14 total
Defamation appeal dismissed; tweets criticizing an organization did not reasonably refer to its board member.
The appellant, a board member of a not-for-profit anti-hate organization, sued the respondents for defamation over two tweets that criticized the organization but did not name him.
The Small Claims Court dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to prove the tweets would lead a reasonable person to believe they referred to him.
On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, concluding the trial judge applied the correct legal test.
The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, confirming that the impugned words were not reasonably understood to refer to the appellant.
Defendant sentenced to 75 days house arrest for civil contempt after breaching defamation order.
The defendant was previously found in civil contempt for flagrantly breaching a court order that required her to remove defamatory social media posts about the plaintiff and publish a retraction.
The court considered the wilful nature of the breaches, the significant mental and financial impact on the plaintiff, and the defendant's eventual purging of the contempt.
Applying criminal sentencing principles to civil contempt, the court sentenced the defendant to a 75-day conditional sentence (house arrest), followed by nine months of probation with 120 hours of community service, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.
Defendant found in civil contempt for intentionally breaching court order to remove defamatory social media posts.
The plaintiff brought a motion for civil contempt against the defendant for failing to comply with a previous court order that required the defendant to remove defamatory social media posts, refrain from further defamation, and publish a retraction.
The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear and unequivocal, the defendant had actual knowledge of it, and the defendant intentionally breached all three directives.
The court found the defendant in contempt and scheduled a second-stage hearing for sentencing, giving the defendant an opportunity to purge her contempt in the interim.
Default judgment granted for $85,000 and injunctive relief against defendant for malicious internet defamation.
The plaintiff, a university instructor, brought a motion for default judgment in a defamation action against a former friend who posted false and malicious tweets accusing her of being a sexual predator.
The defendant did not defend the action.
The court found the tweets were highly defamatory, widely published, and motivated by malice.
The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and ordered a permanent injunction and a 60-day retraction on the defendant's Twitter account.
Motion to lift CCAA stay for sexual assault claim denied; s. 19(2) exception requires existing damages award.
In the context of Laurentian University's CCAA proceedings, a former student (BR) and the University of Sudbury sought to lift the stay of proceedings to pursue civil litigation regarding historical sexual assault allegations.
BR argued that her claim was exempt from the CCAA claims process under s. 19(2)(b)(i), which exempts awards of damages for sexual assault.
The court dismissed the motions, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Montreal (City) v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. to hold that the s. 19(2) exception must be interpreted narrowly and only applies once an award of damages has actually been established.
Consequently, the claims must be determined within the CCAA Claims Process.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of liability and damages for childhood abuse, dismissing both the appeal and cross-appeal.
The appellant, Liviu Calin, appealed findings of liability for assault, battery, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, and the quantum of damages awarded to his twin daughters, Ilinca and Ana Calin.
The respondents cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of mental distress and the quantum of damages.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, and damages award, and affirming the trial judge's causation analysis regarding psychiatric conditions.
The Court of Appeal granted an extension of time to perfect an appeal and directed the Superior Court to expedite the release of transcripts.
The moving parties (appellants) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of transcripts from Superior Court hearings, an extension of time to perfect their appeal, and costs.
The responding parties did not oppose the release of transcripts or the extension but opposed the request for costs.
The court granted the release of the transcripts and the extension of time, directing the Superior Court to expedite its review and release.
However, the court denied the moving parties' request for costs, finding that their essential problem was with the Superior Court, not the responding parties.
The court also clarified it had no jurisdiction over the settling of the Superior Court order.
Costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis to successful respondents following dismissed appeal.
Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal, the respondents sought costs.
The appellants, who were self-represented, argued that costs should be awarded against the respondents for refusing to settle, or alternatively, postponed until the end of the action.
The court rejected the appellants' arguments and awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, finding that the appellants' conduct, while unreasonable at times, did not warrant elevated costs.
The court also reduced the costs claimed by one counsel representing multiple defendants to account for economies of scale.
Costs were ordered payable within 90 days.
Appeal from order denying leave to amend pleadings dismissed for lacking tenable cause of action.
The self-represented appellants appealed a Master's decision denying them leave to amend their statement of claim and prohibiting the father from acting as agent for his adult son.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly concluded that the proposed amendments lacked material facts, failed to properly plead conspiracy, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
The Court also upheld the Master's rulings on the respondents' cross-motions and her refusal to address an unpleaded conflict of interest allegation against opposing counsel.
The court dismissed a motion to extend time for service solely to investigate the claim's merits.
The plaintiffs sought a six-month extension to serve their statement of claim on the defendant surgeon, Dr. Sasha Carsen, to obtain an expert opinion before proceeding.
The motion was brought before the original service deadline.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that extensions should not generally be granted solely to investigate the merits of a claim when the defendant has no knowledge of the action, as this constitutes prejudice.
The court noted that the COVID-19 emergency order had already suspended time limits, providing the plaintiffs with an automatic extension.
Successful defendant in defamation action awarded $59,940.78 in partial indemnity costs.
Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation and unjust enrichment action after a five-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs.
The defendant sought partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offers and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.
The court found that the defendant's offers did not trigger substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 and the plaintiffs' conduct did not warrant a punitive costs award.
The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $59,940.78 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.
The court significantly reduced the successful plaintiffs' costs award due to the vast disproportion between the $10.15 million claimed and the $105,000 recovered.
Following a successful civil action for abuse against their father, Liviu Calin, plaintiffs Ana and Ilinca Calin sought costs of over $395,000.
The court, applying Rule 57.01 factors, found the requested costs disproportionately high given the significant disparity between the $10.15 million claimed and the $105,000 awarded.
While acknowledging the plaintiffs' success and the principles of the Victims' Bill of Rights, the court determined that the plaintiffs' pursuit of unrealistic claims, particularly for income loss and incidents in Romania, unnecessarily lengthened proceedings.
The court awarded the plaintiffs $100,000 in costs, reduced by a prior $17,000 order against them, resulting in a net payment of $83,000 from the defendant.
Father found liable for battery, assault, and breach of fiduciary duty for childhood physical abuse.
The plaintiffs, twin sisters, brought an action against their father for damages arising from alleged physical, psychological, and emotional abuse during their childhood and adolescence.
The court found that the father had committed battery, assault, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty by subjecting the plaintiffs to physical violence and threats that exceeded reasonable parental discipline.
However, the court dismissed the claims for intentional infliction of mental distress and wrongful imprisonment, finding insufficient evidence that the father's conduct caused the plaintiffs' psychiatric disorders or that he completely isolated them.
The court awarded general damages of $50,000 to one plaintiff and $35,000 to the other, along with $10,000 each in punitive damages, but dismissed claims for loss of income and competitive advantage.
Assault on parked Uber driver was an intervening act, not an 'accident' under the Schedule.
The applicant, an Uber driver, was assaulted while parked and waiting to pick up passengers.
He applied for statutory accident benefits, which the respondent denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under section 3 of the Schedule.
The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that while the incident met the purpose test, it failed the causation test.
The Tribunal concluded that the assault was an intervening act and the direct cause of the applicant's injuries, rather than the use or operation of the vehicle.
The application was dismissed.