Glenn Peter Christie

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on gender expression after being required to remove her brassiere while in police custody.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending the conclusion of concurrent criminal proceedings, as the respondent suggested the applicant might bring a Charter challenge on the same facts.

The Tribunal declined to defer the application, finding that it was uncertain whether a Charter application would actually be brought, and deferral on a speculative basis was not appropriate.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitral award that dismissed a professor for just cause.

The underlying dismissal occurred in 2001, and the arbitral award was issued in 2002.

Due to various procedural steps, adjournments, and a late intervention by the dismissed professor raising jurisdictional arguments, the application did not proceed to a hearing until 2014.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for extreme delay, finding that relitigating a workplace dispute over a decade later would cause prejudice and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant filed two applications alleging racial discrimination and reprisal in employment.

A summary hearing was held to determine if the applications had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the allegation regarding a 2010 comment as having no reasonable prospect of success and being untimely.

However, the Tribunal allowed the remaining allegations of racial discrimination, centering on a 'slave for a day' email, to proceed.

The reprisal application, which alleged the applicant's short-term disability benefits were terminated for filing the human rights claim, was dismissed as there was no evidence linking the termination to the application.

The Port Hope Police Services Board applied under section 40 of the Police Services Act for consent to terminate six civilian communicators in order to outsource communications and dispatch services to the Owen Sound Police Service.

After a public meeting and review of the proposed dispatching agreement, the Commission found that the outsourcing would continue to provide adequate and effective police services for Port Hope while addressing financial pressures.

The Commission consented to the application, ordering that any outstanding severance issues be submitted to arbitration if not resolved within 90 days.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on sex after police charged him with assault but refused to charge his ex-girlfriend, and the Crown subsequently withdrew private charges against her.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the Ministry of the Attorney General on the basis of prosecutorial immunity.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the Barrie Police Services Board, finding it was filed outside the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code and the applicant failed to demonstrate the delay was incurred in good faith.

The applicant, a firefighter, alleged discrimination in employment based on race, colour, place of origin, citizenship, and ethnic origin.

He claimed he was denied the opportunity to drive a fire truck, subjected to derogatory comments about his traditional food, and improperly directed to remove a baseball cap indoors.

The Tribunal found no prima facie case of discrimination regarding the cap and food incidents, as there was no evidence linking the actions to a prohibited ground.

While a prima facie case was established regarding the denial of driving duties, the respondents provided a credible, non-discriminatory explanation based on the applicant's driving history and the Captain's discretion in assigning duties.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed against the WSIB and an individual respondent, and whether other individual respondents should be removed.

On consent, the application was dismissed against the WSIB and one individual, and other individual respondents were removed.

However, the Tribunal declined to remove the applicant's manager as a personal respondent, finding that he was alleged to have engaged in personal conduct for which the organizational respondent might be vicariously liable, but which it did not endorse.

The City of Kawartha Lakes Police Service brought a motion to dismiss Constable Randy Johnson's appeal for failing to file a notice of appeal within the 30-day statutory period under section 87(1) of the Police Services Act.

The appellant argued he did not receive written notice of the penalty decision until he received a letter from the Chief on February 15, 2012.

The Commission found that the appellant received written notice on January 6, 2012, when the Hearing Officer emailed the decision to his counsel on consent.

As the notice of appeal was filed late and the Commission has no statutory power to extend the time period, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial, the only remaining issue concerned the quantum of partial indemnity costs payable by the employer to the employee.

The employee sought over $455,000 in costs, including a large disbursement for services provided by a corporate entity associated with a lay witness who assisted counsel and testified at trial.

The court found several categories of claimed legal fees excessive, particularly for pleadings and trial preparation, and held that the defendant should not bear the cost of premium legal services retained by the plaintiff.

The court also significantly reduced the claimed disbursement for the lay witness’s advisory services, noting that much of the evidence was rejected and the invoices lacked sufficient detail.

Fees and disbursements were therefore substantially reduced.

The applicant, a firefighter, filed a Request for Order during Proceedings seeking production of several documents, including the employer's driving and insurance policies, his driver's abstract, notes, and expert reports related to the decision not to allow him to drive fire vehicles.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the policies were not arguably relevant, the request for notes and expert reports was speculative, and the applicant could obtain his own driver's abstract.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing his grievances against the Police Services Board.

The arbitrator had ruled that the applicant lacked standing to proceed to arbitration because his police association refused to take carriage of the grievances.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that under the Police Services Act and the collective agreement, an individual officer does not have the right to arbitrate a grievance against the employer without the association's support.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The grievor, a bus driver, was terminated for texting on her cell phone while driving a bus with passengers.

The union grieved the termination, arguing the penalty was excessive and seeking a lesser penalty.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievance, finding that the grievor had a prior disciplinary record for the same offence, had signed a condition of continued employment, and demonstrated a lack of remorse and dishonesty throughout the investigation and hearing.

The termination was upheld.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination in employment and with respect to membership in a vocational association.

During the hearing of the applications, the applicant requested to withdraw both applications.

The respondents consented to the withdrawals.

The Tribunal granted the requests and the applications were withdrawn with leave of the Tribunal.

During a grievance arbitration regarding the termination of a bus driver for texting while driving, the Union objected to the admission of the grievor's cell phone records.

The Employer had obtained the records from Rogers via a subpoena issued by the Board, but had excused the Rogers representative from attending the hearing.

The Union argued this was litigation by ambush, a violation of PIPEDA, and an abuse of process.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the objections, finding that the records were arguably relevant, obtained under a valid subpoena (which satisfies PIPEDA exceptions), and that the procedure used did not constitute an abuse of process.

The Union raised a preliminary objection seeking to exclude a forensic handwriting analyst's report, arguing that the Employer breached the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act by providing the grievor's handwriting samples from business documents to the analyst.

The Employer used the samples to identify the grievor as the author of an offensive comment on a sympathy card.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the objection, finding that the labour relations exceptions in s. 65(6) of the Act applied, as the documents were used in relation to anticipated proceedings and employment-related matters in which the Employer had an interest.

During an arbitration hearing, an issue arose regarding a summons issued to Rogers, the delivery of requested documents to the employer's counsel, and the employer's failure to produce those records to the union.

The union requested an adjournment.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the employer to provide the union with a copy of the summons, details of any communications with Rogers regarding the summons, and the dates of service and receipt of documents.

The Board also permitted the union to confer with the grievor on this issue only.

Three police officers appealed a finding of guilt for neglect of duty and discreditable conduct arising from their entry into an apartment without a Feeney endorsement or valid consent.

The officers argued the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to admit fresh evidence suggesting the public complainant had set them up, and by misinterpreting police service policies regarding consent.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the Hearing Officer had no statutory authority to reopen the hearing to admit fresh evidence after rendering a finding of guilt.

The Commission also held that the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the person who permitted entry was not an 'occupant' capable of giving lawful consent was reasonable.

The applicant, a Black temporary general labourer, alleged racial discrimination in employment by the respondent temporary employment agency and its employees.

He claimed he was unfairly disciplined following an altercation with a client's security guard, given less desirable shifts, and denied the opportunity to take a test for a higher-paying position.

The Tribunal found no evidence of racial discrimination.

The discipline was based on the applicant's inappropriate conduct, scheduling decisions were based on availability and client needs, and the applicant did not qualify for the higher-paying position because he failed to achieve the required score on an initial aptitude test.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability regarding his termination.

He had also commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal arising from the same facts.

The Tribunal considered whether the application was barred under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that because the civil action did not specifically claim a Code infringement or seek a remedy under the Code, the application was not barred.

However, on the agreement of both parties, the Tribunal deferred the application pending the resolution of the civil action.

The respondent employer brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the human rights application on the basis that the applicant had already commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal arising from the same facts.

The Tribunal found that the civil action included claims for damages based on the employer's alleged failure to accommodate the applicant's disability under the Human Rights Code.

Applying section 34(11) of the Code, the Tribunal held that the application was barred because the applicant had asked a court to find a Code infringement and award damages.

The application was dismissed.