Gary Stuart Joseph

The applicant, charged with failing to slow down for an emergency vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The delay was below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the applicant failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, despite late disclosure by the police.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant's motion for contempt of court against the respondent was dismissed.

The respondent sought full recovery costs of $61,700, arguing the applicant acted in bad faith by using the contempt motion to intimidate her into changing a final order regarding medical decisions.

The court found the applicant's behaviour unreasonable and motivated by a desire to inflict financial and emotional harm, constituting bad faith under rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules.

The court fixed costs payable to the respondent on a full recovery basis in the sum of $55,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decisions of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding party.

The applicant wife brought a motion for child and spousal support against the respondent husband.

The parties were married in 2002 and separated in mid-2022.

They have two children and agreed to shared parenting in a September 2023 consent.

The husband is employed in senior management with annual income of approximately $322,000 to $398,000, while the wife has not worked outside the home since 2013 and receives approximately $35,450 annually from investment income and child tax benefits.

The central disputes concerned the husband's actual income (particularly undisclosed cottage rental income), the proper parenting arrangement for support calculation purposes, and whether the wife should be required to use capital to supplement her needs.

The court imputed income to both parties and ordered child and spousal support, along with an expert assessment of the husband's business income.

The court sentenced Daniel Keefe to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the legal parameters for sentencing, and the positions of Crown and defence.

The court accepted a joint submission for the minimum period of parole ineligibility, citing the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and absence of aggravating factors.

Ancillary orders were also imposed, including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and non-communication orders.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Berge Marcarian from the trial judge’s determination of the date of separation in his marriage to Karen Nairi Kassabian.

The trial judge found the date of separation to be May 16, 2021, as asserted by the wife, rather than December 10, 2014, as claimed by the husband.

The appellate court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings or application of the law, and that her reasons were sufficient.

The decision provides a comprehensive review of the legal principles and factors relevant to determining the date of separation in family law, emphasizing the objective, fact-driven nature of the analysis and the high deference owed to trial judges on such determinations.

The decision concerns a defence motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused, Daniel Keefe, argued that the evidence could not support a finding of second degree murder and that only manslaughter should be left to the jury.

The court reviewed the evidence, including witness testimony, the 911 call, and expert pathology evidence, and applied the legal test for a directed verdict.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a properly instructed jury could convict of second degree murder, and dismissed the motion.

This direction addresses the admissibility and use of a third video clip in a criminal trial involving Daniel Keefe.

The court considers the relevance and potential prejudice of the video, which depicts an attack by Aiden Cunningham on a third party, and provides guidance on how the jury should be instructed if the attacker is not identified in evidence.

The decision addresses whether the statement made by Daniel Keefe to police was voluntary and whether his section 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The court found that, although Keefe was advised of his rights and consulted counsel, the circumstances of his detention—including his youth, inexperience, anxiety, lack of medication, and not being told about the recording or use of his statement—meant the Crown did not prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statement was excluded.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dated September 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $3,660 to the responding party.

This is an appeal from a family proceeding where the appellant sought to overturn the motion judge's decision to terminate spousal and child support obligations for the respondent due to his retirement, and to increase her spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the respondent's retirement was reasonable, that spousal support should be terminated due to material change in circumstances and the appellant's improvident financial decisions, and that child support for the youngest child should end by August 2023.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs award.

The Crown brought an application under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to sentence the young person as an adult for the offence of manslaughter.

The young person, who was one month shy of 18 at the time of the offence, participated in a fatal attack on a friend.

The court considered the young person's significant Gladue factors, history of trauma, and rehabilitative progress while in custody.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence was sufficient to hold the young person accountable.

The application was dismissed, and the young person was ordered to be sentenced as a youth, with sentencing delayed to allow for the development of a release plan.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of McPherson J. dated April 5, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $3,500.

The Respondent Father moved to vary a previous order to expand his parenting time with the child.

The Applicant Mother opposed, proposing a more restrictive expansion.

The court, considering the child's best interests and a s. 30 Assessment, granted a graduated expansion of the father's parenting time, including alternate weekends, midweek time, and extended summer holiday periods, while rejecting some of the father's specific requests regarding transitions and travel distance.

The court emphasized the importance of promoting the child's relationship with both parents despite high parental conflict.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing that occurred during a drug transaction.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence after the victim suddenly attacked him with body spray and grabbed a knife.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the accused's credibility and the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in lawful self-defence, concluding that the accused's response was reasonable in the rapidly evolving and unpredictable circumstances.

The accused was acquitted.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a Motion to Change brought by the respondent, John Craig Fielding, to terminate his child and spousal support obligations following his retirement.

The applicant, Victoria Fielding, opposed the motion and sought to increase spousal support and continue child support.

The court found the respondent to be the significantly more successful party on the Motion to Change, particularly regarding the termination of spousal support due to his reasonable retirement.

While the applicant had some success on child support issues, her overall conduct was deemed unreasonable, including attempts to re-litigate issues under the guise of clarification.

Consequently, the court ordered the applicant to pay the respondent 80% of his overall costs, fixed at $295,000, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

This family law trial addressed the enforceability of an alleged separation agreement, equalization of net family properties, post-separation adjustments, occupation rent, and the sale of two properties.

The court found no binding agreement existed, criticizing the husband's credibility and delay tactics.

The matrimonial home and a New York property were ordered to be sold.

The wife was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $187,677, while the husband was ordered to pay occupation rent of $3,500 per month from March 1, 2021, along with associated property expenses.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside or stay an automatic financial disclosure order, pending a summary judgment motion to determine the enforceability of a 1995 separation agreement that included a spousal support waiver.

The applicant argued that disclosure was necessary to defend against the summary judgment motion.

The court declined to order the full disclosure mandated by the automatic order (Rule 8.0.1 of the Family Law Rules), finding that the threshold issue of the separation agreement's validity should be determined first.

The court emphasized that current financial disclosure was not relevant to the validity of the 1995 agreement and that ordering it would be disproportionate and could derail the pending summary judgment motion.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to admit three videos and the victim's criminal record to support a self-defence claim.

The defence argued this evidence would demonstrate the victim's violent disposition and the reasonableness of the accused's apprehension of violence.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of two videos but opposed the third and the criminal record.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative of the victim's propensity for violence and the risk of harm perceived by the accused, concluding that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appellant's counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record in the Divisional Court proceedings due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The appellant did not oppose the motion, but the respondent opposed it, citing concerns about the timing given an impending motion in the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to remove counsel effective March 29, 2024, noting that the removal applies only to the Divisional Court proceedings and is without prejudice to the pending matters in the Superior Court of Justice.