Frances P. Kiteley

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal procedural orders that adjourned her motion for default judgment and directed the defendants to bring a motion to set aside the noting in default.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the procedural orders were appropriate case management directions and the plaintiff failed to meet the strict test under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the defendants.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike an application concerning post-conviction disclosure and Charter rights for convicted offenders who have served their sentences.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate and conclusory, failing to provide sufficient rationale for dismissing the motion to strike.

The court also found that the motion judge applied the "plain and obvious" test incorrectly to issues of standing and prematurity, which should have been subject to different principles.

The issues raised were deemed to be of public importance, satisfying the conjunctive test for leave to appeal under rule 62.02(4)(b).

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for partial summary judgment, where the motion judge found insufficient evidence to precisely identify the intellectual property sought to be protected.

Applying the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4), the court found no conflicting decision on principle and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, despite minor issues with the motion judge's articulation of legal tests.

The court also determined that the matter did not raise questions of general or public importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to strike the responding party's constitutional application for post-conviction disclosure.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate and failed to properly analyze the issues of standing and prematurity, satisfying the test under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The landlord appealed several orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board, including an order requiring him to pay the tenants $11,084.16.

The appeal was dismissed by the Assistant Registrar because the landlord failed to perfect the appeal within one year and failed to file transcripts.

The landlord brought a motion to set aside the dismissal order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the landlord had not pursued his appeal on his own initiative and had failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeals were dismissed and the certificates of stay were set aside.

David W. Fickel sought leave to appeal from a motion judge's order that stayed the execution of a summary judgment for payment on a promissory note, pending the final resolution of the main action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to Fickel on the promissory note but stayed its execution due to the interconnectedness of the claims arising from the same share purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant a stay under Rule 20.08, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient, sought to appeal an order authorizing a change in her anti-psychotic medication.

After Legal Aid refused to fund the motion for leave to appeal, the appellant brought a motion to appoint her former counsel as amicus curiae.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, appointing the counsel as amicus curiae to represent unrepresented interests and act tantamount to counsel for the appellant in the leave motion and related proceedings, with costs to be paid by the Attorney General.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a final order as to costs made by the motion judge following a summary judgment motion regarding a continuing trespass.

The motion judge had awarded the responding parties elevated costs of $28,000, finding the moving parties' conduct to be outrageous.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge did not err in principle, misapprehend significant facts, or act in a non-judicial manner in awarding elevated costs.

The parties were involved in a combined family law and civil trial.

The wife claimed the date of separation was January 2009, while the husband claimed October 2012.

The court found the date of separation was January 2009 and dismissed the husband's claims for equalization and spousal support due to his failure to provide financial disclosure and lack of evidence.

In the civil action, the court found the husband committed civil fraud by making false representations to the wife regarding funds from a diamond mining venture, resulting in a loss of over $1.2 million.

The court awarded damages for fraud against the husband and found his mother was unjustly enriched by receiving funds belonging to the wife.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The moving party, an accounting firm appointed to conduct a compliance audit of a mayoral candidate's election campaign finances, brought a motion to dismiss an application for judicial review against it.

The applicant sought to quash the auditor's report.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the auditor was not exercising a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act when preparing the report.

The court held that the report was merely a technical step and not determinative of legal rights, making it plain and obvious that the application against the auditor was devoid of merit.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his 17-year-old daughter to be a child in need of protection and making her a Crown ward.

The father sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the child was not in need of protection when she left home at age 14.

The Divisional Court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusions.

The court noted the child's clear preference for no contact with her parents and her need for closure to continue her mental health recovery.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that upheld a construction lien registered against their property by a numbered company operating as The Loen Group.

The appellants argued they contracted with The Loen Group, not the numbered company, and that the numbered company was not entitled to a lien.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellants knew they were dealing with the numbered company and were not misled.

The Court also confirmed that a corporation is a 'person' entitled to register a lien under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that its mobile home park was not exempt from rent control under s. 6(2)(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The appellant argued the park did not exist in 1991 and therefore could not have been occupied for residential purposes prior to November 1, 1991.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as an integral part of the premises was used for residential purposes prior to the statutory cut-off date.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting primary care of a child to the respondent, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give primacy to the principle that siblings should not be separated except in extreme and compelling circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or principle.

The trial judge had properly considered the relevant provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act, expressly addressed the case law on separating siblings, and balanced all factors to determine the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed orders regarding retroactive child support, arguing the trial judge erred by using his line 150 income without deducting carrying charges and interest expenses under section 16 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the parties had agreed at trial to base support on line 150 income without further deductions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding that two contracts were not sufficiently connected to support statutory setoff, equitable setoff, or a stay under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant argued it was prevented from putting a full record before the court due to the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The self-represented applicant brought an application for judicial review of a Deputy Judge's costs order.

The Divisional Court found that the Deputy Judge lacked jurisdiction to order costs for a settlement conference over which he did not preside, and erred in awarding motion costs exceeding $100 without finding special circumstances under Rule 15.07.

The court varied the costs order, requiring the applicant to pay $100 for the motion, and awarded the applicant his disbursements for the judicial review application.

The appellant denturist appealed the revocation of his licence and a costs award by the Discipline Committee.

The Committee found the appellant had provided dental services outside his scope of practice to multiple patients, including vulnerable children, and submitted 911 false insurance claims totaling over $91,000 using the identities of two dentists.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the penalty of revocation was not unreasonable given the egregious nature of the misconduct, and the costs award of $70,000 (representing 55% of the College's costs) was based on appropriate legal principles.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his discrimination claim against a university and a department chair.

The Tribunal had dismissed the application because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination, which it determined was the date the applicant was asked to withdraw for academic reasons.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application as untimely was reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.