William May v. Irving Tissue Corporation, 2009 HRTO 1715

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

William May

Applicant

-and-

Irving Tissue Corporation

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Kaye Joachim

Date: October 20, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 1715

Indexed as: May v. Irving Tissue

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY

William May, Applicant ) Daniel Lokun,

) Counsel

Irving Tissue Corporation, ) Glenn Christie,

Respondent ) Counsel

1This Interim Decision addresses whether the Application is barred or should be deferred as the applicant is a plaintiff in an ongoing civil proceeding.

2The complaint filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission on July 9, 2007 and abandoned upon filing the present Application, alleges that the respondent discriminated on the basis of disability with respect to his employment, including the termination of his employment and disability benefits.

3In May 2008, the applicant filed a civil action against the respondent seeking damages for wrongful dismissal arising out of the same factual situation set out in the complaint.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

4Section 34 (11) of the Code provides:

A person who believes that one of his or her rights under Part I has been infringed may not make an application under subsection (1) with respect to that right if,

(a) a civil proceeding has been commenced in a court in which the person is seeking an order under section 46.1 with respect to the alleged infringement and the proceeding has not been finally determined or withdrawn; or

(b) a court has finally determined the issue of whether the right has been infringed or the matter has been settled.

5Section 46.1 reads as follows:

46.1 (1) If, in a civil proceeding in a court, the court finds that a party to the proceeding has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the proceeding, the court may make either of the following orders, or both:

1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

(2) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to commence an action based solely on an infringement of a right under Part I.

ANALYSIS

6In my view, if a person raises in a civil proceeding an allegation of an infringement of a right under the Code arising out of a specific factual context, s. 34(11) bars that person from also filing an application before the Tribunal to claim a Code infringement arising out of the same factual context.

7This interpretation of s. 34(11), in my view, also corresponds to the underlying purpose and rationale for this provision. As stated in Beaver v. Dr. Hans Epp Dentistry Professional Corporation, 2008 HRTO 282 at para. 10:

Section 34(11) is intended to eliminate duplicate court and Tribunal proceedings alleging breaches of the Code. An applicant’s ability to bring an application at the Tribunal is removed where there is an ongoing court proceeding in which he or she has made a claim for remedies based upon the same alleged infringement of the Code, where a court has finally determined the issue of whether the right has been violated, or where the matter has been settled. Section 34(11) is triggered by the applicant’s decision to raise the Code and seek remedies for its violation in a court action.

8However, in this case, while there is some factual similarity between the civil action and the human rights Application, the civil action makes no specific reference to fact that could give rise to claim for a remedy under the Code. While the plaintiff has claimed that the respondent acted in bad faith, and sought an extension of the reasonable notice period, in the absence of a more specific reference to a breach of the duty to accommodate or a breach of the Code, I decline to find that the present Application is barred by s. 34(11) of the Code.

9Both parties agreed that, if the Application is not barred, it should be deferred pending the resolution of the civil action. I agree.

10In the circumstances of this case, I find that deferral is appropriate.

11At the conclusion of the civil action, either party may contact the Tribunal to continue processing the Application.