Dr. Phillip Klassen

The Crown sought to designate Krista Walker as a dangerous offender following her guilty plea to aggravated assault, carrying a concealed weapon, and failing to comply with probation.

The predicate offence involved stabbing the victim in the chest with a paring knife, causing serious injury.

The court heard extensive evidence regarding Walker's history of violence, psychiatric assessments, institutional records, and community supervision failures spanning decades.

Walker demonstrated a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour with weapons, persistent aggressive conduct, complete indifference to victims' suffering, and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

The court designated Walker as a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellants, who were each found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) on consent, appealed their verdicts.

They argued that the Criminal Code violates sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to mandate an inquiry into whether an accused's consent to an NCRMD finding is voluntary and informed, similar to the inquiry required for guilty pleas under section 606(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter challenges, finding no violation of fundamental justice or equality rights.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' individual arguments regarding the reasonableness of their verdicts, fitness to stand trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for domestic assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample evidence to support them.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant in the community.

The trial judge based this on the appellant's lack of motivation to change, directly contradicting unanimous expert psychiatric evidence that strict external controls would be effective regardless of motivation.

The dangerous offender designation was set aside and a new hearing ordered.

The respondent successfully sued her mother for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect her from sexual abuse by her father during her childhood.

The mother appealed, arguing the action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches due to the 42-year delay in bringing the claim, and that she was powerless to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no acquiescence by the respondent and that the mother failed to establish she was unable to protect her daughter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the award for lost income from $100,000 to $20,000 due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the higher amount.

A cross-appeal regarding trial costs was dismissed.