Greg Skerkowski

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference in relation to his stepdaughter.

At trial, he testified and offered an innocent explanation for the touching, which he had not provided to police upon arrest.

Crown counsel cross-examined him extensively on his failure to provide this explanation earlier, suggesting he had a duty to do so and that his delay undermined his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that while some cross-examination was justified because the appellant opened the door, the Crown exceeded permissible limits by violating his pre-trial right to silence.

The trial judge also failed to give a proper limiting instruction to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which occurred during a car theft.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a confession the appellant made to three associates, one of whom recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the recanted testimony under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in instructing the jury on collusion, in refusing to grant a mistrial when another witness refused to testify, and that the first-degree murder conviction based on unlawful confinement was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that it was open to the jury to find the murder was committed during a distinct act of unlawful confinement.

The appellant was convicted of fraud, uttering a forged document, and breach of recognizance after amassing a large hotel bill and paying with a forged cheque.

Police conducted a warrantless search of his hotel room, which the trial judge found violated his s. 8 Charter rights, but the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions and his consecutive four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors and upholding the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the lack of a factual nexus between his various frauds.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of numerous firearms offences after police found loaded firearms in his bedroom.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a 12-day delay in holding his bail hearing, which violated his s. 11(e) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the residual category of abuse of process and reasonably concluded that the community's interest in seeing the serious charges disposed of on their merits outweighed the need for a stay.

The Court also found that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearms was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, arguing that cross-examination on a draft affidavit was improper, the trial judge misapplied the W.D. test, and the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was fair, the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reasonable doubt, and there was a sufficient evidentiary basis to infer the appellant knew the firearm was loaded.

The self-represented appellant brought multiple appeals and applications before the Court of Appeal, including an application to appoint counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code, an application to review the dismissal of an extension of time to appeal, an appeal of a procedural order restricting his filings, appeals from multiple convictions based on guilty pleas, and an appeal from the dismissal of a stay of proceedings.

The Court dismissed the application for counsel, noting the appellant had previously discharged appointed counsel.

The Court dismissed all other appeals and applications, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and concluding that the appellant's guilty pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The appellant appealed a 22-month sentence for offences including assault, death threats, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider the totality principle when imposing consecutive sentences.

Given the offender's youth, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the total sentence to 18 months, resulting in 13 months going forward after accounting for 5 months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed her 2009 convictions for keeping and being an inmate of a common bawdy house.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bedford, which struck down the bawdy house provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year, the parties agreed to adjourn the appeal.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter to January 12, 2015, after the suspension period expires, to allow the appellant to rely on the unconstitutionality of the provisions.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The appellant challenged an order of the Superior Court of Justice in a criminal matter.

The Court of Appeal, in a brief endorsement, adopted the motion judge's analysis and conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

A Criminal Code publication restriction applicable to the preliminary inquiry evidence was ordered to continue.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, challenging the sentencing judge's approach to enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court granted leave but dismissed the sentence appeal.

It held that the sentencing judge did not err by considering that the appellant would not have been eligible for bail because of his criminal record, and properly took into account delay attributable to both the Crown and the defence.

The exercise of discretion in awarding significant enhanced credit warranted no appellate intervention.

The appellant appealed sentence after convictions for break and enter, assault, threats, wounding by stabbing, and breach of release conditions arising from a violent residential break-in.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not quantifying presentence custody credit, over-emphasized his extensive criminal record, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the proper range.

The Court of Appeal held that, for a pre-Truth in Sentencing Act charge, failure to express an arithmetic formula for credit was not an error in principle where the sentencing judge clearly took harsh dead time into serious account.

Given the grave facts, lasting harm to the victim, the appellant's entrenched recidivism, and the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection, the effective sentence was held to be within range and fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing it was an unreasonable verdict because the complainant's identification evidence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant was sufficiently well-acquainted with the appellant, having seen him daily at school and having an unobstructed view of him for 40 to 45 minutes during the offence.

The court held that the in-dock identification, supplemented by a photo line-up, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from sexual activity with a complainant under the age of consent and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that, given the significant age difference, the complainant's youth, and the circumstances of the first meeting, a reasonable person would have taken significant steps to ascertain age, and the appellant took none.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the consecutive penitentiary sentences, including for possession of child pornography, were upheld under the totality principle.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual offences and internet luring involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by focusing on evidence relevant to the accused's subjective belief about the complainant's age, rather than the objective steps taken to confirm that belief.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of assault causing bodily harm, fabricating evidence, and obstructing justice, applied for bail pending appeal.

The convictions stemmed from an incident where the appellant violently assaulted a civilian, which was captured on video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal to be frivolous given the overwhelming video evidence that contradicted the appellant's version of events.

The court also held that the public interest in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice strongly favoured enforceability of the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At trial, the defence called a psychiatrist who testified that the appellant's schizophrenia may have affected his appreciation of the risk of his driving.

On cross-examination, the Crown elicited hearsay evidence from the appellant's medical records regarding prior violent incidents to suggest the appellant had anger management issues.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of this bad character evidence and its hearsay nature.

The Crown also invited the jury to engage in prohibited propensity reasoning during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal found these non-directions fatal to the verdicts, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a 14-month conditional sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The respondent conceded that a conditional sentence was not legally available for this offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a sentence of incarceration was appropriate but, noting the respondent had already served 11 months of the sentence, his strong rehabilitative potential, and Gladue principles, varied the sentence to 11 months' time served plus 12 months' probation.

The appellants, two youthful first-time offenders, pleaded guilty to a variety store robbery involving planning and violence but no weapon.

They appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by dismissing the sentencing principles of specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

The Court allowed the appeal, substituting a global sentence of two years less a day for each appellant, which, after accounting for pre-trial custody, resulted in a sentence of 357 days.