George Karahotzitis

The applicant sought the release of $2,750,000 from her share of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent brought a cross-motion, agreeing to release $500,000 to the applicant and $100,000 to himself, but sought to impose a condition that a further $2,000,000 be released to the applicant only upon her entering into an agreement to purchase a home in Toronto, citing concerns about her financial management and the children's future housing.

The court found no legal basis to impose such conditions on the applicant's share of property proceeds, distinguishing it from child support cases where such interference is rare and only in exceptional circumstances.

The court granted the applicant's motion for the release of funds without preconditions and denied the respondent's cross-motion.

The respondent brought a motion seeking extensive financial disclosure from the applicant in a family law proceeding, prior to the applicant's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the respondent's corollary claims for spousal and child support, which were based on a separation agreement.

The applicant argued that the disclosure motion constituted an abuse of process and was premature.

The court found no abuse of process, but limited the scope of the disclosure.

It ordered the applicant to produce specific financial documents related to his financial worth and income as of the date of the separation agreement (June 25, 2015), deferring requests for post-agreement disclosure until the summary judgment motion on the agreement's validity is determined.

The applicant, a former spouse, sought preservation and non-depletion orders under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act, respectively, to restrain the respondent from dissipating assets.

These orders were contingent on setting aside a comprehensive separation agreement due to alleged misrepresentation and non-disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant lacked standing for a section 40 order as a divorced spouse and failed to meet the stringent Mareva injunction test, which was deemed applicable given the contingent nature of her claims for equalization and support.

The court found no strong prima facie case to set aside the agreement, no evidence of asset dissipation to avoid judgment, and no undertaking as to damages.

The appellant husband appealed an interlocutory order requiring disclosure of income tax returns and a sworn financial statement in the context of a motion to set aside a 2015 separation agreement that capped his income for support calculations at $1 million per year and included a non-disclosure clause.

The respondent wife moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the substantive issue of the separation agreement's enforceability, but rather was a procedural disclosure order.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

In an uncontested trial, the applicant sought imputed income, retroactive and ongoing child support, a permanent restraining order, damages for assault and battery, and a divorce.

The respondent failed to provide financial disclosure and did not attend the hearing.

The court imputed income to the respondent at $80,000 per annum, awarded retroactive child support of $61,134 and ongoing support of $1,172 per month.

A permanent restraining order was issued against the respondent due to a history of verbal and physical abuse and the applicant's reasonable fear for safety.

General damages of $75,000 were awarded for domestic assaults, recognizing the egregious breach of trust in a marital relationship.

A divorce order was granted, along with a nominal spousal support award of $1.00 per month.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $45,664.

The applicant moved for a stay of an order granting the respondent exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, pending a motion for leave to appeal.

The court proceeded to hear the motion for leave to appeal alongside the stay motion.

The applicant argued the motion judge ignored the Family Law Act provisions regarding equal right to possession and criteria for exclusive possession.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, noting the applicant's failure to provide financial disclosure.

Both the motion for a stay and the motion for leave to appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent a 45% interest in a commercial property via constructive trust, retroactive spousal support, and prejudgment interest on an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the limitation period for the unjust enrichment claim was tolled due to the appellant's fraudulent concealment of the property's true ownership.

The court also upheld the awards for retroactive spousal support and prejudgment interest, noting the appellant's history of non-disclosure and failure to pay adequate support.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion to adjourn the trial scheduled for January 2016 to April or May 2016.

The moving party argued that an adjournment was necessary due to outstanding expert reports, incomplete questioning, and a pending section 30 assessment report.

The responding party opposed the motion, citing prejudice and the moving party's failure to comply with previous timetables.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had twice consented to trial dates and failed to comply with the associated timetables, and that further delay would prejudice the responding party and the parties' child.

The respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant's pleadings and a separate motion for contempt, both based on substantially similar allegations of breaching court orders.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the motion to strike pending the disposition of the contempt motion, arguing that responding to the motion to strike would effectively compel him to testify and violate his right against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The court agreed, finding that the applicant's right to a fair trial on the contempt motion would be prejudiced if he were forced to respond to the civil motion to strike first.

The court ordered the motion to strike stayed pending the resolution of the contempt motion.

The respondent wife in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking an order that service of her Answer and Amended Answer on the applicant husband be deemed service on 36 added corporate and trust respondents, arguing the husband was their alter ego.

The court found insufficient evidence on the motion to make an alter ego finding.

The court validated service on one Ontario corporation and two entities in non-contracting states under the Rules of Civil Procedure as they had actual notice.

However, the court held it had no discretion to validate service on the remaining entities located in Hague Convention contracting states, as Rule 17.05(3) is mandatory and a complete code for service abroad.

Following a successful motion transferring an application to the Family Court Branch, the responding party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the application had been commenced in the wrong forum and that the moving party had previously offered reasonable alternatives to avoid unnecessary motion proceedings.

The applicant nevertheless persisted with unsupported legal arguments and rejected offers to discontinue or consent to transfer.

The court held that the opposition was unreasonable and vexatious, warranting substantial indemnity costs.

Costs of $7,446 were awarded.

The responding party brought a motion to transfer an application challenging the validity of a marriage contract to the Family Court branch of the Superior Court of Justice.

The underlying application sought to set aside the contract under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act and obtain declaratory relief regarding jointly owned real property.

The court held that proceedings under the Family Law Act must be commenced and determined in the Family Court in municipalities where that branch exists, pursuant to ss. 21.1 and 21.8 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Because the application fell squarely within the Family Law Act and York Region has a Family Court, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer the proceeding to the Family Court was therefore granted.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to stay an Ontario application for spousal support and a beneficial ownership declaration respecting Ontario cottage properties.

Applying the real and substantial connection framework, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction because the property was located in Ontario and the parties were ordinarily resident in Ontario as well as Florida during the final years of the relationship.

The court further held that the appellant failed to establish that Florida was clearly the more appropriate forum, including because the respondent would lose a legitimate juridical advantage on support under Florida law.

Ontario law was also properly applied to both the unjust enrichment and support claims.

The respondent father brought a motion to terminate or vary child support obligations established by prior consent orders, arguing that the parties’ adult child was no longer a dependent after changing schools, residing in Toronto for a period, and receiving student loans and grants.

The court found that the child remained a dependent due to documented learning disabilities and continued pursuit of a first undergraduate degree with a reduced course load.

The temporary change in residence and attendance at another institution did not constitute a change in circumstances warranting termination or reduction of support during the five‑year period contemplated by the consent order.

The court held the father to his contractual commitment to pay $5,000 per month child support and post‑secondary expenses for the agreed five‑year period.

For the sixth and final year of studies, support was recalculated based on the father’s income and set at $2,921 per month until completion of the degree.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their joint venture action against the respondents.

The individual appellant had commenced the action while she was a discharged bankrupt, but the cause of action arose before her bankruptcy and was not disclosed to her trustee.

The motion judge found the claim was a nullity and refused to exercise equitable jurisdiction to regularize the proceeding due to the appellant's failure to disclose the asset.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's refusal to grant equitable relief given the appellant's non-disclosure and the subsequent delay.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for leave to appeal an order upholding a Master's decision that required the production of certain documents.

The insurer asserted litigation privilege over the documents, arguing that any document created after litigation was reasonably contemplated is automatically privileged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The court affirmed that the dominant purpose test applies even after litigation is contemplated, and the party asserting privilege bears the burden of proving that the documents were created for the dominant purpose of the anticipated litigation.

Following a successful appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The parties built a new matrimonial home on property owned by the appellant prior to the marriage.

The cost of construction significantly exceeded the market value of the property, leaving it subject to substantial debt.

The trial judge declared the respondent a fifty percent equitable owner based on resulting trust principles and ordered the appellant to pay $160,000 if he remained in the home, explicitly departing from the equalization provisions of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to follow the statutory equalization process.

Under the Family Law Act, the appellant's net family property was zero, meaning no equalization payment was owed.

The respondent's cross-appeal for unjust enrichment was dismissed as the appellant was not enriched.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a trial judgment awarding spousal support to the respondent wife, the appellant husband sought trial costs of over $250,000 and appeal costs of nearly $50,000.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the husband despite his success and his offers to settle.

The court found that the costs sought were grossly excessive and that a costs award would have a devastating effect on the impecunious wife, destroying any chance she had to achieve financial self-sufficiency.

The court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The wife brought a motion to dismiss her husband's appeal of a divorce judgment on the basis that he had failed to pay monthly spousal support since the appeal was heard.

The husband argued his income had declined and his capacity to pay had eroded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion without costs, noting that there were important issues to be decided in the appeal and that the court was releasing its judgment on the main appeal concurrently.