Gregory M. Mulligan

Following a trial where the plaintiffs obtained a judgment for $30,000 and vacant possession of a property, the court determined costs.

The plaintiffs had made a timely Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable to the defendants than the trial outcome.

The court awarded the plaintiffs costs of $34,333.67, representing partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The applicant media organization sought judicial review of a decision to hold an in camera hearing for an extension of time application under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act regarding police misconduct allegations.

The applicant argued the decision-maker erred by failing to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck test for open court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative or procedural functions under the Police Services Act, which contains its own statutory framework for determining when hearings may be closed to the public.

The parties settled a motion by consent temporary order, leaving only the issue of costs.

Both the applicant and respondent sought costs.

The court reviewed Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law on costs after settlement agreements.

The court found no clear "winner" or "loser" and determined that neither party's behaviour rose to the level of unreasonableness warranting costs against them.

Given the divided success and principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The applicant police services board sought judicial review of a municipal by-law that disbanded the local police force in favour of contracting with the Ontario Provincial Police.

The applicant argued the municipality breached its duty of procedural fairness during the consultation process and that the decision was tainted by bias and bad faith.

The Divisional Court granted the applicant public interest standing but dismissed the application.

The court held that the municipality's legislative decision required a lower level of procedural fairness, which was met through public meetings, online engagement, and deputations, and found no evidence of bias or bad faith among the municipal councillors.

This motion concerned the interpretation of a clause in Agreements of Purchase and Sale regarding the calculation of "Net Developable Area" (NDA) for land development.

The core dispute was whether storm water management (SWM) ponds located on "Protected Countryside" (Greenbelt lands) should be included in the NDA, thereby affecting the purchase price adjustment.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasizing a holistic reading of the agreement and grounding interpretation in the text.

It found the clause unambiguous, concluding that the exception for SWM ponds applied only to "open space lands" (Group A) and not to "Protected Countryside" (Group B).

Consequently, SWM ponds on Protected Countryside do not form part of the NDA.

The appellant mother appealed an order interpreting a separation agreement regarding child support and an equalization payment set-off.

The parties had shared custody and agreed to a set-off of child support against a $97,000 equalization payment owed by the mother.

The mother argued the set-off should be calculated from the date of separation based on the father's actual higher income, rather than the date of the agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge made no reviewable error in interpreting the contract and concluding the set-off began at the date of the agreement, noting the discretion under section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines for shared parenting.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Small Claims Court orders arising from a default judgment in an aborted real estate transaction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error or breach of procedural fairness by the deputy judges.

The court noted that the applicant was improperly attempting to use judicial review to circumvent the statutory appeal process under the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs, having succeeded in a 19-day trial and obtained judgment for $614,624 plus $30,000 in punitive damages, sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis totaling $531,272.25.

The defendants argued the costs were excessive, particularly for motions resolved by consent and for alleged over-preparation.

The court, applying principles of reasonableness and the objectives of modern costs rules, reduced the partial indemnity costs for consent motions and the substantial indemnity costs for trial preparation, finding over-preparation.

The court awarded total costs of $353,109.53, including fees and disbursements.

The defendant brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim regarding a fraudulently transferred property.

The court found serious credibility issues with both parties concerning the property transfers and a trust agreement.

The defendant, as trustee, failed in his duty to account to the plaintiff, the beneficial owner.

Given the significant credibility issues, the court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial, and suggested a mini-trial or consolidation with related litigation.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for delay, citing the plaintiff's failure to answer undertakings which required four prior motions to compel.

The court noted that dismissing an action for delay is a severe remedy.

Because the plaintiff had finally answered all undertakings, paid the costs of the prior motions, and passed the Trial Record, the court declined to dismiss the claim.

However, because the motion was necessary to force the plaintiff to advance the matter, the court awarded costs of the motion to the unsuccessful defendant in the amount of $2,000.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking over $100,000 in costs for an entire proceeding commenced in 2004.

The matter had previously been referred to arbitration, where the plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in costs, and a subsequent appeal of the arbitration award resulted in a further $2,500 costs award to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the current motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction as the issue of costs had already been decided and the motion was effectively an attempt to appeal the court's previous costs award without leave.

The parties reached a consent order regarding temporary relief and the matrimonial home prior to the return of a motion.

The applicant sought costs for the initial motion where she achieved partial success, while the respondent argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court awarded the applicant $3,000 in costs, noting her partial success on the contested motion before the previous judge.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add Kristen McLean as a defendant to an action arising from an incident on a slide ride at Blue Mountain Resort.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued the identity of the proposed defendant was not discoverable until the resort provided an unredacted incident report.

The court granted the motion, finding the plaintiff had met the low evidentiary threshold to show the identity was not discoverable with due diligence, and added the proposed defendant without prejudice to her right to plead a limitation defence.

The appellant, a minority shareholder in a family holding company, appealed the dismissal of her application for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

She sought a court-ordered sale of her shares to her brothers after they rejected her offer to sell and she was unable to find a third-party purchaser.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of liquidity for her shares and that her interests as a shareholder were not unfairly disregarded.

The appellant First Nation appealed a costs decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal, arguing that the Tribunal erred by failing to apply the 'polluter pays' principle and by not considering the appellant's First Nation status when assessing whether the respondent's conduct was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, costs are only awarded for unreasonable, frivolous, or vexatious conduct.

The Court found that the 'polluter pays' principle does not apply to costs considerations and that the Tribunal reasonably concluded the respondent's conduct in defending the appeal was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying her income replacement benefits and a treatment plan.

She argued procedural fairness was breached because the hearing was held by telephone rather than in person, minor injury guidelines were added without notice, medical records were not fairly evaluated, and the rule in Browne v. Dunn was not followed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the telephone hearing, noting the appellant should have been aware of the MIG issue, and concluding the adjudicator reasonably evaluated the medical evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of ongoing disciplinary proceedings before the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, applying the principle that judicial review should generally await the completion of administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no exceptional circumstances, noting that the referral to the Discipline Committee complied with the Professional Engineers Act and that disclosure issues should be addressed in the related civil proceedings.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an arbitration award that ordered them to pay $275,431 in damages and costs for breach of a real estate development agreement.

The respondent brought a cross-application to enforce the award.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the arbitrator made no errors of law and that the issues raised regarding the Real Property Limitations Act and the assessment of damages were questions of mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The court granted the respondent's application to enforce the award.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the successful plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The court declined to award elevated costs due to the plaintiff's prior misconduct involving a purported wire transfer that was never actually sent.

Applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable to the plaintiff in any event of the cause.

The applicant was successful on an urgent motion for sole custody and limited supervised access.

As the successful party, the applicant sought costs of $14,086.58 on a full recovery basis or $11,000.00 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent opposed the costs, citing his good faith and dire financial situation.

The court applied the presumption under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules that a successful party is entitled to costs.

Finding no circumstances to justify an elevated rate, the court awarded the applicant costs in the amount of $7,500.00.