Graham Jenner

Following findings of guilt on two counts of uttering threats, the defendant sought to schedule a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The court declined to hear the application, holding that the defendant failed to comply with her duty to raise delay proactively and in a timely manner, having made a tactical decision to await the trial outcome before pursuing the application, contrary to the principles established in R. v. J.F. and R. v. MacLaughlin.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause bodily harm to her son and threatening to burn her daughter-in-law's business property.

Both threats arose from a single voicemail message left on August 25, 2023, following the accused's exclusion from her other son's funeral.

The accused admitted leaving the voicemail.

The defence argued the language was figurative, referring to civil litigation rather than literal threats.

The court found that a reasonable person would perceive the voicemail as containing threats of physical harm and property damage, and that the accused subjectively intended to intimidate and be taken seriously.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Three self-represented informants filed peace bond applications alleging fear of intimate partner violence (IPV) without specifying whether they sought a standard peace bond under section 810 of the Criminal Code or the newly legislated IPV-specific peace bond under section 810.03.

The court addressed procedural and jurisdictional questions regarding how such nonspecific applications should be processed.

The court determined that informants, not the court, must decide which type of recognizance they are seeking and that the choice cannot be made unilaterally by court staff or judicial officers.

A motion concerning parental access to five children in the temporary care and custody of a child protection society.

The children were removed following extremely serious abuse allegations.

The respondent parents were subsequently charged criminally and released on conditions restricting contact with the children.

The court addressed the interaction between criminal release orders and child protection orders, determining that criminal court orders prevail to the extent of any conflict.

The court then assessed appropriate access under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, balancing the risks of harm from alleged abuse against the harm of complete separation from parents.

The court ordered supervised daytime access for the mother (minimum once weekly for three hours) and more restricted supervised access for the father (once weekly for maximum 90 minutes), with no access for the oldest child who disclosed the most severe abuse.

Access remains subject to criminal court release conditions.

The father brought a motion alleging the mother was in contempt of court orders regarding parenting time, as the children had refused to participate in alternating weekend visits since October 2024.

The mother brought a cross-motion seeking retroactive authorization for her relocation with the two daughters from Barrie to Burk's Falls, Ontario.

The court declined to find contempt but found the mother in breach of the parenting order.

The court authorized the relocation on a temporary basis, imposed conditions requiring the mother to use reasonable parenting tools to facilitate the father's parenting time, and ordered both parties to participate in mediation and reunification therapy.

The court also imposed restrictions on further relocations and apportioned travel costs to the mother.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light before veering into a field.

Blood analysis indicated a blood alcohol concentration between 70-110 mg/100mL at the time of driving, with toxicological evidence suggesting impairment at that level.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure, which was later withdrawn.

The court found the arrest and blood demand were supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

Considering the totality of evidence including witness observations of slurred speech, unsteady gait, odour of alcohol, the collision circumstances, and toxicological evidence, the court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a combination of alcohol and cannabis, and that he drove dangerously by failing to observe a sustained red light and stopped vehicles ahead.

This decision addresses the admissibility of evidence and the applicability of solicitor-client privilege in the context of a Gardiner hearing at sentencing for fraud.

The accused, Stephenie Chevis, pleaded guilty to fraud involving misappropriation of funds from a law firm's trust and general accounts.

The court considered whether evidence relating to certain transactions involving other clients of the law firm, potentially protected by solicitor-client privilege, could be admitted.

The judge analyzed the scope of privilege, distinguishing between protected communications and public legal instruments such as wills and mortgages once acted upon.

The court also considered the "innocence at stake" exception to privilege but found no need to pierce privilege at this stage, as the accused was not seeking to elicit privileged communications.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to strike pleadings based on a respondent father's breach of a prior final order regarding child support payments and income disclosure.

The court found the father had breached the order but declined to strike his pleadings, instead ordering disclosure within 90 days and precluding relief related to child support until compliance.

Both parties sought costs, but the court found success was divided and both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, the court denied costs to both parties, emphasizing shared responsibility for the unnecessary motion.

This decision addresses a motion to strike pleadings under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent father's failure to comply with a prior child support order, specifically non-payment and failure to provide required income disclosure.

The court confirms the father's breach of the Final Order but declines to strike pleadings, emphasizing the importance of proportionality, the timing of the mother's motion, and the best interests of the child.

Instead, the court orders the father to provide outstanding financial documents within 90 days and precludes him from obtaining child support relief until compliance.

The decision highlights the court's discretion in sanctioning non-compliance and balancing procedural fairness with substantive justice in family law matters.

This decision addresses multiple Charter issues arising from an impaired driving investigation, including voluntariness of statements, grounds and timing for an approved screening device (ASD) demand, and the right to counsel under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the accused’s statements involuntary due to an inducement by police, but upheld the ASD demand as lawful with reasonable suspicion and no Charter breach in timing or delay in providing the right to counsel.

The accused was found to be the driver in care and control of the vehicle and impaired by alcohol beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in convictions on both impaired operation and BAC ’80 plus’ charges.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted a motion to strike the respondent’s pleadings in a family law matter involving decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and child support for a 16-year-old child.

The respondent failed to comply with court orders to provide financial documents and did not comply with the Family Law Rules regarding settlement and trial management conferences.

The court found the respondent’s non-compliance justified striking pleadings to allow the matter to proceed uncontested, emphasizing the need for finality and the applicant’s right to a just resolution.

The court declined to permit limited participation by the respondent after striking pleadings due to his history of non-compliance and absence.

This decision addresses the interpretation of section 527 of the Criminal Code concerning the conveyance of prisoners to court when they refuse to attend.

The court held that a s. 527 order compels the custodian to deliver the prisoner to court and that the use of necessary force to do so is authorized under s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code without requiring explicit language in the order.

The court emphasized that prisoners do not have a choice to refuse attendance and that correctional staff must be aware of their legal authority to use reasonable force.

The decision clarifies the interplay between s. 527 and s. 25, rejecting the need for “extraction orders” with specific force authorization clauses.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the respondent father's motion for summary judgment and addressed the issue of costs.

The successful applicant, self-represented and residing outside the region, sought costs for lost income and travel expenses totaling $2,001.48.

The respondent opposed costs, citing the applicant's unpreparedness and overestimation of lost work time.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant case law, including Mattina v. Mattina, to determine costs.

The court found some inefficiencies attributable to the applicant but overall reasonable conduct during the summary judgment motion.

Considering the respondent's unreasonable conduct in bringing a duplicative motion, the court awarded costs of $2,000 payable monthly, emphasizing the need to discourage repetitive litigation.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced T.O. following his guilty pleas to four counts of voyeurism under s. 162(1) and one count of theft under s. 334(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The offences involved surreptitious sexualized photography of children and adults, including nude images and the theft and sexual use of victims' underwear.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the large volume of images (over 1,000), the prolonged duration of offending over five years, abuse of trust, and the significant impact on victims and their families.

Mitigating factors included T.O.'s lack of prior record at the time of offences, guilty pleas, remorse, and engagement in treatment.

The court rejected a conditional sentence order, imposing an effective custodial sentence of almost 18 months, followed by three years’ probation with strict conditions, and a 10-year SOIRA order.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, forfeiture of electronic devices, and communication restrictions.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Ryan Wood to an effective four years’ imprisonment for possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, concurrent with an 18-month sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offender, a 31-year-old with a serious and related criminal record including prior firearm offences and breaches of court orders, was credited 1.5 days for each day in pretrial custody.

The court emphasized the seriousness of firearm offences, especially for repeat offenders, and considered systemic anti-Black racism as a mitigating factor but found it insufficient to reduce the sentence below the Crown’s position.

The decision reflects careful balancing of deterrence, denunciation, public safety, and rehabilitation principles.

This child protection application involved a temporary care and custody hearing for two children (ages 14 and 12) removed from their mother's care.

The Children's Aid Society sought court approval for the current placements.

A key issue was the Society's failure to provide proper notice to the children aged 12 and older, as required by s. 79(4) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The court emphasized that this statutory requirement is mandatory and cannot be overlooked due to exigencies.

The hearing was adjourned for two days to allow the Society to serve notice to the children.

Despite the adjournment, the court issued a temporary, without prejudice order approving the children's current placements (son with maternal grandmother, daughter in society care) based on evidence of risk of harm if returned to the mother's care, including hazardous home conditions, drug paraphernalia, inadequate supervision, and allegations of physical and sexual inappropriateness.

The Children's Aid Society sought leave to withdraw its child protection application concerning two children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) and the father opposed the withdrawal, arguing that live protection concerns and parental alienation issues required adjudication.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that the children's best interests required a full factual record and timely determination of outstanding issues.

The court ordered that the child protection application and the parents' Children's Law Reform Act application proceed to a combined trial, ensuring OCL involvement and preserving the option of continued society involvement.

The respondent, the biological father, brought a motion to vary interim parenting time and primary residence of his six-year-old child, seeking to have the child primarily reside with him and to eliminate the applicant's (the child's step-mother) parenting time.

The applicant opposed, asserting her significant parental role.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, finding the applicant had played a central parental role and was a stable force.

The court noted the respondent's substance abuse, violent and harassing behaviour, and his unwillingness to support the child's relationship with the applicant.

The respondent's motion was dismissed, and the existing temporary order, which provided for the child to primarily reside with the applicant and granted the respondent specific parenting time, was maintained with additional conditions.

The respondent mother sought to set aside a final order, including provisions for retroactive and ongoing child support and costs, which resulted from an uncontested trial where her pleadings were struck and she was noted in default.

She argued she was not made aware of her lawyer being removed from the record or of the father's motion to strike, claiming the email address used for notice was not in use.

The court granted the mother's motion to set aside the final order and the order striking her pleadings, finding that she did not receive adequate notice of the motion to strike, presented an arguable case on the merits, and acted promptly upon learning of the order, despite her prior inattentiveness to the proceedings.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the accused's Charter application, which alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the "manifestly frivolous" standard established in R. v. Haevischer, the court found that none of the accused's Charter arguments were manifestly frivolous.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the Charter application was allowed to proceed to a voir dire at trial.

The judge also provided observations on the efficiency and procedural considerations of such summary dismissal motions.