James A. Ramsay

Following several family law motions concerning parenting time with a young child, both parties sought full indemnity costs.

The court found that success was divided but that the applicant was successful on the most significant issue—obtaining overnight parenting time.

The respondent had advanced allegations of domestic violence that were unsuccessful, while the applicant succeeded on arguments relating to parental alienation.

The court declined to award full or substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed partial indemnity costs at $4,500 payable by the respondent.

The plaintiff sued her accident benefits insurer for breach of contract and bad faith after the insurer refused to pay non-earner benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the two‑year limitation period in the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The court held that the limitation period began when the insurer clearly refused the non‑earner benefit in 2004, or alternatively when income replacement benefits were discontinued in 2006.

A subsequent application for non‑earner benefits years later could not restart the limitation period.

The court also found no evidentiary basis for claims of bad faith or mental distress in the administration of the claim.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment in an action seeking accident benefits and alleging bad faith in the handling of the claim.

The court found the action was commenced outside the two-year limitation period under s. 281.1 of the Insurance Act, which began running from the insurer’s clear refusal of benefits.

The plaintiff had also failed to submit a disability certificate certifying the statutory criterion required for non-earner benefits.

The court further held the allegations of bad faith were unsupported by evidence and subject to the same limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The plaintiff, a long‑term hospitality employee with approximately nineteen and a half years of service, brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated following the purchase of a minority interest in a separate bar.

The employer alleged abandonment of employment, conflict of interest, dishonesty, intoxicated calls to the employer, and after‑acquired cause including drinking on duty and mismanagement of inventory.

The court found the plaintiff had not abandoned his employment and that the employer effectively terminated him by presenting a letter demanding resignation and release.

The court rejected the alleged just cause and after‑acquired cause allegations, finding the evidence insufficient and the bars were not competing businesses.

Applying common law notice principles, the court awarded twenty months’ reasonable notice, subject to mitigation.

The applicant, a dismissed teacher, brought human rights complaints against his former employer and various other parties, which were summarily dismissed by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

He sought judicial review.

On a motion, a single judge ordered that a lawyer, Lise Leduc, be joined as a respondent but refused to order her recusal as counsel.

Both the applicant and Leduc brought motions to a panel of the Divisional Court to review the single judge's decisions.

The panel held that the single judge lacked jurisdiction to join Leduc as a respondent and quashed that order.

The panel dismissed the applicant's motion to recuse Leduc, finding no conflict of interest, and dismissed his requests for damages and reinstatement for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interest arbitrator's interim award regarding the renewal of collective agreements.

The arbitrator concluded he had jurisdiction to interpret the Competition Act but exercised his discretion to defer those issues to the Competition Tribunal or the courts.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's exercise of discretion was subject to a reasonableness standard of review.

The Court found the arbitrator's decision to defer was reasonable given the Competition Tribunal's specialized expertise, the potential ramifications beyond the parties, and the expedited nature of the interest arbitration process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing his applications for repair costs and a rent abatement.

The tenant had alleged the landlord failed to repair his stove and refrigerator and interfered with his reasonable enjoyment due to a mould issue.

The Board found the landlord acted reasonably by offering alternative mould-free accommodation, which the tenant refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and concluding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears.

The tenants argued the Board's reasons were deficient and misapprehended evidence regarding their verbal agreement for rent and superintendent services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision and that the tenants' arguments amounted to an attempt to revisit factual findings, which does not constitute an error of law.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that affirmed findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of her licence to practice law.

She argued that the Hearing Panel lacked jurisdiction due to improper transition from the old discipline regime to the new one, and that she was denied procedural fairness when refused access to an RCMP file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the transition provisions were properly applied, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and she failed to demonstrate the relevance of the RCMP file or overcome the doctrine of abuse of process regarding her prior litigation.

Dispute among siblings and co-executors regarding administration of an estate where the primary assets consisted of two real properties specifically gifted under a will and holograph codicil.

Motions for directions were brought amid conflict between executors over whether to sell the properties to satisfy estate debts or allow a beneficiary additional time to fund payment of those obligations.

The court found the administration of the estate had stalled due to a serious breakdown in trust between the executors and beneficiaries.

To preserve the estate and ensure proper administration, both executors were removed and replaced with an independent professional executor.

The newly appointed executor was directed to determine the estate’s debts and expenses and administer the estate accordingly, including potential sale of property if necessary.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a 1997 consent order that had found the respondent to be the father of the child but required no child support due to the respondent’s inability to pay.

The applicant sought retroactive child support for three years prior to the motion and a contribution to the child’s post‑secondary education expenses.

The court found the original order contemplated support once the respondent became able to pay and that the respondent had failed to notify the applicant of changes in his financial circumstances as required.

While the court accepted retroactive support, it reduced the table amounts due to the respondent’s obligations to support multiple other children and the hardship that full table payments would create.

The respondent was ordered to pay reduced retroactive and ongoing child support until April 2016 and to contribute to post‑secondary expenses, along with partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order staying its action for unpaid fees against the respondent law firm.

The deputy judge had stayed the action pending the approval of the minor client's settlement under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Superior Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that Rule 7.08 is designed to protect litigants under a disability, not lawyers, and does not apply to a contract dispute between a service provider and a law firm.

The stay was vacated and the matter remitted to the Small Claims Court for trial.

Following an unsuccessful motion by certain defendants seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel from the record, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff requested substantial indemnity costs alleging the motion contained meritless allegations and misstatements of fact amounting to reprehensible conduct.

The court found the motion lacked merit and was ill‑conceived but declined to characterize the conduct as reprehensible.

The court held that reasonably generous partial indemnity costs were appropriate in the circumstances and fixed costs accordingly.

Following a long marriage, the respondent sought equalization and spousal support after separation.

The court considered whether the applicant’s interest in a large family trust formed part of net family property under the Family Law Act.

It held that the applicant had no present or contingent proprietary interest in the trust during the marriage and therefore its value was excluded from equalization.

However, the court found the applicant had substantial means and imputed income based on available corporate resources and earning capacity.

Significant spousal support was ordered to reflect the marital standard of living and the respondent’s economic disadvantage following the marriage.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against a commercial tenant and its guarantor for unpaid rent and related damages under a lease agreement.

The defendants resisted the motion and sought an order compelling the plaintiff to produce an affidavit of documents, while also advancing a counterclaim alleging that the landlord interfered with a proposed assignment of the lease to new tenants.

The court held that the evidentiary record, including affidavits, cross-examinations, and correspondence, provided a sufficient basis to determine the issues without a trial.

The court rejected the counterclaim, finding the allegation that the landlord’s lawyer discouraged prospective purchasers by misstating arrears lacked evidentiary support.

Summary judgment was granted for the landlord, including damages for arrears and mitigation-adjusted future rent.

Following a prior decision, the court considered submissions regarding costs.

The applicant’s reply largely reiterated earlier arguments but raised an objection to awarding costs for a settlement conference.

The court agreed that costs should not be awarded in relation to the settlement conference.

Ultimately, the court confirmed its earlier ruling that there should be no order as to costs.

The court reconsidered a prior costs decision following late submissions from the respondent.

The issue was whether costs could be ordered personally against the respondent when the notice of application had requested costs only from the incapable person.

The court held that no prejudice arose because the respondent had ample notice throughout the proceedings that personal costs were in issue, including through settlement offers and prior court appearances where costs were reserved.

Emphasizing the principle that costs follow the result and that family members assisting an incapable person should not bear all litigation risk, the court confirmed that a costs order against the respondent was permissible as ancillary relief.

The earlier costs order was therefore affirmed.

The court reconsidered a prior costs decision after receiving late submissions from counsel for the respondent.

The issue concerned whether the court had jurisdiction to order costs against the respondent when the notice of application had requested costs only against an incapable person.

The court permitted the applicant to file written submissions addressing the jurisdictional issue within 15 days.

The endorsement dealt solely with the procedural reconsideration of the costs determination.

Following settlement of all substantive issues in a family proceeding, the remaining dispute concerned costs related to a motion for child support.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of approximately $13,000, while the respondent sought costs of approximately $18,000, alleging the applicant had acted unreasonably.

The court found the income figure of $35,000, accepted by both parties, to be reasonable and rejected the argument that the applicant’s conduct alone caused the delay.

The judge noted that the respondent’s conduct could equally have contributed to prolonging the proceedings.

The court concluded that neither party should recover costs.

Following a successful guardianship application brought for the benefit of an incapable person, the applicant sought costs against the respondent.

The court noted that the incapable person had no meaningful estate from which costs could be recovered, despite benefiting from the proceeding.

The respondent’s conduct during the litigation, including perjury in cross-examination that risked exposing the incapable person to harm, unnecessarily increased the cost of the proceedings.

Applying the principle that costs follow the event and referencing the recognized range for such proceedings, the court ordered costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $30,500 all inclusive.