Gregory John Tweney

The appellant challenged her jury conviction for aggravated assault arising from injuries to an infant diagnosed as shaken baby syndrome, arguing several procedural errors in the conduct of the trial.

The court held that the impugned rulings concerning transcript requests, witness exclusion, disclosure of an expert report, jury note-taking, and cross-examination were all within the trial judge's discretion and disclosed no reversible error.

On sentence, both sides sought leave to appeal from a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by three years' probation.

The court held that the sentence was within range on the exceptional facts and that the trial judge did not err in principle by imposing a conditional sentence or by setting the probationary terms.

The Crown appealed a sentence in which the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence.

The court held the sentencing judge was in the best position to assess the effect of the respondent's serious mental illness on the commission of the offence and that there was evidence supporting that finding.

The court also relied on the respondent's youth, controlled mental illness, family support, and the Crown's position at trial.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged criminal convictions and argued, among other things, that there had been a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal rejected the delay argument but held that the trial judge erred in refusing a brief adjournment after defence counsel was removed from the record on the trial date.

The court found the assumption that any new lawyer would face the same difficulties was unwarranted on the record.

The interests of justice required a short adjournment to permit the accused to retain counsel or prepare to proceed on his own.

Leave to appeal was granted, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants sought to set aside a sentence order directing forfeiture of cash bail toward restitution arising from a break and enter and theft involving the release of mink from a fur farm.

The Crown conceded that the Criminal Code did not authorize forfeiture of bail money to satisfy a restitution order, and the court quashed that portion of the sentence.

The majority held, however, that it should not direct payment of the bail funds to third-party family members and a friend who had supplied the money, particularly given possible competing creditor claims and the unsuitability of criminal proceedings to adjudicate such disputes.

Requests for costs and interest against the Crown were also denied.

A dissent would have ordered the bail money returned directly to the third-party funders ex debito justitiae.