Frances P. Kiteley

The applicant insurer brought a motion for an immediate order of prohibition staying a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) proceeding pending judicial review.

The insurer sought judicial review of the LAT's decision to deny its requests to adjourn a written hearing regarding the respondent's entitlement to statutory accident benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay, as there was no serious issue to be tried and no irreparable harm.

The court also held that the motion was premature, as it offended the general rule against judicial interference with ongoing administrative processes.

The respondent fell while stepping onto a deck at the appellants' home and sued for negligence.

The trial judge found the appellants 65% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act because the deck step was higher than standard, and also noted a breach of the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, finding the trial judge erred by failing to analyze whether the deck height created an objectively unreasonable risk of harm and by failing to make any finding that the deck height actually caused the fall.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent's claim was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a letter from the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada denying his request to write the pharmacist qualification examination for a fifth time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the letter was not a reviewable decision but merely a statement of the existing rule limiting attempts.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that the Act creating the Board and the rule limiting examination attempts were ultra vires, noting that the Board does not regulate the profession but merely administers an examination that provincial licensing bodies may use.

The plaintiffs appealed a certification order that denied certification of claims for unlawful means conspiracy and claims on behalf of 'Umbrella Purchasers' in a class action alleging a global price-fixing conspiracy for lithium-ion batteries.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal regarding the unlawful means conspiracy claim, finding it was bound by a recent Court of Appeal decision.

However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the Umbrella Purchasers, concluding that allowing claims by purchasers who bought from non-defendant manufacturers would expose the defendants to indeterminate liability for economic loss.

The Holmes defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their fourth motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and ancillary orders.

The motion judge had dismissed the Mareva order challenge on grounds of waiver and res judicata.

The applicant argued for leave based on conflicting decisions and doubt regarding the order's correctness.

The court denied leave, finding no conflicting decision on principle and no serious debate about the order's correctness, emphasizing the unique circumstances and the history of repeated, unsuccessful motions.

The appellant appealed a final costs order requiring him to pay $25,000 to the respondent following the settlement of their matrimonial proceedings.

The trial judge had based the costs award on a finding that the respondent had proposed the fundamental framework of parallel parenting and the appellant had unreasonably rejected it.

The Divisional Court found this to be a palpable and overriding error, as the appellant's earlier offer had actually proposed parallel parenting, while the respondent's initial offers sought weekend access.

The costs order was set aside, and no costs were awarded for the trial or the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering the estate of Doreen Duffey to pay $11,862.31 to the estate of Frederick Duffey.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting the will regarding funeral expenses and characterizing certain house expenditures as capital rather than repairs.

The Divisional Court found no error in the judge's interpretation of the will or characterization of the expenses.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of a conceded $939.00 deduction, and otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for civil fraud and ordering him to pay $30,526 plus costs.

The respondent had paid the appellant's CRA tax lien to clear title to a jointly owned family residence transferred to her pursuant to a family law settlement, and subsequently sued him after he declared bankruptcy, alleging his failure to disclose the tax debt constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred in law by applying a test for fraudulent non-disclosure rather than the strict four-part test for fraudulent misrepresentation, and made palpable and overriding errors of fact unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her eviction so the landlords' daughter could move into the unit.

The tenant argued she was denied procedural fairness and that the Board erred in applying the genuine intention test and refusing relief from eviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the Board's application of the genuine intention test under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, and no error in refusing relief under s. 83(3).

The applicant brought a motion seeking extensive disclosure of the respondent's medical and personal records, alleging mental health issues.

The respondent opposed, arguing the requests were irrelevant, privileged, and constituted a fishing expedition.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no evidence to support the mental health allegations, inferring an element of retaliation given the timing of the requests after criminal charges were laid against the applicant, and concluding the requests were overly broad.

The court awarded $5,000 in costs to the respondent, payable by September 30, 2017, or offset against future financial claims.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision denying a grievance over the termination of retiree benefits following a plant closure.

The arbitrator found that the employer had the right to terminate the benefits because the collective agreement incorporated an insurance master contract containing a minimum participation provision, which was no longer met.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and concluded that the arbitrator's decision was defensible in respect of the facts and the law.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant, a co-op unit owner, appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent housing co-op's claim to enforce a lien against his unit for clean-up costs and dismissing his counterclaim.

The clean-up was necessitated by a Toronto Fire Services Inspection Order citing excessive combustibles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the appellant had agreed to proceed without a trial transcript.

The appellant contractor appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid invoices and the respondent homeowner's set-off claim.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract by failing to provide materials and labour in a good and workmanlike manner, and that the appellant failed to prove its claim for the outstanding balance.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the breach.

The court also held that while the trial judge erred in considering damages when only a set-off was permitted, this did not affect the outcome as the appellant failed to prove its claim.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dated January 27, 2017, which authorized the interim administration of clozapine under the Health Care Consent Act, pending an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The applicant also sought a stay of the interim treatment order if leave was granted.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the applicant failed to meet the two-part test under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Specifically, there was no conflicting decision on a matter of principle, nor was there sufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the original order.

The court also noted that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of such importance to warrant leave, particularly given the applicant's strategic decision not to accelerate the main appeal involving constitutional issues.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which had rescinded the Director's finding that he was financially ineligible for ODSP benefits but declined to order retroactive payment to the date of his original application, citing a lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal erred in law, as it has the same discretion as the Director and the authority to make any decision the Director could have made.

The Court granted the appeal and ordered the Director to pay ODSP benefits retroactively to September 2012, along with costs.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of an eviction order, for security for costs, and to dismiss the tenant's appeal.

The tenant, who had not paid rent for eight months, requested an adjournment, which was denied.

The court lifted the automatic stay, finding the appeal appeared frivolous and vexatious, and ordered the tenant to post $2,500 as security for costs and pay $2,970 in costs for the motion.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his application for judicial review for delay.

The underlying application sought to challenge a decision terminating his rent subsidy, which had led to his eviction.

The court found that the applicant failed to perfect his application for over a year and did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Furthermore, given the passage of time and the fact that the applicant had already been evicted, the court concluded that the merits and justice of the case did not warrant continuing the proceeding.

The motion was dismissed with no costs.

The tenant brought a motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order and to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of the appeal.

The tenant, who lived in supportive housing and had mental health issues, failed to perfect the appeal on time.

The court found that the tenant demonstrated an ongoing intention to appeal and that the delay was understandable given his deficits.

The court also found that the potential prejudice to the tenant outweighed any prejudice to the landlord, and that the appeal had merit because the Board member may have relied on inadmissible double hearsay.

The motion was granted, the time to perfect was extended, and the eviction was stayed pending the appeal.

The Health Professions Appeal and Review Board brought a motion for a sealing order regarding portions of its record of proceedings in an application for judicial review.

The applicant, acting in person, opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion seeking an adjournment, a public trial, and written responses from the respondents.

The Divisional Court granted the Board's motion to protect the integrity of its non-disclosure orders and dismissed the applicant's cross-motion, noting the procedural requirements of judicial review.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing her action against the police defendants for delay.

The plaintiff argued the Master erred by failing to consider her alleged mental illness, her involvement in multiple other proceedings, an order for trial together with another action, and by refusing to consider evidence filed in a companion motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, exercise of discretion on wrong principles, or palpable and overriding error in the Master's decision.