Dr. Jonathan Gray

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused, who pled guilty to multiple domestic violence offences including criminal harassment, forcible confinement, and assault with a weapon against his former girlfriend.

The accused had a lengthy history of violence against intimate partners and multiple mental health diagnoses.

The court found that the accused met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, noting a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court concluded that the risk could not be adequately managed in the community and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his 15-year-old cousin.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court conditionally stayed several counts and proceeded to sentence the accused on five counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching.

The court considered the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the devastating impact on her and her family as aggravating factors.

The accused was sentenced to a global term of 3.5 years in penitentiary, along with DNA, SOIRA, non-communication, and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his daughter.

The offences occurred when the victim was a teenager and involved inappropriate touching and measuring.

The court considered the accused's low risk of reoffending, lack of criminal record, and the historical nature of the offences, balanced against the significant breach of trust and psychological harm to the victim.

The court imposed a global conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with SOIRA registration, a DNA order, and a weapons prohibition.

Following a conviction for criminal harassment based on repeated sexualized letters sent from jail to an unwilling complainant, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code.

The court found the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and that the offender had established a pattern of repetitive behaviour creating a high risk of future psychological, and possibly physical, harm to elderly women.

However, applying the governing framework, the court concluded there remained a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community through a fixed penitentiary sentence, strict geographic and behavioural restrictions, treatment, and a long-term supervision order.

The dangerous offender application was denied and a long-term offender designation was made.

The offender was convicted following trial of sexual exploitation of a young person in a position of trust and of mischief for interfering with a motor vehicle.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 and continued for approximately two years, involving numerous acts of intercourse and a significant age disparity.

The court considered aggravating factors including prolonged abuse of trust, repeated sexual acts, lack of insight or remorse, and the lasting psychological harm described in victim impact statements.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, stable employment history, and a psychiatric assessment indicating a low risk of reoffending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order made under section 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code.

The order was initially granted after the appellant, a university student, wrote disturbing comments on an exam, prompting police to seize his lawfully owned firearms.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof from the Crown to the appellant and by relying on irrelevant considerations such as the number of firearms owned.

The order was set aside and the matter remitted for a new hearing.