Christine Marchetti

This judgment addresses issues of section 7 expenses and section 9 child support in a shared parenting arrangement.

The court determined the parties' incomes, excluding the father's non-taxable benefits and the mother's RRSP withdrawals (which were used for legal fees).

It found the father's blanket refusal to consent to additional section 7 expenses unreasonable, ordering him to contribute to therapy and competitive dance, but not Montessori tuition or private swimming lessons.

For ongoing child support, despite a set-off calculation, the court ordered the father to pay an additional amount to the mother, considering the higher housing costs incurred by the mother and the father's greater ability to absorb costs.

This judgment concludes a four-day trial addressing child support and spousal support.

The court determined the applicant's income for support purposes, calculated child support under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, and assessed the respondent's entitlement to spousal support.

The court declined to impute additional income to the applicant from reimbursed business expenses, finding them legitimate.

For child support, the court ordered the applicant to pay a set-off amount plus an additional $100 per month to ensure similar standards of living for the children in both households, considering the income disparity and the respondent's higher housing costs.

The respondent's claim for spousal support, both compensatory and non-compensatory, was dismissed, as the court found no economic sacrifices made by him during the marriage and that his mental health did not impede his ability to work.

This endorsement addresses two motions in a family law matter.

The respondent father sought increased parenting time, equal sharing of reunification therapy costs, and an order preventing the applicant mother from recording children's telephone calls.

The applicant mother sought supervised and public parenting time, and a higher contribution from the father for therapy costs.

The court granted the father's requests regarding the recording of calls and the equal division of reunification therapy costs.

The mother's request for supervised and public parenting time was dismissed.

The court ordered a more gradual increase in the father's parenting time than he proposed, aiming for a shared parenting regime, and denied the father's request for make-up parenting time.

The applicant father brought a motion to change the child's surname to a hyphenated name, arguing a material change in circumstances due to increased access and bonding.

The respondent mother, who has sole custody, brought a cross-motion to enforce a prior consent order regarding section 7 expenses, life insurance, and RESP contributions.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that under the Change of Name Act, only a person with lawful custody can apply for a name change, and the father had not sought to vary the custody order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court granted the mother's enforcement motion, ordering the father to authorize direct dental claims, pay his share of guitar lessons, provide proof of life insurance, and deposit $10,000 into the mother's RESP for the child.

The parties settled a motion by consent temporary order, leaving only the issue of costs.

Both the applicant and respondent sought costs.

The court reviewed Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law on costs after settlement agreements.

The court found no clear "winner" or "loser" and determined that neither party's behaviour rose to the level of unreasonableness warranting costs against them.

Given the divided success and principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The respondent mother brought a motion to vary an existing access order to allow the four-year-old child to attend full-time junior kindergarten, and for further financial and medical disclosure from the applicant father.

The father brought a cross-motion regarding access.

The court varied the access schedule to accommodate the child's full-time attendance at junior kindergarten while ensuring regular contact with the father.

The court ordered the father to provide the requested financial disclosure but dismissed the mother's request for the father's unredacted medical records, finding they were not necessary for the determination of the issues.

The applicant father sought joint custody and increased access to his daughter, G., who had never had an overnight visit in six years.

The respondent mother opposed, alleging sexual abuse by the father and seeking sole custody and supervised access.

The court conducted a 14-day trial, finding the mother's allegations of sexual abuse to be false and her evidence unreliable.

The court characterized the mother's actions as extreme gatekeeping, driven by a desire to control access and marginalize the father.

The court granted joint custody, with primary residence remaining with the mother, and established a detailed, stepped-up parenting schedule for the father.

Child support was also determined, with the father's income imputed and arrears fixed.

This is a costs decision following a three-day Hague Convention hearing in which the court ordered the mother to return two children to their habitual residence in North Carolina and stayed the mother's custody claim.

The respondent father sought full recovery of costs totalling $38,304.87, while the mother sought no costs award.

The court awarded costs of $20,000 to the father, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, with payment suspended for one year to allow the mother to regularize her immigration status and stabilize her living arrangements with the children.

The court permitted enforcement against the mother's real property interests and set-off against any property settlement or division owing to her.

The respondent mother wrongfully removed two children from their habitual residence in North Carolina to Ontario.

The applicant father sought the return of the children pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alternatively seeking recognition and enforcement of a North Carolina custody order, or an order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found that the removal was wrongful under Article 3 of the Hague Convention, that no grave risk exception applied under Article 13(b), and that the North Carolina order could not be recognized due to lack of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.

The court ordered the return of the children to North Carolina with specific undertakings and conditions to protect the mother during the transition.

Following a 15‑day custody and access trial, the successful party sought $493,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis to the date of a settlement offer and full indemnity thereafter.

The court analyzed success at trial, the parties’ settlement offers, litigation conduct, and reasonableness of the claimed fees under the Family Law Rules.

The court found the moving party clearly more successful and that his settlement offers were more closely aligned with the trial outcome than the opposing party’s offers.

However, the court reduced the recovery due to unreasonable conduct, including surreptitious recording of the opposing party during disputes involving the children.

Costs were fixed at $345,000 on a partial recovery basis and ordered payable within 90 days.

A high-conflict custody trial concerning three teenage children where each parent alleged parental alienation by the other.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of all children and suspension of the father’s access pending therapeutic intervention.

The respondent father sought sole custody of two children and joint custody of the third.

The court accepted the assessor’s opinion that the case was a “mixed” alienation scenario involving problematic parenting behaviour by both parties rather than pure parental alienation by one parent.

Given the children’s ages, experiences with each parent, and entrenched conflict, the court declined to change residential custody as requested and instead structured a divided custody arrangement combined with extensive therapeutic intervention and detailed parenting orders designed to repair parent‑child and sibling relationships.

During an ongoing family law trial, the applicant sought to call two witnesses in reply concerning a child's mental health events and communications that emerged from late-produced emails.

The court considered the principles governing reply evidence, including whether the evidence addressed new matters arising from the defence or whether it constituted impermissible splitting of a party’s case.

The court held that limited reply evidence from the child’s therapist was permissible regarding specific events in June–July 2011 and related emails that gained new significance during the defence case.

However, broader inquiries into the child’s ongoing mental health and alleged information‑withholding could have been addressed in the applicant’s case in chief and were therefore excluded.

The proposed testimony of the guidance counsellor was not proper reply evidence, and the applicant’s request to reopen her case in chief was denied.

In a family law proceeding involving allegations of parental alienation, the court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of proposed expert evidence from a developmental psychologist retained to provide a generic report on parental alienation theory.

Applying the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan and the two‑stage analysis articulated in R. v. Abbey, the court considered necessity, reliability, and the balance between probative value and potential prejudice.

The court concluded that limited portions of the expert’s report explaining common alienating strategies and behaviours of alienated children would assist the trier of fact.

However, other portions—including general discussions of prevalence, cult analogies, therapeutic practices, and proposed remedial solutions—were excluded as lacking sufficient relevance or probative value.

The expert was also prohibited from answering fact‑based hypothetical questions because the retainer was limited to providing generic educational evidence rather than case‑specific opinions.

During a custody and access trial, the applicant brought a motion seeking to redact portions of a custody assessor’s notes, records, and report that referenced communications from a prior closed mediation.

The applicant argued that mediation privilege had not been clearly waived when she consented to the assessor obtaining information from the mediator.

The court found that the applicant knowingly signed a release permitting disclosure to the assessor and understood that information provided to the assessor could be disclosed in court under the assessor’s retainer terms.

The court further held that the applicant impliedly waived mediation privilege by later providing submissions discussing the mediation for the assessor’s consideration.

Given the parties’ consent and the potential prejudice to the integrity of the assessment if extensive redactions were allowed, the motion to redact was denied.