V. Christie

The Estate of the insured brought a summary judgment motion to determine whether an Excluded Driver Endorsement (OPCF 28A) was valid, thereby excluding coverage for the insured's daughter under her parents' Intact insurance policy.

The daughter was driving her father's vehicle when she was involved in a collision with the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's insurer, Commonwell, argued the endorsement was invalid because it was not proven that the daughter signed it or had notice of it.

The court held that the endorsement was valid, finding that the insured parents understood and agreed to the exclusion, and that notice to or signature by the excluded driver is not a legal requirement under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage property with the intention of severing it into three lots, relying on the defendant solicitor's advice that severance would be straightforward due to a Planning Act consent stamp on title.

The solicitor later admitted this advice was negligent, as the consent was qualified and severance was not guaranteed.

The plaintiffs sued for the lost hypothetical value of the severed lots and carrying costs.

The court applied the Messineo measure of damages, finding that the plaintiffs suffered no loss because they paid fair market value for the unsevered property, which had since significantly increased in value.

The court awarded only $3,100 in special damages for the wasted retainer and application fees.

The plaintiff purchaser brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the return of a $300,000 deposit and delayed closing compensation following a failed pre-construction real estate transaction.

The purchaser argued the vendor breached the Tarion Addendum by improperly setting closing dates and failing to obtain an occupancy permit.

The court found that the vendor's notices complied with the Tarion Addendum and that the agreement placed the obligation to obtain the occupancy permit on the purchaser.

The court concluded that the purchaser failed to close the transaction and ordered the $300,000 deposit forfeited to the vendor.

The applicant challenged the validity of her late mother's 2019 will, which left the estate to a defunct charity and appointed a neighbour's daughter as estate trustee.

The application was uncontested.

The court found the will invalid due to suspicious circumstances, including the deceased's documented brain injury and lack of capacity since 2012.

The court declared an intestacy, appointed the applicant as estate trustee, and allowed the estate to be processed as a small estate despite being marginally over the financial threshold.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $2.37 million settlement for a minor who was catastrophically injured when struck by a motor vehicle.

While the court found the overall settlement amount reasonable and in the minor's best interests, it scrutinized the proposed 25% contingency fee of $565,000.

Applying the Solicitors Act, the court found the fee agreement was neither fair nor reasonable, noting it was signed years after the retainer began, the case lacked significant complexity or risk on liability, and the docketed time was vastly lower than the proposed fee.

The court reduced the approved legal fees to 15% of the total award ($355,500) and ordered a newly structured settlement reflecting this reduction.

The plaintiffs brought a medical negligence action against various doctors, nurses, and a hospital following a surgery to treat severe nerve damage sustained in a snowmobile accident.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The plaintiffs failed to provide any admissible expert evidence to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation, whereas the defendants provided uncontradicted expert evidence supporting the care provided.

The court granted the summary judgment motions and dismissed the action against the moving defendants, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons on a s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel.

The appellant claimed the trial judge failed to explain why he preferred the police officers' evidence over his own.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not make a negative credibility finding, but rather relied on the uncontroverted evidence that the arresting officer read the right to counsel from a card while the appellant was in the police cruiser.

The reasons were deemed sufficient for appellate review.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to transfer the action to the Simplified Procedure under Rule 76, amend the Statement of Claim to reduce damages to $200,000, and strike the defendant's jury notice.

The motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave under Rule 48.04(1).

Furthermore, the court held that transferring the action would prejudice the defendant's substantive right to a jury trial, and the matter could not be fairly tried within the five-day limit of the Simplified Procedure.

The defendant insurer, Unifund, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against it.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff daughter resided with her mother at the time of a motor vehicle accident, which would entitle her to coverage under the mother's OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The court reviewed evidence from examinations under oath and concluded that the daughter maintained her own separate residence and did not reside with her mother, despite frequently staying over to provide care.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding residency and granted summary judgment dismissing the action against Unifund.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The parties were co-workers and unionized teachers subject to a collective agreement.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace harassment complaints.

The court applied the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber, finding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute must be resolved through the grievance arbitration process.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with serious firearms and drug trafficking offences, sought a bail review on the sole ground that the Justice of the Peace failed to give due weight to Gladue considerations under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the application of Gladue principles at the bail stage, noting that while judicial notice must be taken of systemic factors, the accused should provide case-specific information bearing on release.

The court found the Justice of the Peace had properly considered the applicant's unique circumstances and dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction to review.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in a hot tub at a cottage.

The Crown alleged that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity, while the accused testified that the complainant affirmatively consented to both vaginal and attempted anal intercourse.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused's evidence to be straightforward and believable, raising a reasonable doubt.

Conversely, the court found material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and conflicts with other witnesses' testimonies.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant Medical Officer of Health sought an ex parte injunction under section 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act to restrain the respondent restaurant owner from contravening a section 22 order.

The respondent had repeatedly refused to comply with COVID-19 regulations regarding masking, contact tracing, and proof of vaccination for indoor dining.

The court found a clear breach of the enactment and granted an interim interlocutory injunction for 10 days, scheduling a return hearing to allow the respondent an opportunity to participate.

The accused was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for the stabbing deaths of a father and son in their home.

The mandatory sentence is life imprisonment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 20 years, while the defence sought 16 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the accused's background, and the impact of pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at 18 years concurrent on each count, commencing from the date of arrest.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision, citing anticipated delays in scheduling civil jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion under Rule 48.04(1) but ultimately dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found that the plaintiff had not moved the action forward expeditiously prior to the pandemic and failed to demonstrate that any potential delay outweighed the defendant's substantive right to a jury trial, noting that civil jury trials were likely to resume by May 2022.

The accused was charged with first degree murder of Nickolas Pasowisty and second degree murder of James Pasowisty following a violent altercation at the victims' residence where the accused had gone to purchase marijuana.

The accused admitted to stabbing both victims but claimed he acted in self-defence after being attacked.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent with the physical evidence, blood spatter analysis, and pathology findings.

The court found the accused guilty of second degree murder for both victims, concluding the Crown disproved self-defence and provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, but failed to prove the unlawful confinement required to elevate the murder of Nickolas to first degree murder.

The applicant, serving a seven-year aggregate sentence for fraud, money laundering, and a criminal organization offence, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his ineligibility for accelerated parole review (APR).

He argued that while the criminal organization offence was ineligible for APR, his other offences should be considered separately and remain eligible.

The court found that while the applicant's argument had logical merit, it was bound by appellate authority holding that a single excludable offence renders an offender ineligible for APR on the entire merged sentence.

The application was dismissed.

The parties cohabited for nine years and had one child.

Following separation, the respondent sought spousal support, equalization of net family property, and proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses.

The court imputed an income of $65,000 to the respondent, who operated a cleaning business and received CPP disability benefits, finding she was intentionally under-employed by choice to prioritize her child and health.

The court dismissed the spousal support claim, finding the respondent was self-sufficient and suffered no economic disadvantage from the marriage.

The applicant was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $125,747.88, maintain a $50,000 life insurance policy to secure child support, and pay 60% of section 7 expenses.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for repeated harassing telecommunication and breach of recognizance.

The charges arose from a prolonged dispute regarding a local dog park, during which the appellant repeatedly emailed a volunteer and posted about her online in breach of his bail conditions.

On appeal, the appellant raised numerous grounds, including errors in arraignment, limitation periods, mens rea, and the trial judge's handling of his self-represented status and the appointment of section 486.3 counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings sound, his legal analysis correct, and his management of the trial exceedingly fair to the self-represented appellant.

The 60-day conditional sentence and suspended sentences were upheld as fit.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a paragraph from the plaintiff's Reply and Defence to Counterclaim under Rule 25.11.

The plaintiff, a dentist, sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal and discrimination, alleging a pattern of discriminatory conduct against female employees.

In her Reply, she alleged a broader pattern of spurious allegations against any employee who left the practice.

The court found the impugned paragraph was a bald statement without supporting facts, overly broad, and amounted to a fishing expedition that would prejudice and delay the fair trial of the action.

The motion was granted and the paragraph was struck without leave to amend.