Heather J. Williams

The mother was substantially successful on the father's motion to change child support and sought full indemnity costs.

The court reviewed the parties' behaviour, time spent, and offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

The mother had made an offer to settle that was more favourable to the father than the final decision, entitling her to full recovery costs from the date of the offer.

The court awarded the mother $13,000 in fees plus disbursements and HST, and ordered that the costs be deemed as additional support enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

The father sought costs of $1,000 following his successful motion for unsupervised access and to amend his pleading.

The mother, who was self-represented, opposed the costs request, arguing divided success and that her opposition was reasonable given the father's history.

The court found the father was more successful as he was granted unsupervised access, but acknowledged the mother's concerns were understandable.

The court awarded the father costs of $500.

The applicant unit owner sought an oppression remedy against the respondent condominium corporation, alleging it failed to repair and maintain common elements (exhaust fans) that were causing noise and vibration in her unit.

The court found that the corporation had regularly inspected and maintained the fans, and that the noise was not caused by a failure to repair.

The court also held that the corporation responded reasonably to the applicant's complaints over several years by hiring experts and replacing equipment, and therefore its conduct was not oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.

The plaintiffs purchased a vacant recreational property in 2005.

In 2014, the defendants purchased an adjacent property and claimed a right of way over a track on the plaintiffs' land, tearing down the plaintiffs' fence to gain access.

The plaintiffs sued for trespass and an injunction, while the defendants counterclaimed for a declaration of a right of way or an access road under the Road Access Act.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the defendants failed to establish a prescriptive easement under the doctrine of lost modern grant, as there was insufficient evidence of 20 years of continuous, uninterrupted use prior to the land's conversion to the Land Titles system in 1999.

The court also held that the track did not qualify as an access road under the Road Access Act.

The court granted an injunction prohibiting the defendants from crossing the plaintiffs' property.

The moving party landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision that lifted a stay on an eviction order.

The tenants had previously consented to an order to pay arrears but breached it shortly after.

The tenants requested an adjournment to obtain legal advice, which the court denied.

The court found the appeal devoid of merit, as it did not raise a question of law and a successful appeal would not change the outcome given the unappealed consent order.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review regarding the refusal to renew a trapline licence, the respondent Minister sought costs.

The applicant did not make any costs submissions.

The Divisional Court awarded the Minister costs of $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis, noting the commercial nature of the dispute and the reasonableness of the quantum sought.

The applicant sought to discharge a $50,000 mortgage registered against his property by the respondent.

The respondent, operated by the son of the applicant's former lawyer, brought a counter-application seeking repayment of various loans.

The court declined to join the proceedings, finding the counter-application required a trial.

On the main application, the court found the mortgage was invalid and unconscionable because there was no contract for debt, the applicant was unaware of the mortgage, and there was an undisclosed relationship between the applicant's lawyer and the lender.

The mortgage was ordered discharged and the counter-application was converted into a separate action.

The defendant homeowners brought a motion to vacate a construction lien registered by the plaintiff contractor, arguing the lien had expired before perfection because the contract was abandoned earlier than claimed.

The homeowners also sought an order for security for costs.

The court found the contractor did not abandon the project until the homeowners refused access, meaning the lien was preserved and perfected in time.

The court also dismissed the motion for security for costs, finding the corporate plaintiff was impecunious and its claim was not obviously devoid of merit.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce personal guarantees signed by the defendants for loans made to a now-bankrupt corporate borrower.

Three of the defendants brought competing summary judgment motions seeking to discharge their guarantees, arguing they lacked independent legal advice and that the bank acted in a commercially unreasonable manner.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the defendants' motions, finding the guarantees valid and enforceable.

The court held that the lack of independent legal advice did not invalidate the guarantees absent unconscionability or misrepresentation, and the express terms of the guarantees precluded the commercially unreasonable realization defence.

The defendants' counterclaims were also dismissed.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, acting for an incapable beneficiary, applied to require the estate trustee to pass accounts.

The estate trustee relied on a release signed by the beneficiary before she was declared incapable.

The application judge ordered the passing of accounts, finding 'red flags' regarding the beneficiary's capacity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred in applying s. 2(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act by failing to consider what the estate trustee actually knew about the beneficiary's capacity at the time the release was signed.

The appeal was allowed and the order to pass accounts was set aside.

The father brought a motion to change a final consent order for child support, which stated it would not be varied 'for any reason whatsoever'.

He argued that the children's circumstances had changed, as one child had finished university and started working, and the other had moved to British Columbia for university.

The court dismissed the motion to change support, finding that these changes were reasonably contemplated at the time the original order was made and therefore did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

The court did grant orders requiring the mother to pay her share of tuition at the beginning of each semester and allowing the father to remove the older child from his life insurance policy.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to refuse to renew his commercial trapping licence for a specific trapline and to allocate it to an Indigenous trapper.

The applicant had initially been allocated the trapline, but the Ministry later determined it had erred in rejecting the Indigenous trapper's claim of ancestral connection to the area.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's discretionary decision was reasonable, intelligible, and transparent.

The court also held that the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, as he was kept informed and had no substantive property right to the trapline.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation and unjust enrichment action after a five-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offers and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court found that the defendant's offers did not trigger substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 and the plaintiffs' conduct did not warrant a punitive costs award.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $59,940.78 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff for unpaid construction work.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside a default judgment and found that the defendant did not move promptly, failed to provide a plausible excuse for the default, and lacked an arguable defence to the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim.

The court concluded that setting aside the judgment would prejudice the plaintiff and undermine the integrity of the administration of justice.

The motion was dismissed.

On a temporary family law motion, the moving party sought unsupervised and overnight access to two children and leave to amend his application to include two stepchildren.

Despite the responding party’s concerns arising from the moving party’s prior armed bank robbery, incarceration, reliability, temper, and living arrangements, the court held that increased regular access was in the children’s best interests.

The court emphasized the importance of a child’s right to maintain attachment to a non-custodial parent, found no evidentiary basis for concerns about the grandmother’s mental health or the sleeping arrangements, and avoided school-night overnights to reduce logistical difficulty.

Temporary phased-in unsupervised and overnight access was ordered, and leave to amend was granted under Rule 11(3).

The moving party estate sought an interim order for exclusive possession and sale of a commercial/residential property co-owned by the deceased father and the responding party son.

The son opposed the sale, arguing he had an oral agreement with his father to inherit the property and that a sale would defeat his claim for sole ownership at trial.

The court granted the motion, finding the property was vacant, deteriorating, and accumulating tax arrears, and that the son's opposition did not amount to malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct by the estate that would justify refusing a sale under the Partition Act.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment seeking $1,350,000.00.

The court noted that the plaintiff was attempting to re-litigate issues that had already been decided in previous proceedings, including an action against the defendant's former lawyers.

Finding the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, the court dismissed both the motion and the underlying action.

The court issued a further endorsement regarding a proposed settlement and application materials for Xinshi Wang, a mentally incapable applicant represented by litigation guardians.

The judge raised several concerns, including the absence of the full McKellar Structured Settlement report, insufficient explanation for the recommended settlement amount, lack of evidence regarding offers exchanged, improper commissioning of affidavit exhibits, and non-compliance of the contingency fee retainer agreement (CFRA) with the Solicitors Act.

Specific concerns were also raised about Ms. Wang's capacity to sign the CFRA and the lack of translation evidence.

Additionally, the proposed management plan to purchase a house for Ms. Wang was deemed not in her best interests, citing contradictory evidence regarding her living environment and the care provided by her ailing husband and daughter-in-law.

The court required additional evidence to address these issues before approving the settlement, CFRA, or management plan.

The appellant sought to appeal an order refusing a stay of summary judgment.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 71(3) of the Construction Lien Act, no appeal lies from an interlocutory order.

Citing Court of Appeal precedent, the court confirmed that an order refusing a stay of summary judgment is procedural and therefore interlocutory.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant general contractor appealed a trial judgment awarding $142,553.33 to the respondent subcontractor in a construction lien action.

The appellant argued the respondent abandoned the project when faced with a payment dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent had fully performed its obligations and did not abandon the contract, but rather stopped work due to the appellant's material breach in refusing to pay.