ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MERCEDEZ CIUTTI
Applicant
— AND —
MICHAEL BEDARD
Respondent
Before Justice G. Jenner
Costs submissions received in writing November 17, 2025
Costs endorsement released on November 21, 2025
Samantha Chaput counsel for the applicant
Jordan Duplessis counsel for the respondent
JENNER J.:
Costs Endorsement re: Motions Scheduled for October 17, 2025
I. Introduction
1On October 17, 2025, I was to hear two motions brought by the respondent father, who resides in Sudbury, Ontario, against the applicant mother, who resides in North Bay, Ontario, in respect of their three-year-old son (the child). The motions resolved on consent except for the issue of costs. After directing the parties to address that issue in writing, I received and reviewed the minutes of settlement and the costs submissions of both parties, including bills of costs and various formal and informal written offers to settle.
2Despite resolving the substantive issues on the motion, the parties are over $37,000 apart on costs. The father seeks his costs on full indemnity basis in the amount of $20,933.92. He alleges the mother behaved unreasonably, repeatedly breached the court’s previous orders, and declined to engage in reasonable resolution discussions. The mother seeks her costs on a full indemnity basis in the amount of $16,596.87. She suggests this is a case of divided success but argues that the father’s own unreasonable conduct justifies her request. She stresses that the father’s failure to follow the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (the Rules) contributed to significant costs. Both parties allege the other acted in bad faith.
II. General Legal Framework
3Rule 24 of the Rules establishes the framework for awarding costs for family law cases in this court. The elements of that framework which are germane to this matter are as follows:
Costs Deciding Costs
- (1) Promptly after dealing with a step in a case, the court shall, in a summary manner,
(a) determine who, if anyone, is entitled to costs in relation to that step and set the amount of any costs; or
(b) expressly reserve the decision on costs for determination at a later step in the case.
Entitlement to costs, presumption
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, there is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a step in a case.
Divided success
(4) If success in a step in a case is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate.
Unreasonable behaviour by successful party
(7) A successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a step in a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.
Same
(8) In deciding whether a party has behaved unreasonably, the court shall examine,
(a) the party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;
(b) the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and
(c) any offer the party withdrew or did not accept.
Bad faith
(10) If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.
Failure to accept offer
(12) A party who makes an offer in relation to a step in a case is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date to the conclusion of the step, if the following conditions are met:
If the offer relates to a motion, it is made at least one day before the motion date.
If the offer relates to a trial or the hearing of a step other than a motion, it is made at least seven days before the trial or hearing date.
The offer does not expire and is not withdrawn before the hearing starts.
The offer is not accepted.
The party who made the offer obtains an order that is as good as or better than the offer.
Same, burden of proof
(13) The burden of proof that the order is as good as or better than the offer to settle is on the party who claims the benefit of subrule (12)
Setting costs amounts
(14) In setting the amount of costs in relation to a step in the case, the court may consider,
(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors, as applicable, as they relate to the importance and complexity of the issues in the step:
(i) Each party’s behaviour,
(ii) The time spent by each party,
(iii) any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the conditions set out in subrule (12) or the requirements of rule 18,
(iv) Any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,
(b) any other relevant matter.
Requirement for parties to confer
(17) Before each step in a case, each party shall confer or make best efforts to confer orally or in writing with every other party with a view to settling costs, including the amount of costs, unless the party is prohibited from such communication by a court order or there is a risk of domestic violence by a party who is not represented by a licensed representative.
4In Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867, the Court of Appeal for Ontario articulated that modern costs rules are designed in furtherance of four fundamental principles:
(1) to partially indemnify successful litigants;
(2) to encourage settlement;
(3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants; and
(4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly (pursuant to rule 2(2) of the Rules).
III. Costs Following Settlement
5Courts have observed that when parties reach a settlement, courts should be slow to award costs unless there are compelling reasons to do so. It is difficult for the court to determine success where there has not been judicial fact-finding or legal determination. It also requires the parties and the court to revisit issues that have ostensibly been resolved, generating further legal costs for the parties and further demands on finite judicial resources: Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 2015 ONSC 6378, at para. 42; Frape v. Mastrokalos, 2017 ONCJ 915, at paras. 56-57; Shute v. Shute, 2017 ONCJ 533, at para. 33; Krueger v. Krueger, [2017] O.J. No. 1108 (SCJ); Goetschel v. Goetschel, 2022 ONSC 5860, at paras. 12-15.
6Courts have equally recognized that there are cases in which a costs order is appropriate even following a negotiated resolution. Courts have seen fit to award costs where the court can readily ascertain success and assess unreasonable conduct: Goetschel, at para. 16; Scipione v. Del Sordo¸ 2015 ONSC 5982, at para. 64; Okafor v. Okafor, 2022 ONCJ 290; Ali Hassan v. Abdullah, 2023 ONCJ 186, at para. 28.
7Ultimately, a balance must be struck. Rule 2(3)(d) requires that, in dealing with cases justly, the court must give appropriate resources to the case while considering the need to give resources to other cases. The court must be appropriately protective of its finite resources when considering costs requests. At the same time, summary dismissal of costs requests in settled matters can undermine the Mattina principles. I agree with and adopt the observations made in Scipione v. Del Sordo, 2015 ONSC 5982, at para. 64, which I would restate as follows:
(i) parties are to be encouraged to settle up to and including the commencement of a hearing;
(ii) in some cases, determining success is possible and straightforward,
(iii) settling at a late stage does not erase a history of poor litigation choices, and may simply be damage control,
(iv) reasonable parties who foresee success should not be pressured to avoid settling out of fear of sacrificing a costs claim; and
(v) foreclosing costs based on signed minutes of settlement can discourage resolution.
IV. Context
The preceding order
8Before resolution was reached on the motion, parenting issues between the parties were governed by the temporary order of Justice Lefebvre dated April 25, 2024. The relevant terms of that order provided for a graduated increase in the father’s parenting time, beginning with one hour per week and, over the course of several months, increasing to one overnight visit per week for a minimum of 18 hours. The order provided that the parenting time shall thereafter be increased as agreed to by the parties considering the recommendations made by the AFCC (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts) guidance.
The motions
9The father brought two motions related to parenting issues. The father filed a motion for an interim parenting order on March 18, 2025 (the main parenting motion). It was originally scheduled to be heard on August 12, 2025.
10In the main parenting motion, the father sought the following substantive relief on an interim basis:
An order that he have parenting time with the child three weekends per month from Friday at 4:00 pm to Sunday at 3:00 pm, with weekends being extended by one day in the event of a long weekend, with pick-ups at daycare and drop-offs at the Chelmsford Community Centre.
An order for a specific holiday parenting time schedule.
An order that the mother shall contact the child’s daycare center to request they authorize the father to pick the child up.
A police enforcement clause.
11The main parenting motion was not reached on August 12, 2025, and was adjourned to be argued on October 17, 2025. On August 29, 2025, the father filed an amended notice of motion. It sought the same relief as previous, but added a request for an order that the mother pay an $8,000 fine pursuant to Rule 1(8)(a.1) of the Rules.
12On September 3, 2025, the father filed a 14B motion seeking an order that he be provided with any information from all third parties providing medical, dental, educational, childcare, or any other services to the child (the information motion). The motion came before Justice Lefebvre in writing. The mother opposed the motion being heard in writing. The court agreed and adjourned the information motion to be argued with the parenting time motion on October 17, 2025.
The resolution
13Minutes of Settlement were executed on October 16, 2025, resolving both motions. They provide for the following:
The father shall have parenting time from Saturday October 18, 2025, at 3:00 pm to Sunday October 19, 2025, at 10:30 am.
Beginning October 24, 2025, the father shall have parenting time every second weekend from Fridays at 4:30 pm to Sundays at 3:00 pm, with pick-ups at the child’s daycare, and drop-offs at the Howard Armstrong Recreation Centre in Hanmer, Ontario, extended on holidays.
The father shall have four make-up weekends of parenting time between October 2025 and March 2026.
The parties retain the right to discuss the child’s welfare with the child’s medical caregivers and teachers and shall have equal access to related documentation that relates solely to the child. For clarity, the father may reach out to the child’s care providers to request information related to the child’s well-being, and any unrelated information or information about the mother is not to be released.
14There are additional provisions respecting daycare costs, holiday parenting time, and additional parenting time when the applicant is unable to parent and the daycare is closed.
15The Minutes of Settlement expressly indicate that “[a]ll other claims in the respondent’s notice of motion’s [sic] shall be dismissed, with the exception of costs only.”
Offers to settle
16The following offers to settle were made. I have omitted minor terms relating to exchange points and holidays and have simplified the parenting time to focus on frequency rather than specific schedule. No party suggests that any offer to settle triggered the consequences of r. 24(12).
Date of Offer
Offering Party
Key Aspects
August 26, 2024
Mother
The father shall have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at 6:00 pm to Sunday at 3:00 pm.
Each party shall bear their own costs of the motion.
May 29, 2025
Mother*
Beginning May 30, 2025, the father shall have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at 4:30 pm to Sunday at 3:00 pm.
Each party shall bear their own costs of the motion.
*the parties worked towards a consent, which ultimately the mother was prepared to accept and the father rejected.
July 29, 2025
Mother
The father shall have parenting time for three weekends in August from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon. Beginning September 12, 2025, the father shall have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at 4:30 pm to Sunday at 3:00 pm.
Each party shall bear their own costs of the motion.
July 28/30, 2025*
Father
The father shall have parenting time four of the five weekends in August 2025 from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon.
For the remainder of 2025, the father shall have parenting time 50% of the weekends (the offer is silent as to the period after 2025).
The mother shall provide her consent to the child’s family physician and daycare to provide the respondent with any requested information.
Each party shall bear their own costs of the motion.
*the date on this document is July 28, but the father’s submissions date it the 30th.
August 5, 2025
Father
The mother shall sign any consent necessary for the father to obtain information from any third party providing care or services to the child.
October 7, 2025
Father
Beginning October 10, 2025, the father shall have parenting time every other weekend from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon.
The father shall have make-up parenting time on four weekends between October 2025 and January 2026.
The mother shall consent to the father being provided with information from all third parties providing care and services to the child on request.
Costs of the motion remain live.
October 15, 2025
Mother
Beginning October 24, 2025, the father shall have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at 6:00 pm to Sunday at 3:00 pm.
There shall be two weekends of make-up parenting time between November 2025 and January 2026.
The parties shall retain the right to discuss the child’s welfare with care providers and shall have equal access to related documentation.
Each party shall bear their own costs of the motion.
V. Analysis
Success and the offers to settle
17Success is difficult to assess in this case. On the information motion, it appears the father was successful in obtaining a term in line with what he initially sought. On the main issue of ongoing parenting time, however, the father achieved an outcome that was less than the relief he initially sought before amending his motion quite late in the process (three weekends per month down to two). Moreover, his achieved outcome was close to what he had been consistently offered by the mother.
18I am aware of the line of cases in which courts have held that offers to settle should not be considered in determining success (e.g. Spadacini- Kelava v. Kelava, 2021 ONSC 2490, at para. 72; Liddell-MacInnis v. MacInnis, 2021 ONSC 2777), but am more persuaded by the approach taken in Lawson v. Lawson, 2008 CanLII 23496 (Ont. SC), at para. 7. The latter was recently followed in Grant v. Runciman, 2025 ONSC 857, in which the court observed, at para. 13, that one method of gauging success is to compare the eventual order to any settlement offers that were made. In this particular case, and considering the principles that must be balanced in examining post-settlement costs disputes, I find the timeline of offers to settle is critical.1
19The mother argues she has made early, consistent, and reasonable efforts to resolve this matter. The father says the mother’s offers to settle contain terms much less favourable to the father than was ultimately agreed-on. They provided limited make-up parenting time and limited his Christmas parenting time. He argues that his offers dated July 30, 2025, and October 7, 2025, contain nearly identical terms to those ultimately agreed-on. Had the mother agreed to his terms on July 30, 2025, the father submits, it would have saved both parties significant legal fees. The father concedes that his original position was for parenting time three weekends per month but stipulates that he reasonably reduced his expectation to two weekends per month prior to the original motion date in August 2025.
20That these parties were not able to resolve the parenting time aspect of this motion at an earlier stage is disappointing. Both made offers to settle at different junctures on terms very similar to those ultimately adopted in the minutes of settlement. Having said that, a review of the timeline of offers to settle indicates that the mother’s offers were made at a much earlier stage. Early enough, in fact, that had they been accepted, make-up parenting time would not have arisen as a critical issue. The father could have accepted a shift to alternating weekend parenting time as early as September 2024. His offers to settle, while also closely aligned with the ultimate agreement reached, were not made until much later in the process, close in time to the original motion date, and after the bulk of the legal work had been undertaken.
21I am mindful as well that until recently this matter has been scheduled for trial in December 2025. With trial dates approaching, it was not reasonable for the father to treat make-up parenting time as a critical issue holding up resolution of ongoing parenting time. On the main issue of ongoing parenting time, the timeline of offers to settle strongly supports a flow of costs from the father to the mother, in particular with respect to the pre-August 2025 period.
22With regard to the information motion, I take a different view. It appears to me that by filing the 14B motion the father was seeking a court order to clarify what was already the case under s. 20(5) of the Children’s Law Reform Act; that he, as a parent, had the right to make inquiries and be given information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education. The mother’s response to that motion was a complaint on procedural grounds. While the mother may have taken some exception to the proposed wording of an order, she was ultimately content with language very similar to that proposed by the father, as is demonstrated by her own offer to settle and the ultimate resolution. The mother’s failure to make reasonable efforts to resolve the information motion promptly cuts against her.
(Un)reasonableness of Conduct / Bad Faith
23The father’s initial filing of a 139-page affidavit was unreasonable and contributed to unnecessary expense. I consider this as a factor, but give it limited weight, as the court required him to re-file a condensed affidavit. I am not prepared to find the father acted unreasonably in filing further affidavits. The original motion date was delayed through no fault of the parties, and it was reasonable for the parties to seek to place updated information before the court.
24The father asks me to find the mother acted unreasonably, and indeed in bad faith by unilaterally imposing conditions on his parenting time and by breaching the terms of the previous order on several occasions. I am not prepared to undertake an exploration of that issue. The father’s motion was amended to include r. 1(8) relief relating to this very issue. The minutes of settlement see that issue dismissed. In my view, a post-settlement costs request cannot be used as a Trojan horse to pursue claims that have been abandoned as part of the substantive resolution. If the father wished to pursue relief for the alleged conduct, he ought to have pursued the claim. He chose not to.
25I reject the mother’s submission that I should consider, in determining costs, the decision of the father to pursue the information motion by way of 14B. The question of the form of that motion was directly before Justice Lefebvre, who directed that it be set for argument as a regular motion, and made no corresponding costs order. Justice Lefebvre did not reserve the question of costs for my consideration.
26In the result, I make no findings of bad faith. My limited findings as to unreasonableness do not change my view that an appropriate costs award should primarily reflect the father’s failure to accept the mother’s earlier offers on the core issue of ongoing parenting time, and to a lesser extent the mother’s failure to resolve the information motion promptly. I am not persuaded that any circumstances warrant a heightened cost award at or approaching a full recovery basis.
Costs amounts
27In determining an appropriate quantum of costs, I am obligated to assess the reasonableness of costs claimed. This analysis can be undertaken in a global fashion and I am not required to conduct a painstaking line-by-line review: Docherty v. Catherwood, 2016 ONSC 2140, at para. 50. Additionally, without the parenting motion having been argued, the court is poorly positioned to opine on the reasonableness and proportionality of the fees claimed. Having mind to r. 2(3)(d), the court is not prepared to engage in a comprehensive examination of the complexity of a motion not argued. I am mindful, however, that the bills of costs for both parties reflect similar fees, at similar rates, for similarly experienced counsel. In that context, I am not prepared to second-guess the fees claimed as unreasonable or excessive.
28Costs may be discounted, however, due to lack of detail in a bill of costs: Tintinalli v. Tutolo, 2022 ONSC 6276, at para. 44, Nguyen v. Khookrathok, 2017 ONCJ 783, at paras. 16-19. The mother’s bill of costs does not detail when costs were incurred, which deprives the court of the ability to assess what proportion of the fees relate to what period and frustrates the court’s ability to consider the fees in conjunction with the various offers to settle. It warrants a more conservative estimation of her costs.
VI. Conclusion
29Considering (i) the parties’ degree of success, the parties’ conduct, the timeline of offers to settle, and the resolution reached, and mindful of the principles articulated in Mattina v. Mattina, I find that an award of costs is appropriate in this case.
30The mother made early, consistent, and reasonable offers to settle the core issue of ongoing parenting time, which closely aligned with the ultimate resolution. The father’s failure to accept these offers at an earlier stage resulted in unnecessary legal expense and prolonged litigation. The father achieved some success on the information motion, and the mother’s conduct in relation to that issue warrants a modest reduction in her entitlement to costs. The deficiencies in her bill of costs warrant a further reduction.
31I order that the father pay the mother costs in the amount of $6,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and applicable taxes. Installments of $2,000 shall be due on the first day of each of the next three months. On default, the entire amount shall be due immediately.
Released: November 21, 2025
Signed: Justice G. Jenner