CITATION: R. v. Papa, 2026 ONCJ 263 DATE: April 23, 2026 Information No. 4260 999 00 3866412X-001

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE MATTER OF THE PROVINCIAL OFFENCES ACT, R.S.O. 1990

HIS MAJESTY THE KING v. ANGELO PAPA

E X C E R P T O F P R O C E E D I N G S (Reasons for Decision)

BEFORE HER WORSHIP JUSTICE OF THE PEACE D. ELLARD on April 23, 2026 at 105 - 1265 Arthur Street East, THUNDER BAY, Ontario

APPEARANCES: M. Grimaldi, Municipal Prosecutor G. Joseph, Counsel for the Defendant

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2026

ELLARD, J.P. (Orally):

The applicant, Mr. Papa, seeks a stay of proceedings under Section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the basis that his Section 11(b) Charter of Rights has been breached.

Section 11(b) of the Charter states:

Any person charged with an offence has the right...to be tried within a reasonable time.

The applicant argues the following premise: a stay of proceedings should be granted for unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Jordan addressed what was termed a culture of complacency, and set a presumptive ceiling for delay for matters heard in the Ontario Court of Justice at 18 months. The 18-month ceiling was thereafter affirmed at 18 months for Part I and Part III matters heard in the Provincial Offences Act Court. R. v. Nguyen, 2020 Ontario Court of Appeal 609.

The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Coulter also addressed the steps to be taken when analyzing applications under the Jordan framework.

A stay of proceedings for a matter under the Jordan presumptive ceiling can only be granted if defence can show that the delay is reasonable. R. v. Jordan, at paragraph 48.

In this matter, the applicant bears the burden of proof. The applicant must prove that a breach has occurred based on the standard of probabilities. The applicant is also required to prove that the remedy sought should be granted, based on a balance of probabilities. R. v. Collins, 1987, referenced as well in R. v. Coulter.

There is a set on steps in terms of analyzing the delay, but I will not conduct a full analysis of the time frame, as noted in R. v. Coulter, as it has been conceded that this is an under the ceiling application.

This is not a matter of Crown inaction, as noted by the applicant, such as noted in R. v. Qureshi — Madam Clerk, I can give you the names and spellings later, but Q-U-R-E-S-H-I, Ontario Court of Appeal, 2026.

The heart of this matter is the late disclosure provided by the police to the prosecutor. The applicant submits that there is a culture of complacency at play for this matter by the police, and the respondent disagrees.

The exhibits tendered by the applicant. There is the affidavit of Ms. Caron, exhibits, there is a trial notice, an email from the prosecutor to the defence counsel indicating police notes, and the email from the prosecutor to defence with the video evidence records.

Sergeant Colin Dubuc of the OPP testified under oath, via Zoom, within the voir dire for this motion.

The History of this Matter

Mr. Papa has alleged to have committed the offence of failing to slow down and proceed with caution for an emergency vehicle or tow truck, contrary to Section 159(2) of the HTA, which allegedly occurred on October 2nd, 2024. He was served with a certificate of offence on the same date.

The certificate of offence was filed with the court on October 4th, 2024.

Mr. Papa requested his trial, filing his intention to dispute the charge on October 16th, 2024.

According to Exhibit A, the notice of trial was sent to Mr. Papa, signed by the court clerk on June 23rd, 2025. Presumably, Mr. Papa received this trial notice at his last known address.

The matter was first set for trial August 7th, 2025.

As per his motion, Mr. Papa attended court on August 7th, 2025 in answer to the trial notice, and made a disclosure request on this date; that is noted on the certificate of offence itself, judicial note. He requested an adjournment to secure disclosure and seek legal advice.

Mr. Papa had another court date of September 17th, 2025, and had not secured counsel at that time.

Mr. Papa retained counsel on October 3rd, and Mr. Joseph, who appeared with him today.

Mr. Papa formally requested disclosure of the prosecutor, according to the certificate — I have mentioned this already — of August 7th.

The Analysis

When calculating delay, the Jordan clock begins with when the proceeding commences.

The reference in the applicant’s motion, at paragraph 9, is legally incorrect; it does not begin with swearing of the information. In Provincial Offences Court, as this is a Part I matter, there is no information.

The matters under Part I of the POA, the proceeding commences upon the filing of the certificate of offence with the court, as per Section 3(1) of the POA. For this matter, that date was October 4th, 2024.

No transcripts were provided to this court to assist in the calculation of any delay.

The applicant indicates in paragraph 13 of his motion that a full 11(b) chart was included in the applicant’s factum, but this was not received by the court.

The applicant acknowledges in the filed motion that he requested an adjournment on his first day of trial, August 7th, 2025, for the purposes of securing disclosure and seeking legal advice.

There is a note on the certificate of offence itself, made by either the clerk of the court or a judicial officer, that the adjournment was also for the purposes of a pre-trial.

According to the applicant’s motion, Mr. Papa made the adjournment request, and the matter was adjourned. To be clear, according to the applicant’s motion, Mr. Papa made the adjournment request and the matter was adjourned to December 11th for trial.

This also is factually incorrect. According to the endorsements on the certificate of offence, the matter was adjourned from August 7th to September 17th, 2025, and endorsed to be spoken to.

On September 17th, Mr. Papa attended his second court date, again, as a self-representative, defendant.

It is unknown who made the adjournment request as the court was not provided with a transcript nor was there was any notation on the certificate of offence; it is unknown if it was on consent or not.

Complexity or Exceptional Circumstances Resulting in Any Delay

Neither the applicant nor the respondent made any submissions regarding that this matter is anything beyond any complexity or exceptional circumstances that are to be considered in this matter. In fact, the applicant acknowledges the lack of these factors in paragraph 12 of the motion.

Therefore, I have not considered the issues of complexity or exceptional circumstances that may have resulted in the delay.

The parties agree that the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan has not been exceeded in this case.

According to the applicant’s motion, the matter was at 15 months and 27 days on the last court date, according to their calculations.

As previously stated, no transcripts were provided to the court to assist in determining if any delay falls at the feet of the prosecutor or Mr. Papa; this is in reference to the September 17th court date.

However, I will conclude that this matter indeed falls under the Jordan presumptive ceiling.

So the onus now shifts to the applicant. With this determination, the applicant must show, on a balance of probabilities, that he:

(1) took meaningful steps and demonstrated a sustained effort to expedite these proceedings; and

(2) the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

If the defence succeeds in establishing both the requirements, a stay must be granted; if not, there is no breach of Section 11(b) and the trial must proceed.

Case Law

The following case law was submitted by the applicant and has been considered: R. v. Cody, 2017 Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Jordan, 2016 Supreme Court of Canada, and R. v. A.H., 2025 ONCJ 243.

In R. v. A.H., submitted by the applicant, the matter was at 17.75 months in length when considered by Justice Monahan; that is a difference of more than two months to this matter.

The following case law was provided by the respondent and has been considered: R. v. D.P., 2026 ONCJ, R. v. J.S., 2026 ONCJ, R. v. Mirilavasani — I will not pronounce that correctly, my apologies — 2026 ONCJ, and R. v. Yousaf, 2025 ONCJ.

In the one case submitted by the respondent, the matter was at the 16.5 month mark when decided by Justice Kenkel.

Three other decisions that I have considered as part of this motion: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 — this is the leading instructive decision on disclosure — R. v. Dixon, Supreme Court of Canada, 1998, and R. v. Ruthowsky, 2024 Ontario Court Appeal, in which Justices Pepal, Copeland and Monahan identified that when the late disclosure or non-disclosure is raised as a ground of appeal, the fact of late disclosure alone does not entitle an accused to a remedy.

“The applicant must establish on a balance of probabilities that the late disclosure impacted their right to make full answer and defence. To discharge this burden, the applicant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosed or late-disclosed information affected the outcome at trial or the fairness of the trial process. The reasonable possibility must be grounded in reasonable possible uses of the non-disclosed or late-disclosed information or reasonably possible avenues of investigation that were foreclosed due to the non-disclosure or late-disclosure.”

Also, R. v. Barra, Ontario Court of Appeal, and R. v. Dixon.

I have also considered R. v. Hanan, 2023 Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. K.D., 2025 Ontario Court of Appeal. These are decisions which identify the importance of the court considering all the relevant circumstances for each matter, when considering delay.

I have also considered the directive by the Chief of Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice, the Jordan- Compliant Trial Scheduling procedure, available on the internet, which also applies to the POA Court.

Did Mr. Papa Take Meaningful Steps?

Mr. Papa requested his trial and received his trial notice as already indicated.

The exhibit, the trial notice, clearly indicates, “You can contact the prosecutor’s office at”, notes a phone number and then an email address, “to discuss your charge and obtain your disclosure prior to your court date, or visit www.thunderbay.ca/court.”

The Provincial Offences Court is designed for individuals to represent themselves, and a variety of resources are available for assistance. A guide for self-represented individual is available on the internet, and most often is given to someone who appears in person.

Assuming Mr. Papa received his trial notice at the beginning of July 2025 via regular mail, this is a period of inactivity for 13 months from the date he requested his trial in October 2024.

It appears that he took no meaningful steps before his first trial date on August 7th, 2025, except to request his trial, despite the guidance on the notice of trial to seek disclosure.

It also appears that he took no proactive steps to seek legal counsel during this time or contact the prosecutor for his disclosure, as suggested on the trial notice.

Sometime after the trial date, Mr. Papa requested disclosure from the prosecutor. There is a note that it was requested on August 7th, but as I said, I had no transcripts to verify that.

It does not appear that Mr. Papa secured defence counsel until after this second court date, according to the notes on the certificate of offence. And we heard today that that was in fact October 3rd.

There is no evidence that a pre-trial occurred prior to counsel being involved, or any steps taken by Mr. Papa to arrange same with the prosecutor, either as a self-rep or by counsel until as of late.

There was no evidence of any proactive efforts by Mr. Papa to bring the matter forward at an earlier date, essentially requesting the court to do so.

Did the Case Take Markedly Longer Than it Reasonably Should Have?

The period of time between the offence date of October 2nd, 2024 to the date first set for trial on August 7th, 2025 is consistent with local circumstances at the moment, unfortunately.

Disclosure was requested August 7th, 2025. And according to the exhibit, the officer indicated in an email to the prosecutor dated November 20th, 2025, that no dash cam or body worn camera, or sorry, in-car camera video or body worn camera footage was available.

On December 11th, 2025, the officer’s handwritten notes were provided to Mr. Papa, the day his matter was set for trial the second time.

The prosecutor then discovered that in-car camera footage was also available.

Sergeant Dubuc testified under oath today that he was unaware of the in-car camera footage was available, created by another officer who he was working with that day. Once it was revealed, Sergeant Dubuc quickly provided it to the prosecutor, as he was the investigating officer for this matter.

There was no clear explanation provided to the court as to this oversight, other than Sergeant Dubuc was unaware that it existed.

This evidence was provided to Mr. Papa later the same day of December 11th, 2025.

The time frame from the date of the request for disclosure, assuming it was August 7th, 2025, to the receipt of the disclosure, December 11th, 2025, is 4.1 months.

It is unknown if any further attempts, save and except the initial request, were made by Mr. Papa himself to prompt the prosecutor for disclosure.

As per R. v. Stinchcombe, the Crown, or in this case, the prosecutor, is required to provide all the information related to the matter, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, to the defence.

However, the defence also has responsibilities when we are considering the issue of disclosure, as noted in R. v. Dixon:

“The fair and efficient functioning of the justice system requires that defence counsel exercise due diligence in actively seeking and pursuing disclosure. The very nature of disclosure process makes it prone to human error and vulnerable to attack. As officers of the court, the defence counsel have an obligation to pursue disclosure diligently.” R. v. Dixon.

I heard today within the motion that Mr. Joseph indeed has done that.

While the timing of the receipt of the disclosure fell very short of the standard of diligence typically required by this court, any potential prejudice resulting from the delay was adequately remedied through an adjournment. This was provided, this provided the applicant the necessary opportunity to consider the new evidence and preserve the fairness of the proceeding.

Prior to the last two motion dates, this matter has only had three court dates, not including today and the last court date. And on the last court date, the matter did not proceed for a motion as the notice to the Attorney General was not properly completed.

Further, given the absence of transcripts, it is not possible for me to determine whether the December 11th, 2025 adjournment, the day it was also set for trial on the second time, that the adjournment request was made on consent. I am not sure who made it and I am not sure if it was on consent.

The final perspective, in considering all the circumstances for this matter, is whether the pace to which this matter proceeded is consistent or not with any other similar matters.

To this point, I will highlight the dates of offence on the entire docket for today’s date. The overwhelming majority are over the six-month mark. There is only a handful that are under the six-month mark, which would be in compliance with the Chief Justice’s Direction, unfortunately; we are working on that. In fact, most are a year old or more. While this is not something for the prosecutor to boast about, it certainly provides valuable context.

A stay is a drastic remedy and should only be granted in the clearest of cases.

The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that a stay of proceedings is a last resort remedy, to be entered only when all other remedies are inappropriate; there is a number of cases that cite that.

As per R. v. Jordan, at paragraph 48, and R. v. Coulter, paragraph 54, stays beneath the presumptive ceiling should only be granted in the rarest of cases. This is not one of those cases, even in POA Court.

R. v. Jordan instructs me that when delay is below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable, by establishing it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the case, and that it took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. R. v. J.S. and R. v. Jordan.

Based on the evidence and submissions before the court, I find that the applicant did not take meaningful steps or demonstrated a sustained effort since 2024 to expedite the proceedings, nor did this case proceed in a manner that was markedly slower than reasonably expected.

The applicant has failed to prove the breach on the balance of probabilities.

Accordingly, the delay in these matters was not unreasonable, and the applicant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time has not been infringed. I therefore conclude that the application for Charter relief must be dismissed.

E N D O F E X C E R P T O F P R O C E E D I N G S

FORM 2

Certificate of Transcript (SUBSECTION 5(2)) Evidence Act

I, Laura Rowsell, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. Angelo Papa, in the Ontario Court of Justice, Provincial Offences Court, held on October 26, 2022, at 105 - 1265 Arthur Street East, Thunder Bay, Ontario, taken from Recording No. lcr_20260423_POA, which has been certified in Form 1.

DATED: May 1, 2026

Electronically Signed Laura Rowsell, Authorized Court Transcriptionist #1611571159 orders@courtreporters.ca 905-440-2053

Signed in the Province of Ontario, Canada

A certificate in Form 2 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.