Graham Jenner

The accused, Maninder Grewal, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) equal to or above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The trial focused on several Charter-based arguments, including the lawfulness of his arrest and breath demand, breaches of his right to counsel (informational component and premature termination of call), arbitrary detention, and unreasonable search and seizure related to being videotaped while urinating.

The court found breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel (false dichotomy of options and premature termination) and s. 9 right to not be arbitrarily detained.

The court dismissed the s. 8 and s. 9 arguments related to the ASD/mouth alcohol issue and the privacy issue while urinating.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence due to the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches.

The applicant father sought enforcement of a previous order regarding virtual parenting time and a change to his interim in-person supervised parenting time.

The court found the respondent mother in non-compliance with the virtual parenting order and imposed a monetary penalty of $250.

The court maintained supervised in-person parenting time for the father due to ongoing concerns about his substance abuse and criminal charges, prioritizing the children's physical, emotional, and psychological safety.

A new, more appropriate virtual parenting schedule was also established by consent.

The offender, a Staff Sergeant with the Ontario Provincial Police, pleaded guilty to breaching the public trust under s. 122 of the Criminal Code for taking seized items (a beaded firearm strap and scope) and misleading colleagues for 11 months.

The items held significant sentimental and spiritual value for the Indigenous victim.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, citing the offender's public service, community support, and mental health struggles (PTSD and depression).

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and probation, arguing against a discharge.

The court denied the conditional discharge, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence in breach of trust cases involving police officers, particularly given the sustained deception and the impact on a vulnerable Indigenous victim.

A suspended sentence with 12 months probation and specific conditions was imposed.

The father sought to strike the mother's pleadings or obtain summary judgment due to her protracted non-compliance with disclosure orders regarding s. 7 expenses and income.

The court found the mother in breach of disclosure orders but declined to strike pleadings, opting for a costs order and a restriction on future s. 7 claims.

The motion for summary judgment on spousal support was dismissed due to unresolved income accuracy issues.

The motion for summary judgment on s. 7 expenses was partially granted, dismissing the mother's claim for a new payment method, but denying summary judgment on the father's claim for retroactive reduction due to credibility issues requiring oral evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding for two children, A.A. and B.B., alleging risk of physical harm, sexual abuse, and emotional harm due to their mother D.C.'s failure to protect them from an abusive male adult, Y.B. The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) supported the protection finding, while the mother opposed it.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluding that the children were not in need of protection.

The court determined that the risks, primarily related to Y.B., had been mitigated over time, and there was insufficient admissible evidence to establish a present likelihood of serious harm.

The decision emphasized the importance of the 'flexible approach' to the material time period for protection findings and highlighted issues with the admissibility of hearsay evidence in summary judgment motions.

This is a costs endorsement following the respondent's successful motion for summary judgment, which dismissed the applicant's claims in their entirety.

The respondent sought full recovery costs, arguing the applicant acted aggressively and in bad faith.

The court found the applicant's conduct, including baseless accusations and attacks on opposing counsel, constituted bad faith.

Consequently, costs were assessed on a full recovery basis, though the claimed amount was reduced, and the applicant was ordered to pay $13,560 immediately.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application, and the court *sua sponte* raised the question of whether the application was brought within the five-day statutory limit under s. 88 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society argued that Rule 3(2) of the Family Law Rules, which excludes weekends for periods less than seven days, applied.

The court held that Rule 3(2) does not apply to statutory timelines, as it would exceed the rule-making authority and conflict with the substantive legislative intent of balancing child protection with parental constitutional rights.

Consequently, the Society failed to bring the application within the five-day period, having done so on the seventh day.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion brought by the respondent mother to strike the applicant father's pleadings for failure to comply with a previous costs order.

The motion was not argued as the applicant paid the outstanding costs.

The court found the respondent to be the successful party despite the motion not being heard, as her objective of enforcing the costs order was achieved.

The court also found the applicant acted in bad faith through duplicity regarding payment, threatening to destroy the child's belongings, and making unfounded attacks on the respondent's counsel.

Consequently, the court awarded the respondent costs on a full recovery basis, fixed at $3,000, and prohibited the applicant from bringing further motions or obtaining relief without leave until the costs are paid.

The applicant, Karen Beaudette, sought to set aside an order noting her in default and a subsequent final order from an uncontested trial.

The respondent, Michael James, sought to dismiss the applicant's motion and to prohibit her from bringing further motions without leave until outstanding costs were paid.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding she did not act promptly, failed to provide an adequate explanation for non-compliance with the Family Law Rules, and did not establish an arguable case on the merits.

The court granted the respondent's request to prohibit the applicant from bringing further motions without leave until all outstanding costs orders are paid.