Graham Jenner

In a child protection proceeding involving an Indigenous child, long-term foster parents moved to be added as parties to the disposition phase.

The court held that foster parents do not have party status as of right under s. 13 of An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families because “care provider” does not include foster parents whose role arises from a state-created placement.

Applying the discretionary framework under r. 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, together with the participation rights contemplated by s. 79(3) of the CYFSA, the court found that full party status was in the child’s best interests.

The foster parents’ lifelong caregiving role, ability to advance a plan of care, and unique evidence about the child’s needs justified their addition without undermining the Federal Act’s emphasis on cultural continuity, Indigenous jurisdiction, and family and community connection.

The Crown applied for an order appointing state-funded counsel for the complainant in a pretrial application for the production of counseling records under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that it was bound by vertical stare decisis to follow the Superior Court of Justice decision in R. v. Smith, which established that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction by necessary implication to make such orders as a matter of course.

While granting the order, the court expressed significant reservations about the Smith framework, noting concerns regarding the separation of powers, the expansion of the doctrine of necessary implication to mandate provincial spending, and the development of this jurisprudence in the absence of a true adversarial dispute.

The Crown requested an ex parte order appointing counsel for the complainant in respect of upcoming pretrial applications under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge declined to make the order ex parte, expressing discomfort with making an order impacting the accused's trial without notice.

The Crown was directed to bring a formal application on notice to the accused, the complainant, the Ministry of the Attorney General, and Legal Aid Ontario, and to be prepared to address whether the court has jurisdiction to make such an appointment.

The offender pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for misappropriating $622,087.92 from her employer's law firm trust and general accounts over six years.

The court weighed the significant breach of trust, the quantum of the fraud, and the profound impact on the victim against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, and underlying mental health and addiction issues.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale employee frauds, the court imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment, along with a full restitution order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

Following findings of guilt for uttering threats, the accused sought to bring an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court previously declined to hear the application because it was not brought proactively before the end of the trial.

The accused requested a reconsideration based on a recent appellate decision confirming that a trial judge is not functus officio to hear such applications before sentencing.

The court dismissed the request, holding that while it had jurisdiction, the application was properly declined due to the accused's failure to raise the delay issue in a timely manner as required by the Jordan framework.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

At trial, the Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights were breached.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked objective grounds for the arrest and breath demand, breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court also found a s. 10(b) breach because police failed to identify the accused when leaving voicemails for his counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches were not serious and had minimal impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was found guilty of the 80 plus charge.

Following findings of guilt on two counts of uttering threats, the defendant sought to schedule a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The court declined to hear the application, holding that the defendant failed to comply with her duty to raise delay proactively and in a timely manner, having made a tactical decision to await the trial outcome before pursuing the application, contrary to the principles established in R. v. J.F. and R. v. MacLaughlin.

Following settlement of two family law motions concerning parenting time and access to child-related information, the court determined whether a costs award should nevertheless be made.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs may appropriately follow settlement where success and unreasonable conduct can still be assessed.

The court found that the mother made early, consistent, and reasonable offers on the core parenting issue that closely matched the ultimate resolution, while the father achieved limited success on the information motion.

Balancing divided success, litigation conduct, the timing of offers, and deficiencies in the mother's bill of costs, the court ordered the father to pay the mother $6,000 inclusive.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause bodily harm to her son and threatening to burn her daughter-in-law's business property.

Both threats arose from a single voicemail message left on August 25, 2023, following the accused's exclusion from her other son's funeral.

The accused admitted leaving the voicemail.

The defence argued the language was figurative, referring to civil litigation rather than literal threats.

The court found that a reasonable person would perceive the voicemail as containing threats of physical harm and property damage, and that the accused subjectively intended to intimidate and be taken seriously.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Three self-represented informants filed peace bond applications alleging fear of intimate partner violence (IPV) without specifying whether they sought a standard peace bond under section 810 of the Criminal Code or the newly legislated IPV-specific peace bond under section 810.03.

The court addressed procedural and jurisdictional questions regarding how such nonspecific applications should be processed.

The court determined that informants, not the court, must decide which type of recognizance they are seeking and that the choice cannot be made unilaterally by court staff or judicial officers.

A motion concerning parental access to five children in the temporary care and custody of a child protection society.

The children were removed following extremely serious abuse allegations.

The respondent parents were subsequently charged criminally and released on conditions restricting contact with the children.

The court addressed the interaction between criminal release orders and child protection orders, determining that criminal court orders prevail to the extent of any conflict.

The court then assessed appropriate access under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, balancing the risks of harm from alleged abuse against the harm of complete separation from parents.

The court ordered supervised daytime access for the mother (minimum once weekly for three hours) and more restricted supervised access for the father (once weekly for maximum 90 minutes), with no access for the oldest child who disclosed the most severe abuse.

Access remains subject to criminal court release conditions.

The father brought a motion alleging the mother was in contempt of court orders regarding parenting time, as the children had refused to participate in alternating weekend visits since October 2024.

The mother brought a cross-motion seeking retroactive authorization for her relocation with the two daughters from Barrie to Burk's Falls, Ontario.

The court declined to find contempt but found the mother in breach of the parenting order.

The court authorized the relocation on a temporary basis, imposed conditions requiring the mother to use reasonable parenting tools to facilitate the father's parenting time, and ordered both parties to participate in mediation and reunification therapy.

The court also imposed restrictions on further relocations and apportioned travel costs to the mother.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light before veering into a field.

Blood analysis indicated a blood alcohol concentration between 70-110 mg/100mL at the time of driving, with toxicological evidence suggesting impairment at that level.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure, which was later withdrawn.

The court found the arrest and blood demand were supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

Considering the totality of evidence including witness observations of slurred speech, unsteady gait, odour of alcohol, the collision circumstances, and toxicological evidence, the court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a combination of alcohol and cannabis, and that he drove dangerously by failing to observe a sustained red light and stopped vehicles ahead.

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence and the applicability of solicitor-client privilege in the context of a Gardiner hearing at sentencing for fraud.

The accused, Stephenie Chevis, pleaded guilty to fraud involving misappropriation of funds from a law firm's trust and general accounts.

The court considered whether evidence relating to certain transactions involving other clients of the law firm, potentially protected by solicitor-client privilege, could be admitted.

The judge analyzed the scope of privilege, distinguishing between protected communications and public legal instruments such as wills and mortgages once acted upon.

The court also considered the "innocence at stake" exception to privilege but found no need to pierce privilege at this stage, as the accused was not seeking to elicit privileged communications.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to strike pleadings based on a respondent father's breach of a prior final order regarding child support payments and income disclosure.

The court found the father had breached the order but declined to strike his pleadings, instead ordering disclosure within 90 days and precluding relief related to child support until compliance.

Both parties sought costs, but the court found success was divided and both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court denied costs to both parties, emphasizing shared responsibility for the unnecessary motion.

This decision addresses a motion to strike pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent father's failure to comply with a prior child support order, specifically non-payment and failure to provide required income disclosure.

The court confirms the father's breach of the Final Order but declines to strike pleadings, emphasizing the importance of proportionality, the timing of the mother's motion, and the best interests of the child.

Instead, the court orders the father to provide outstanding financial documents within 90 days and precludes him from obtaining child support relief until compliance.

The decision highlights the court's discretion in sanctioning non-compliance and balancing procedural fairness with substantive justice in family law matters.

This decision addresses multiple Charter issues arising from an impaired driving investigation, including voluntariness of statements, grounds and timing for an approved screening device (ASD) demand, and the right to counsel under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the accused’s statements involuntary due to an inducement by police, but upheld the ASD demand as lawful with reasonable suspicion and no Charter breach in timing or delay in providing the right to counsel.

The accused was found to be the driver in care and control of the vehicle and impaired by alcohol beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in convictions on both impaired operation and BAC ’80 plus’ charges.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted a motion to strike the respondent’s pleadings in a family law matter involving decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and child support for a 16-year-old child.

The respondent failed to comply with court orders to provide financial documents and did not comply with the Family Law Rules regarding settlement and trial management conferences.

The court found the respondent’s non-compliance justified striking pleadings to allow the matter to proceed uncontested, emphasizing the need for finality and the applicant’s right to a just resolution.

The court declined to permit limited participation by the respondent after striking pleadings due to his history of non-compliance and absence.

This decision addresses the interpretation of section 527 of the Criminal Code concerning the conveyance of prisoners to court when they refuse to attend.

The court held that a s. 527 order compels the custodian to deliver the prisoner to court and that the use of necessary force to do so is authorized under s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code without requiring explicit language in the order.

The court emphasized that prisoners do not have a choice to refuse attendance and that correctional staff must be aware of their legal authority to use reasonable force.

The decision clarifies the interplay between s. 527 and s. 25, rejecting the need for “extraction orders” with specific force authorization clauses.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the respondent father's motion for summary judgment and addressed the issue of costs.

The successful applicant, self-represented and residing outside the region, sought costs for lost income and travel expenses totaling $2,001.48.

The respondent opposed costs, citing the applicant's unpreparedness and overestimation of lost work time.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, including Mattina v. Mattina, to determine costs.

The court found some inefficiencies attributable to the applicant but overall reasonable conduct during the summary judgment motion.

Considering the respondent's unreasonable conduct in bringing a duplicative motion, the court awarded costs of $2,000 payable monthly, emphasizing the need to discourage repetitive litigation.