Frances P. Kiteley

The Chief Building Official issued building permits for a body rub parlour in a specific zoning area.

A competing business appealed the decision to the Superior Court, where the appeal judge rescinded the permits, finding the CBO's interpretation of the word 'front' in the zoning by-law to be unreasonable.

The CBO and the permit holder appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review.

The CBO's interpretation of the by-law was reasonable.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The Applicant sought interim custody, child and spousal support, release of matrimonial home proceeds, and disclosure.

The Respondent sought temporary sole or shared custody, primary residence in Florida, supervised access for the Applicant, and a s. 30 assessment.

The court granted the Applicant temporary sole custody, established a parenting schedule allowing the child to travel to Florida one week per month, ordered the Respondent to pay $75,000 monthly in temporary child and spousal support, and released the net proceeds of the matrimonial home to the Applicant.

The Respondent's motion for a s. 30 assessment was dismissed without prejudice, and his request for a sealing order was adjourned for further submissions.

The court also ordered the Respondent to provide comprehensive financial disclosure.

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant for breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy after the defendant posted an intimate video of the plaintiff online.

The defendant successfully moved to set aside the default judgment.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal the order setting aside the default judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's application of the test to set aside a default judgment, and concluding that a trial on the merits would be of general importance to the development of the law.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision that set aside a default judgment against the defendant.

The original default judgment found the defendant liable for breach of confidence, intentional infliction of mental distress, and invasion of privacy, awarding significant damages and an injunction.

The motion judge (Dow J.) set aside the default judgment, allowing the defendant to defend on the merits, conditional on a costs payment.

The plaintiff argued that the motion judge erred by considering the defendant's proposed defence despite intentional default, failing to distinguish liability from damages, and not adequately considering psychological harm.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and emphasizing the importance of a trial on the merits for the development of tort law in this unique area.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of two Landlord and Tenant Board orders terminating the tenancy and evicting the tenant for non-payment of rent.

The Divisional Court found that the tenant's appeal raised no questions of law and was manifestly devoid of merit.

The court also noted that the appeal appeared to be a delaying tactic, as the tenant had not paid rent for several months.

The motion to quash was granted, the stay of enforcement was lifted, and the landlord was awarded costs.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a $30,000 costs order made against him following a family law motion regarding child custody.

The applicant argued there was conflicting case law on awarding costs in child-related issues and that the motions judge erred by not considering the respondent's offer to settle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as the respondent was clearly successful on the main issue of custody.

The respondent sought costs of over $16,000 for several case conferences and a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant, who was later represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee, had failed to attend conferences and her former counsel caused undue delay.

The court awarded the respondent $4,000 in costs payable by the applicant for the conferences and motion preparation, and $1,500 payable personally by the applicant's former counsel for unnecessary attendances caused by her delay and unresponsiveness.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order to require the respondent father to contribute to the post-secondary education (section 7) expenses of their two children.

The court imputed income to the applicant based on full-time employment at her current hourly rate.

The court established a formula for sharing the section 7 expenses, requiring the children to apply for student loans and grants and contribute a percentage (up to 40%) of the remaining costs, with the parents sharing the balance proportionate to their incomes.

The respondent was ordered to pay his proportionate share of the expenses in addition to the table amount of child support.

The applicant mother commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking sole custody and permission to relocate to Texas, despite a prior Florida order governing custody.

The respondent father consented to the relocation shortly after, and the mother moved to Texas.

The parties subsequently consented to dismiss the Ontario application and answer, leaving costs to be determined.

The court found the mother acted unreasonably in launching the Ontario proceedings and maintaining that Ontario had jurisdiction after moving to Texas.

The mother was ordered to pay $2,500 in costs to the father.

The parties made submissions regarding the costs of two prior motions dealing with parenting and child support.

The applicant sought costs on a full or partial recovery basis, while the respondent argued each party should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found that success was divided on both motions and that the applicant's costs were disproportionate.

The court ordered that neither party shall pay or recover costs.

Following the dismissal of the father's motion regarding his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, the daughter and mother sought costs.

The court found that while the father did not act in bad faith, he acted unreasonably by omitting relevant evidence, relying on inadmissible letters, using accusatory language, and failing to respond to offers to settle.

The daughter was awarded full indemnity costs of $6,063.52.

The mother's claim for costs was dismissed as her participation was not necessary.

Following a motion on the admissibility of evidence in a family law arbitration, the successful applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis and costs thrown away due to the adjournment of the arbitration.

The court awarded significant costs for the motion, noting the complexity of the issues, but declined to order full recovery as neither party acted unreasonably.

The request for costs thrown away was dismissed because the interruption did not warrant such an order and the applicant relied on estimates rather than actual costs.

At a Trial Management Conference, the court provided directions for an uncontested trial on financial issues following the striking of the applicant's pleadings.

The respondent was ordered to file a trial record, including an affidavit for the uncontested trial, and the trial was scheduled for February 2017.

The applicant was permitted to attend but prohibited from participating.

At a Trial Management Conference for custody and access issues, the self-represented applicant attempted to include financial issues in her brief.

The court noted that the applicant's claims regarding financial issues had been previously struck and she was prohibited from participating in the trial on those issues.

The court struck the irrelevant materials from her brief, set the witness lists and time estimates for the custody and access trial, and provided procedural directions for filing the trial record and form 35.1.

At a case conference in a high-conflict family law proceeding, the court noted the children were living in increasingly chaotic and harmful circumstances.

The respondent mother had been granted sole authority to decide the son's school, but the son was not attending regularly and was completely detached.

Recognizing that the Superior Court could not relieve the chaos and that the Children's Aid Society was deferring to the court, the judge ordered a stay of all proceedings, including the applicant father's trust claims, to allow the Society to investigate and potentially apprehend the children.

The applicant mother, residing in Alberta, brought an application to vary child support for post-secondary expenses against the respondent father, residing in Ontario.

The matter was referred to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for an interjurisdictional hearing via video-conference.

The court adjourned the hearing to allow for further disclosure and cross-examination, and ordered the respondent to pay an interim amount towards tuition.

The Applicant sought to disqualify the Respondent's counsel, Harold Niman and Niman Gelgoot & Associates, citing a conflict of interest due to Niman's prior representation against the Applicant and her family in other family law disputes, and alleging Niman possessed confidential information.

The Applicant also argued the Respondent's retention of Niman was tactical and intended to intimidate her.

Niman brought a cross-motion to strike certain evidence from the Applicant's affidavits, including settlement-privileged communications and documents related to a complaint against Dr. Douglas Weir to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion to disqualify, finding no "sufficient relationship" between the prior retainers and the current proceeding, and no evidence that Niman actually possessed relevant confidential information.

The court granted Niman's motion to strike, upholding settlement privilege and the statutory prohibition against admitting professional regulatory proceedings in civil matters.

The Applicant sought to adjourn a trial scheduled for October 2016 to March 2017, primarily to pursue further disclosure and potentially amend her claims to set aside a 1999 consent divorce judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the request amounted to a "fishing expedition" to fundamentally change the nature of the proceedings, was made too late, and was not adequately supported by medical evidence.

The court emphasized balancing fairness to both parties and the Respondent's right to a timely resolution after four years of litigation on the Motion to Change.

The trial was confirmed for October 2016 with strict time limits for each party.

This endorsement addresses cross-motions concerning parenting issues and child support.

The Respondent sought a specific parenting schedule and a s. 30 assessment, while the Applicant sought a different parenting schedule, an order to engage a child therapist, and temporary and retroactive child support, including s. 7 expenses.

The court established a temporary parenting schedule based on alternate 3-night weekends with specific holiday arrangements, dismissing the Respondent's request for an immediate 50/50 split and the Applicant's request for a child therapist.

A s. 30 assessment was ordered due to the toxic parental relationship and differing views on the children's needs, with costs to be shared equally.

The court determined the Respondent's income for child support at $324,923 CAD, rejected his undue hardship claim, and ordered him to pay $4,013 per month in child support.

The Applicant's claim for ongoing s. 7 expenses (except for nanny costs, which were to be negotiated) and retroactive support was dismissed or adjourned to trial.