking repayment of a defaulted mortgage.

The defendants alleged their default resulted from an insurer’s failure to pay benefits following a motor vehicle accident and attempted to claim indemnity from that insurer.

The court held the claim for contribution and indemnity was statute‑barred under the two‑year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002, which runs from the date the defendants were served with the main claim.

The court further found the claim duplicated existing litigation against the insurer and therefore constituted an abuse of process.

In addition, the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the insurer could not be liable for the lender’s loss in the mortgage action.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under a Criminal Code driving prohibition.

He argued that the trial judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias, that the vehicle operated was not a motor vehicle because it was a battery-powered motor-assisted bicycle, and that the prohibition order was deficient due to non-compliance with statutory notice requirements.

The court rejected the bias argument because the appellant raised no objection at trial despite being aware of the prior judicial involvement.

It held that the vehicle met the definition of a motor vehicle under s. 2 of the Criminal Code because it was propelled by means other than muscular power.

The court also found that the Crown proved the prohibition order and compliance with s. 260(1)(c).

The prosecuting municipality sought certiorari and mandamus under s.140 of the Provincial Offences Act to set aside a justice of the peace’s order quashing a certificate of offence for speeding under s.128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice had ruled that the certificate disclosed no offence because the word “speeding” was not used in the offence description.

The Superior Court held that the certificate sufficiently described the offence by referencing the statutory provision and factual particulars, satisfying s.25 of the Provincial Offences Act.

Alternatively, even if deficient, the justice was required to permit amendment under s.34 absent prejudice.

The justice erred in quashing the certificate on her own initiative and misapprehended the amendment power under the Act.

The employer appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the plaintiff $25,000 for wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff, a casino dealer, was terminated after an altercation with a co-worker where he used profanity, followed by insubordination during the investigative suspension.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, finding that the trial judge failed to apply the McKinley proportionality test and misapprehended material evidence regarding the plaintiff's prior disciplinary history.

The court upheld the trial judge's assessment of damages at eight months' notice.

The plaintiff sued the defendant general surgeon for medical malpractice following a laparoscopy assisted vaginal hysterectomy during which her left ureter was transected.

The court found that while the defendant was qualified to perform the surgery and did not breach the standard of care in its execution, he was liable for battery as he failed to obtain informed consent regarding the specific risk of ureter damage.

Furthermore, the defendant breached the standard of care by negligently delaying the diagnosis of the complication, failing to order a CT scan despite clear symptoms and recommendations from colleagues.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for pain and suffering, past and future income loss, and OHIP's subrogated claim.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to elicit from its witness in chief that she had given a previous inconsistent statement because she was afraid of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted impermissible oath-helping.

The court ruled that eliciting the fact of a previous inconsistent statement in chief does not constitute oath-helping, as it detracts from rather than bolsters the witness's truthfulness.

However, the court held that the explanation for the previous statement should generally wait for cross-examination and re-examination.

The Crown was permitted to elicit the fact of the previous statements and the timing of the witness's change of heart.