Franklin Lyons

The applicant brought a mid-trial application seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 278.93/4 hearing and to prevent disclosure of application materials to the complainant, relying on the recent decision in R. v. Reddick which found those provisions unconstitutional.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the principles of stare decisis did not apply because Reddick was decided in the context of a pre-trial application, whereas this was a mid-trial application.

Furthermore, the court held that even if stare decisis applied, the decision in Reddick was plainly wrong as it failed to fully consider the constitutional issues in the context of a mid-trial application and misinterpreted the legislation.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion seeking to prohibit the complainant from participating in a s. 276/278 admissibility hearing regarding WhatsApp messages.

The applicant relied on a recent Superior Court decision (R. v. Reddick) that found the participation provisions unconstitutional, arguing that under the principles of stare decisis, the court should follow Reddick without a formal constitutional challenge.

The Crown argued that a Notice of Constitutional Question was required under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that relying on a previous declaration of unconstitutionality still puts the constitutional validity of the legislation in question, thereby triggering the mandatory notice requirement under s. 109.

However, the court ruled that notice did not need to be served on the complainant.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought a ruling on whether an application to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity (WhatsApp messages) under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code could be brought mid-trial rather than pre-trial.

The court reviewed the legislative history, the purpose of the rape shield provisions, and the accused's Charter rights to make full answer and defence and against self-incrimination.

The court concluded that requiring a pre-trial application would force premature disclosure of impeachment material, potentially tainting the complainant's evidence and violating the accused's fair trial rights.

The court ruled that the application could be brought mid-trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his wife, sought to adduce WhatsApp messages exchanged between them.

He brought an application for a ruling that the messages were not 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and thus not subject to the admissibility regime in s. 278.92.

The court first ruled that the Crown was not entitled to review the messages at the threshold stage to argue whether they constituted a record.

After reviewing the messages, the court held that the complainant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, as they were voluntarily exchanged with the accused and were innocuous in nature.

Therefore, the messages were not 'records' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

During a trial for attempted robbery, the accused brought an application to adduce third party suspect evidence relating to a separate carjacking incident that occurred months later in the same neighbourhood.

The defence argued the accused was an innocent bystander hit by the victims' fleeing vehicle and that the true perpetrators were the suspects from the other incident.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient nexus or air of reality connecting the two incidents, as the descriptions and circumstances were generic and not significantly similar.

The applicant, charged with attempted robbery, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of Bill C-75 amendments to the Criminal Code which eliminated peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The applicant argued these changes infringed sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the new procedures, including expanded judicial powers to stand aside jurors, adequately safeguard the right to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The court also held that the amendments are procedural in nature and therefore apply retrospectively.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

However, the accused had left Canada for over 10 months before being arrested.

The court held that the pre-arrest period did not engage s. 11(b) interests as the accused was unaware of the charges, or alternatively, it constituted a discrete event exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness due to defence delay, including allowing his Legal Aid certificate to lapse.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized 554 grams of methamphetamine and $2,000 from a hotel suite rented by the offender.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of commercial mid-level trafficking against the mitigating factor of the offender's 15-year drug addiction.

The offender was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, reduced to 80 days after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation.