Greg Elder

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80', arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application.

The appellant contended that an 8-minute delay at the roadside before being informed of his right to counsel, and the police officer's decision to delay access to counsel until arriving at the station, violated his rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the brief delay to secure the scene and the decision to wait for a private environment at the station were reasonable.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The offender, a 19-year-old unlicensed driver, drove a vehicle at speeds up to 170 km/h while heavily impaired by alcohol, resulting in a catastrophic collision that killed one person and seriously injured three others.

He was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

The court weighed the offender's youth and lack of prior record against the extreme moral blameworthiness of his prolonged, dangerous driving.

The offender was sentenced to 9 years in prison and an 18-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, following a horrific motor vehicle collision.

The central issue at trial was the identity of the driver, as the defendant claimed his friend was driving the vehicle.

The court applied the W.D. analysis and relied on circumstantial evidence, including mirror-image seatbelt injuries sustained by the occupants, to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the driver.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol and that his driving at excessive speeds constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonable person.

The defendant was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The accused brought a multi-pronged Charter application seeking the exclusion of statements, medical records, blood samples, and other evidence, alleging violations of his ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the accused's ss. 10(a) and 10(b) rights were briefly violated during the initial detention prior to his arrest, and that his s. 10(b) rights were later violated when police failed to pass on a lawyer's contact information provided by his family.

However, the court held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused, and that the search warrants and production order for his blood samples and medical records were validly issued.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence obtained during the brief period between the initial detention and the arrest, but admitted the balance of the evidence, finding that its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant argued that a period of delay caused by missing video disclosure should not have been attributed to the defence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not reviewing the disclosure until the eve of trial.

The appeal was dismissed as the net delay fell well within the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and robbery, sought a bail review under s. 522 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court agreed that the pandemic was a material change, granting jurisdiction to review the detention order.

However, the court found that the applicant's detention remained necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Despite a strict proposed release plan involving house arrest and electronic monitoring, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the applicant would commit further offences and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the alleged offences.