Fowler Byrne

The defendant director brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against him in his personal capacity.

The plaintiff alleged the director should be personally liable for inducing breach of contract, deceit, and other torts, arguing the corporate veil should be pierced due to the director changing corporations mid-project for personal reasons.

The court dismissed the defendant's request to file a late supplementary affidavit.

The court also dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that a trial was required to determine the director's intent behind the corporate restructuring and billing practices, and whether his actions constituted a separate tort or improper conduct warranting piercing the corporate veil.

This case involved a two-day trial to determine outstanding s. 7 child support expenses for two children following a divorce.

The respondent father disputed payment based on arguments that the applicant mother did not personally incur the expenses (they were paid by extended family) and that he did not provide prior consent as required by a Final Order.

The court addressed the necessity and reasonableness of the expenses, the impact of third-party payments, and the requirement for prior consent, ultimately ordering the father to pay a significant portion of the claimed expenses and establishing a new communication protocol for future expenses.

This costs endorsement follows a motion where the defendant sought dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, which was denied, but other orders were made to advance the matter.

The plaintiff, self-represented, sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff was prima facie entitled to costs as the defendant was unsuccessful in its primary request for dismissal.

However, the plaintiff's claim for costs was significantly reduced due to insufficient evidence of lost remunerative activity, excessive hours claimed, and unsubstantiated disbursements.

The court awarded the plaintiff $500 in costs, inclusive of time and disbursements, noting that the plaintiff's inaction necessitated some of the orders made.

Following a successful application by a condominium corporation to enforce its declaration against an offending unit owner and its tenants, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded the applicant full indemnity costs of $24,771.93, noting that section 134(5) of the Condominium Act and the condominium's declaration contemplate full recovery of enforcement costs to protect innocent unit owners.

A supporting respondent, who gathered evidence of the breach to protect his exclusive use rights, was awarded partial indemnity costs of $15,000 against the offending respondents.

This criminal trial concerned multiple charges, including aggravated assault and firearm offences, stemming from a shooting incident where a child was injured.

The court, sitting without a jury, evaluated circumstantial evidence primarily focused on identity.

One defendant was found guilty of numerous charges based on a confession, corroborating video evidence, and flight from police, while the other defendant was acquitted on all counts due to insufficient evidence and unreliable expert testimony regarding fingerprints.

The applicant was charged with possession of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a traffic stop.

The police stopped the taxi the applicant was in while responding to a 911 gun call.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search under s. 8.

The court found the investigative detention and initial pat-down search were lawful.

However, the subsequent search of the applicant's knapsack in the vehicle violated s. 8, as immediate safety concerns had been alleviated.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court admitted the drug evidence, finding the police acted in good faith and society's interest favoured admission.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and three years' probation imposed on the respondent following guilty pleas to domestic assault and breach of recognizance.

The respondent had served 276 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in granting the discharge and in refusing to make a DNA order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unique circumstances, including the minor nature of the assaults and the respondent's lack of a prior record.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The trial judge erred by refusing to allow the Crown to call the Qualified Breath Technician (QBT) without a certificate and by dismissing the charges without hearing submissions.

The Superior Court found these to be fundamental errors in law, as the Crown is entitled to prove its case through viva voce evidence even without a certificate, and parties must be given an opportunity to make submissions.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new trial.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for a violation of her Charter s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge found the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or reasonable steps to mitigate the delay following an adjournment caused by a witness's medical emergency.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the trial judge's implicit findings that no delay was attributable to the defence and that the Crown had not taken reasonable steps to secure an earlier trial date after the initial adjournment.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault simpliciter, arguing the trial judge reached irreconcilable verdicts, provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and drew impermissible inferences.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant of assault with a weapon but found she assaulted the complainant by forcibly removing him from her apartment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no material misapprehension of evidence or unreasonable inferences, concluding the evidence supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of domestic assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct without a voir dire, engaged in impermissible propensity reasoning, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted as narrative context, the trial judge did not engage in propensity reasoning, and the credibility findings were grounded in the evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and voyeurism, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, relied on inadmissible video evidence, and misinterpreted the voyeurism provisions of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal court found no reversible errors, noting the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and the video exhibit was admitted without limiting instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Johnston, appealed his conviction for Over 80.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to address a conceded Section 10(a) Charter breach and to provide reasons for rejecting it, thereby denying counsel an opportunity to make submissions on the point.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred by not notifying counsel of her intention to reject the concession and by failing to provide adequate reasons for her decision regarding the Charter breaches.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with sexual assault after an intoxicated female passenger woke up half-naked in his bed.

The complainant had no memory of how she got into the bed or what happened.

A sexual assault kit revealed the accused's DNA on the complainant's left breast.

The Crown's expert testified about DNA transfer but could not rule out secondary transfer from the accused's bedding.

The court found the expert's evidence on DNA transference was outside her area of expertise and could not discount the possibility of secondary transfer without direct contact.

The accused was acquitted due to reasonable doubt.