Gregory M. Mulligan

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and indignity to human remains after killing a young woman and dismembering and disposing of her body parts in the community.

At sentencing, the court considered the jury’s recommendation regarding parole ineligibility, the offender’s character, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Significant aggravating factors included the methodical dismemberment of the body, concealment and disposal of remains, deception of investigators, and lack of demonstrated remorse.

Applying the principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding parole ineligibility for second degree murder, the court determined that the statutory minimum of ten years was insufficient.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at seventeen years, with a concurrent sentence for indignity to human remains.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking permission to challenge prospective jurors for cause due to extensive pre‑trial publicity surrounding a homicide prosecution.

The parties agreed on five proposed voir dire questions addressing jurors’ exposure to media coverage and potential pre‑formed opinions, but disagreed on a sixth question referencing the alleged dismemberment of the deceased.

The court considered the distinction between prejudice against the accused and generic prejudice arising from the nature of the offence, as discussed in appellate authorities.

The judge held that the sixth question constituted an impermissible offence‑based question and that the presumption of juror impartiality had not been displaced.

The challenge for cause was permitted but the proposed sixth question was excluded.

Pre-trial evidentiary ruling in a homicide prosecution concerning the admissibility of photographs of the deceased taken prior to death.

The Crown sought to introduce several social photographs to show the victim’s physical stature and to humanize the victim before the jury.

The defence argued the photographs lacked probative value and risked eliciting sympathy from the jury, offering instead to concede the victim’s size and stature through an agreed statement of facts.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis from established authorities, the court concluded that one photograph had limited but legitimate probative value and minimal prejudicial effect.

The court permitted the Crown to introduce a single photograph depicting the victim’s small stature, subject to appropriate jury instructions.

The accused applied to exclude firearms evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, alleging the warrant was invalid and violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The challenge relied on the Garofoli framework and argued that the Information to Obtain relied on insufficiently credible and corroborated confidential source information and that redactions impaired full answer and defence.

After considering the redacted ITO, a judicial summary of confidential information, and cross‑examination of the affiant, the court held the issuing justice could reasonably have authorized the warrant.

The court found the confidential source information sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police investigation.

In the alternative, even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under the s. 24(2) Grant analysis.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross‑examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with him and with other individuals.

The proposed questioning arose in the context of numerous text messages between the parties that appeared to reference sexual relations during the period when they lived together.

The court held that cross‑examination regarding alleged prior consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the accused was relevant to credibility and necessary to provide context for the text message evidence.

However, proposed questioning about the complainant’s sexual activity with other individuals was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly engaging the prohibited “twin myths.” Leave was therefore granted only in relation to prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant argued the search violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

After considering the evidentiary record, including cross‑examination of the investigating detective and submissions from both parties, the court found no basis to exclude the evidence.

The application to exclude the fruits of the search warrant was dismissed.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent successfully brought a motion against three non-party corporations seeking financial disclosure required by a business valuator to determine the applicant’s income.

After the motion succeeded and disclosure was ordered subject to a confidentiality agreement, the parties returned to court to resolve disputes over the confidentiality terms and costs.

Both sides sought substantial indemnity costs and relied on offers to settle under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that neither party met the burden of proving that the result was as favourable as their respective offers and therefore assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Applying the factors in Rule 24 and considering the respondent’s substantial success on the disclosure motion, the court ordered the non-parties to pay costs.

In a civil jury trial, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking to question sworn jurors for potential bias relating to abortion after the jury panel had already been selected and sworn.

The plaintiff relied on survey evidence suggesting Canadians hold strong views on abortion and argued that questioning jurors was necessary to identify potential prejudice.

The court held that civil juries are presumed capable of setting aside personal views through the trial process and judicial instructions, and that there was insufficient evidence of widespread bias that would justify such questioning.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of challenges for cause in civil proceedings and warned that permitting such questioning could create delays and open the floodgates to inquiries on many personal characteristics.

The motion was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiff moved to set aside a full and final release executed as part of a settlement agreement resolving claims arising from an alleged water and sewage leak following a cable installation.

The plaintiff argued that the settlement, reached during discovery negotiations for $80,000, should be rescinded because she was physically disabled, in pain, and unable to obtain legal advice at the time of signing.

The defendants opposed and sought judgment enforcing the settlement.

The court held that lack of independent legal advice alone is not a basis to invalidate a settlement and found no evidence of incapacity, coercion, or unconscionability.

The settlement negotiations were conducted over several hours with offers and counteroffers initiated by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acknowledged understanding the release when signing it.

The court concluded the release was binding and enforced the settlement.

The defendant employer brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The underlying motion sought to fix a reasonable notice period while dismissing claims for bad faith, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court held that the motions judge reasonably concluded that the evidentiary record raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the circumstances of the termination and potential mental suffering damages.

Applying rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order sufficient to justify leave.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused given the small quantum at issue and the motions judge’s broad discretion in fixing costs.

The offender was convicted following trial of sexual exploitation of a young person in a position of trust and of mischief for interfering with a motor vehicle.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 and continued for approximately two years, involving numerous acts of intercourse and a significant age disparity.

The court considered aggravating factors including prolonged abuse of trust, repeated sexual acts, lack of insight or remorse, and the lasting psychological harm described in victim impact statements.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, stable employment history, and a psychiatric assessment indicating a low risk of reoffending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence.

Following earlier estate litigation and an unsuccessful appeal concerning the beneficiaries of an estate and a notice of objection to the issuance of a certificate of appointment of estate trustee, the respondents sought further costs against the applicant.

The applicant had failed to withdraw his notice of objection despite explicit direction from the Court of Appeal and required additional steps by the respondents to have the registrar remove it.

The court considered the costs discretion under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the applicant’s conduct justified a costs award, the court found it did not rise to the level of sanctionable behaviour warranting elevated costs.

Costs were therefore awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The mother brought a motion to change seeking sole custody and a variation of the father's access schedule to accommodate the child's minor hockey schedule.

The parties had previously entered into a separation agreement providing joint custody and alternate weekend access with the father, who resided a significant distance away.

The court held that the agreement's flexibility clause did not permit the mother to unilaterally cancel the father's access to accommodate extracurricular activities.

Given the limited parenting time available to the father and the absence of evidence that the child could not continue playing hockey if some games were missed, the court declined to vary the regular access schedule.

The court maintained the existing access arrangement with a limited exception for a specific tournament weekend and granted the father alternating March Break access beginning in 2014.

Following a jury trial where the plaintiffs recovered damages for general damages and future care but failed on claims for wage loss, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $247,000, while the defendants argued for partial indemnity costs around $105,300.

Applying the principles of reasonableness under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that substantial indemnity was not justified because there was no reprehensible conduct by the defendants.

The court emphasized that costs must be fair and proportionate to the result achieved.

Partial indemnity fees of $100,000 and disbursements of $50,000 inclusive of HST were awarded.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a statement of claim to seek a declaration of an equitable mortgage over the defendants’ property and to obtain a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The defendants opposed the CPL, arguing the claim was raised outside the limitation period and that registering a CPL years after the action commenced would cause prejudice because the property had been used to secure financing for their defence.

The court held that the proposed amendment flowed from the existing pleading and did not constitute a new cause of action, and therefore leave to amend should be granted under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the court declined to issue a CPL, finding that the plaintiff delayed more than three years before seeking the remedy and that granting it would cause significant prejudice to the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

Sentencing following conviction after a non‑jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000.

Police executing a search warrant at a motel room seized 11.18 grams of crack cocaine, 3.21 grams of cocaine, digital scales, a debt list, and cash.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for drug trafficking offences spanning decades and had served multiple prior custodial sentences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for trafficking in crack cocaine while considering mitigating factors including a difficult personal background and relatively small quantities of drugs.

Enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was denied because the offender’s remand detention arose from other charges.

A custodial sentence was imposed with credit for time served.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000 following execution of a search warrant at a motel unit.

Police located crack cocaine and cocaine packaged in multiple baggies, a digital scale with cocaine residue, numerous small baggies, debt lists, multiple cell phones, and over $1,500 in small-denomination currency.

The accused was the sole occupant of the small, cluttered motel unit and his vehicle was parked outside throughout police surveillance.

The court held that constructive possession was established based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs.

Considering the packaging, paraphernalia, expert evidence on trafficking indicators, and cash denominations, the court concluded the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the currency represented proceeds of crime.

Following an estate application seeking removal of an estate trustee, the parties resolved most substantive issues through minutes of settlement prior to the hearing.

The applicant obtained the respondent’s resignation as estate trustee and a release of claims against the estate, while the respondent retained proceeds of a life insurance policy paid to her as beneficiary.

The remaining dispute concerned entitlement to costs of the application.

The court found both parties achieved a measure of success through settlement and that a full hearing was unnecessary.

In the circumstances, it was appropriate that each party bear their own costs.

Following dismissal of a motion to vary a long-standing child support order after a half-day trial, the court considered costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The successful party sought approximately $14,684 in partial indemnity costs.

The court held that costs associated with earlier proceedings such as a settlement conference and Dispute Resolution Officer appearance could not be claimed because costs were not reserved to the trial judge.

The court also reduced travel time and mileage charges for out-of-town counsel, finding that absent evidence local counsel was unavailable such additional costs should not be borne by the opposing party.

Taking into account the respondent’s lack of preparation and the overall circumstances, the court awarded reduced costs.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action for delay arising from a 2007 lawsuit relating to the purchase of a retirement home and alleged wrongdoing by vendors, real estate agents, and the plaintiffs’ former solicitor.

The court reviewed the procedural history, including delays in scheduling examinations for discovery and counsel availability, and applied the two‑part test requiring the plaintiffs to explain the delay and demonstrate an absence of prejudice to the defendants.

Although the litigation had progressed slowly and one plaintiff was medically incapable of discovery, the court found this was the first status hearing, the plaintiffs were not in breach of court orders, and a litigation timetable had been proposed.

The court concluded the plaintiffs should be given a “lifeline” to proceed.

A timetable was ordered requiring the trial record to be passed within twelve months.