Brian Callender

The applicant, serving a seven-year aggregate sentence for fraud, money laundering, and a criminal organization offence, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his ineligibility for accelerated parole review (APR).

He argued that while the criminal organization offence was ineligible for APR, his other offences should be considered separately and remain eligible.

The court found that while the applicant's argument had logical merit, it was bound by appellate authority holding that a single excludable offence renders an offender ineligible for APR on the entire merged sentence.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, filed an application for habeas corpus under the Criminal Proceedings Rules to challenge his involuntary transfer to a maximum-security institution.

The respondent requested that the application be refiled under the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the matter was civil in nature.

The court directed the Registrar to accept the application as a criminal proceeding for administrative purposes, noting that requiring inmates to navigate civil rules and filing fees would impede access to justice.

The applicant, awaiting sentencing for sexual assault, brought a motion to vacate his interim release under s. 523(2)(c) of the Criminal Code so he could immediately surrender into custody.

Due to COVID-19, in-person hearings were suspended, delaying his sentencing.

The applicant sought to begin serving his anticipated custodial sentence to expedite his return to society and his parenting responsibilities.

The Crown consented, and the court granted the motion, finding cause was shown to vacate the release and allow the applicant to surrender to police pending a virtual sentencing hearing.

The applicant, a federal offender, sought a declaration that he was eligible for accelerated parole review (APR) despite the regime's repeal by the Abolition of Early Parole Act.

He argued that because one of his offences was committed prior to the repeal, denying him APR violated his rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that because the applicant committed five additional offences after the repeal of APR, his expectation of liberty was altered by his own actions, not by retrospective legislative action.

Therefore, there was no variation in punishment and no breach of s. 11(i).