Graham Theodore Clark

The accused was charged with multiple historical sexual offences against twin sisters who frequented his convenience store when they were youths.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual contact occurred before the complainants turned 14, or that one of the complainants was sexually assaulted.

However, the court found that the accused was in a position of trust towards one of the complainants when they began a sexual relationship after she turned 14.

As a result, her consent was legally irrelevant, and the accused was found guilty of sexual exploitation.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking after a police officer found cocaine in his rental vehicle following a traffic stop.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the initial traffic stop was a pretext for a criminal investigation and not a valid stop under the Highway Traffic Act, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The court also found that the officer's demands for the rental agreement and questions about the accused's travel itinerary constituted unreasonable searches and seizures.

Furthermore, the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the multiple serious Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the drugs under section 24(2).

The accused, charged with drug offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude drugs seized from his person and residence, as well as his inculpatory statements.

He argued that the warrantless search of his home violated s. 8, his consent was coerced by the unlawful detention of his daughter (s. 9), and his statements were involuntary.

The court found the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful.

The court also held the daughter's detention was based on reasonable grounds and the accused's consent to search his home was voluntary and informed.

The application was dismissed and the evidence admitted.

The appellant appealed his sentence for breaching a court order by making collect calls to the complainant from custody.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred in principle by proceeding without hearing submissions from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional discharge with six months' probation, noting the breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the appellant had served four months in jail, and he faced deportation if convicted.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault against the complainant on April 25 and April 29, 2012, in Oakville.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The complainant gave a detailed videotaped statement to police under oath, describing violent physical assaults including slapping, pushing, choking, and punching.

At trial, the complainant recanted her statements, claiming she could not remember the events and that police had forced her to give a statement.

The court found the complainant's trial evidence highly unreliable, riddled with inconsistencies and lacking common sense.

The court concluded that the complainant had initiated and provoked the arguments, was emotionally unstable, and had called police as a retaliatory measure after the accused ended their relationship.

The court found no independent corroboration of the alleged assaults and rejected the complainant's credibility.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, attempt to obstruct justice, break and enter, uttering a threat, and mischief to property, as well as his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and designation as a long-term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on in-dock identification and in failing to disqualify a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate given the context, including that the complainant knew the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting that fresh evidence confirmed the appellant remained a high risk to reoffend, justifying the long-term supervision order.

The young person appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as a serious violent offence designation.

In an addendum to a previous endorsement, the Court of Appeal noted the Crown's intention not to proceed on a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, ordered a new trial, and stayed those charges.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the serious violent offence designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as the remaining conviction for weapons dangerous could not support it.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appellant relied on s. 34(1), but the trial judge only addressed s. 34(2).

The Court of Appeal found an air of reality to the s. 34(1) defence, noting the trial judge made no finding that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm and the findings did not establish disproportionate force.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery following a series of violent home invasions.

During the investigation, one of the appellants, Tran, was severely beaten by police officers after turning himself in, resulting in a broken jaw.

The officers attempted to cover up the assault and perjured themselves.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter but refused a stay of proceedings, opting instead to reduce Tran's sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions of the other appellants, finding no errors in the jury charge regarding multiple conspiracies, the Vetrovec warning, or the admission of co-conspirator statements.

However, the Court allowed Tran's appeal and entered a stay of proceedings, holding that the egregious police brutality, compounded by the Crown's conduct at trial, fell into the clearest of cases where a stay is the only appropriate remedy to preserve the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judgment that upheld her conviction.

She argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, ignored the requirements of R. v. W.(D.), and improperly relied on prior discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided an adequate analysis of the evidence, applied the proper burden of proof, and did not rely on prior discreditable conduct in his assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict was not unreasonable, as several witnesses identified the appellant.

However, the court admitted the fresh evidence of a new witness, finding it was reasonably capable of belief and could have affected the result given the frailties in the identification procedure.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a first offender of otherwise good character, appealed his sentence for a serious commercial offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in principle.

The trial judge appropriately prioritized general deterrence given the commercial nature of the offence when rejecting a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving a machete.

The trial judge made several errors regarding self-defence, including reversing the burden of proof.

However, the Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso, finding that the errors did not affect the verdict because the trial judge accepted the Crown's version of events, under which self-defence did not arise.

The appeal from conviction and disposition was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, extortion, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant and co-accused kidnapped the victim, forced him into a car, and assaulted him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in his jury instructions regarding conceded facts and identity, and in allowing prior consistent statements to enhance a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and noting the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.D. framework by not fully assessing and reconciling the evidence of the police officers after rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave full reasons, properly articulated his application of W.D., and made clear findings of fact based on the accepted and reliable evidence of the police.