R. v. Charrion, 2026 ONSC 1880

CITATION: R. v. Charrion, 2026 ONSC 1880

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-40000736-0000

DATE: 20260327

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE king

– and –

DEEANNA CHARRION

Greg Elder and Ian Laing, for the Crown

Jacob Stilman, for Ms. Charrion

HEARD at Toronto: December 3, 2025

RULING #3: examination of linda cooke by the Crown on collateral issue related to her credibility

DAVIES J.

1Deeanna Charrion was charged with second degree murder in relation to the death of Gerrard Martin. Mr. Martin died from injuries he sustained falling down a flight of stairs. The Crown’s theory was that Ms. Charrion intentionally pushed Mr. Martin down the stairs during an argument. Ms. Charrion’s position was that Mr. Martin fell down the stairs accidentally or, to the extent she caused him to fall down the stairs, she was acting in self-defence.

2At the time of his death, Mr. Martin lived in an apartment on the second floor of a house. Mr. Martin’s downstairs neighbour was Linda Cooke. Ms. Cooke was called as a witness by the Crown. Ms. Cooke testified that she heard the argument between Ms. Charrion and Mr. Martin just before he fell down the stairs. Ms. Cooke’s credibility and the reliability of her evidence were central issues at Ms. Charrion’s trial.

3The Crown brought a mid-trial motion for leave to question Ms. Cooke during her examination-in-chief about an affidavit she filed in May 2025 (15 months after Mr. Martin’s death) in an unrelated criminal case involving her son-in-law. In that affidavit, Ms. Cooke recanted allegations she made against her son-in-law in December 2024 and said she may have “inadvertently embellished certain things” about her son-in-law’s conduct in her initial statement because she was “near hysterical” when she spoke to the police. The Crown argued that it should be permitted to ask Ms. Cooke about her May 2025 affidavit during her examination-in-chief because counsel for Ms. Charrion was likely going to cross-examine Ms. Cooke about it. The Crown argued that it was entitled to deal with an anticipated a line of attack on Ms. Cooke’s credibility during her examination-in-chief.

4Counsel for Ms. Charrion opposed the Crown’s motion. The defence argued that the Crown was trying to bolster Ms. Cooke’s credibility as a form of oath-helping. In the alternative, the defence argued that the collateral fact rule prevented the Crown from adducing evidence about an unrelated criminal matter.

5To avoid delaying the trial, I gave a brief oral ruling denying the Crown’s request to question Ms. Cooke about her May 2025 affidavit during examination-in-chief. These are my reasons for that ruling.

6To start, I reject the defence’s argument that permitting the Crown to question Mr. Cooke about her May 2025 affidavit would amount to oath-helping. Adducing evidence that Ms. Cooke recanted a statement she gave to the police and admitted that she may have embellished the facts would not bolster her credibility or prove the truthfulness of her evidence. If anything, the evidence the Crown wants to adduce about the incident involving her son-in-law would undermines Ms. Cooke’s credibility and the reliability of her evidence.

7I also reject the defence’s argument that the collateral fact rule prohibits the Crown from asking Ms. Cooke about the incident involving her son-in-law and her May 2025 recantation. The collateral fact rule prohibits a party from calling evidence solely for the purpose of contradicting a witness on a collateral fact: R. v. CF, 2017 ONCA 480, 349 C.C.C. (3d) 521 at para. 58. The collateral fact rule does not limit the scope of examination or cross-examination of a witness. The criminal matter involving Ms. Cooke’s son-in-law is collateral to the allegations against Ms. Charrion. However, the collateral fact rule does not prohibit the parties from asking Ms. Cooke about that incident. The collateral fact rule would only preclude a party from calling other evidence to contradict Ms. Cooke’s evidence about that incident.

8I agree with the Crown that there is no rule of evidence prohibiting a party from dealing preemptively with an issue that are anticipated to arise in cross-examination, including issues touching on their witness’s credibility or reliability: R. v. Pollock (2004), 2004 16082 (ON CA), 187 C.C.C. (3d) 213, at para. 137, leave to appeal refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 405, R. v. R.S., 2019 ONSC 1089 at paras. 46-61. However, my ruling on this motion turned on an assessment of the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the evidence the Crown wanted to adduce from Ms. Cooke. I found that the evidence about the unrelated criminal matter involving Ms. Cooke’s son-in-law was more prejudicial than probative when the Crown sought to adduce it. I came to that conclusion for three reasons.

9First, the facts related to the incident involving Ms. Cooke’s son-in-law were not relevant to what happened to Mr. Martin in any way. It was an entirely separate, unrelated criminal matter. That incident was only relevant insofar it touched on Ms. Cooke’s credibility. The fact that the Crown wants to question Ms. Cooke about an unrelated matter distinguishes this case from cases in which the Crown wanted to pre-emptively deal with an inconsistent statement given by a witness about the matter before the Court. For example, in R. v. Gillespe, 2019 BCCA 8, 370 C.C.C. (3d) 285, at paras. 31-35, the complainant gave a statement on the night of the alleged sexual assault that Mr. Gillespe had a knife in his hand during the assault. The complainant retracted her allegation that Mr. Gillespe had a knife in her second police statement. The Crown elicited evidence from the complainant during her examination-in-chief that she gave inconsistent statements to the police. On appeal, counsel for Mr. Gillespe argued that allowing the Crown to adduce evidence during the complainant’s examination-in-chief that she changed her statement amounted to impermissible oath-helping. Counsel for Mr. Gillespe conceded the evidence was relevant and admissible but argued the Crown should not have been permitted to adduce it until the complainant was cross-examined on her prior inconsistent statements. The Court of Appeal held there was nothing improper with the Crown anticipating the defence cross-examination and raising the inconsistency with the complainant during its own case. In this case, the evidence the Crown wants to adduce is about an entirely separate incident that happened almost a year after Mr. Martin’s death and, therefore, has much less probative value than it would if it was related to the facts in dispute.

10Second, I was concerned that the evidence about the incident involving Ms. Cooke’s son-in-law would unduly distract the jury from the facts surrounding to Mr. Martin’s death. To understand the import of Ms. Cooke’s statement that she may have “inadvertently embellished” the allegations against her son-in-law in her May 2025 affidavit, the jury would have to first hear evidence about the statement Ms. Cooke gave to the police on the day of the alleged assault in December 2024. The jury would then have to hear about the circumstances surrounding Ms. Cooke’s decision to swear an affidavit recanting her statement and the content of her affidavit. That evidence would distract the jury from the factual issues they had to decide about how Mr. Martin fell down the stairs and what role, if any, Ms. Charrion played in his fall.

11Finally, I considered whether it would be fairer to Ms. Charrion to allow the Crown to ask Ms. Cooke about the recantation in her May 2025 affidavit during examination-in-chief so Ms. Charrion’s counsel would have an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Cooke about her explanation. In Giillespe, at para. 39, the Court noted that if the inconsistency was adduced for the first time in cross-examination, the Crown would be entitled to ask the complainant for an explanation in re-examination, which would be the last evidence the jury hears from the complainant. If, however, the Crown adduced the explanation for the inconsistency during examination-in-chief, the defence counsel challenge the explanation in cross-examination and the Crown would be prohibited from re-examining on that issue. Counsel for Ms. Charrion maintained his objection to the Crown questioning Ms. Cooke despite the risk that he would not have an opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Cooke about any explanation she gave in re-examination.

12On balance, I found that the evidence about Ms. Cooke giving inconsistent statements in an unrelated criminal matter was more prejudicial than probative at the behest of the Crown. I, therefore, ruled the Crown was not permitted to question Ms. Cooke about her recantation in the May 2025 affidavit during examination-in-chief. Nonetheless, I ruled that if counsel for Ms. Charrion chose to cross-examine Ms. Cooke about her May 2025 affidavit, it would be open to the Crown to re-examine Ms. Cooke about it.

___________________________ Davies J.

Released: March 27, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Charrion, 2026 ONSC 1880