Ewa Krajewska

The applicant brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement regarding her late parents' estates.

The parties disputed the valuation date for real estate joint ventures and corporate shares used to fund a $4.9 million preference payment to the applicant.

The applicant argued for 2010 valuations, which would grant her the subsequent appreciation in value, while the respondent argued for current valuations.

The court held that, based on an objective interpretation of the settlement and the general rule for estate distributions, the assets must be valued at a date proximate to their distribution.

Appeals from determinations made by an application judge regarding the will of the late Peter Trezzi.

The deceased operated a successful construction business through two corporations: Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) and Trezzi Construction Ltd. (Trezzi Construction).

Peter was the sole shareholder of Trezzi Construction.

The central disputes concerned whether Peter could effectively bequeath assets held by Trezzi Construction to his son Albert; whether his wife Gina owned 50 per cent of ACC shares; and whether Gina was entitled to an extension of time to file a surviving spouse's election under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, upholding the application judge's determinations on each issue.

The respondents, Trillium Gift of Life Network and University Health Network, brought motions to dismiss and transfer applications challenging the constitutionality of liver transplant waitlist criteria for patients with alcohol-related liver disease.

UHN moved to dismiss the application against it, arguing the Charter did not apply to its clinical decisions.

Trillium moved to transfer the application to the Divisional Court, arguing it involved the review of a statutory power.

The Superior Court dismissed both motions, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Charter did not apply to UHN's adoption of the criteria, and affirming the Superior Court's inherent jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies without bifurcating the proceedings.

This costs endorsement followed multiple motions concerning the administration of the Estate of Peter Trezzi.

The court applied the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, considering public policy factors and the general civil litigation costs regime.

Costs were determined for four main matters: ownership of 18 Boyle Drive, extension of the applicant's Family Law Act rights, corporate assets, and share ownership of Across Canada Construction Ltd. The court also addressed costs for an adjournment motion, production orders, and consent orders.

The decision allocated costs between parties and the Estate, often finding that the Estate should bear costs due to issues arising from the deceased's actions or ambiguities in the will.

This application concerned the legal definition of death and the withdrawal of life support for Shalom Ouanounou, a devout Orthodox Jew, who was declared brain dead but whose family believed he was alive under Jewish law.

The applicant sought an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of life support, rescission of the initial death certificate, and a declaration that the Consent and Capacity Board had jurisdiction over such disputes.

Following Ouanounou's natural death, the court considered whether the application was moot.

Citing a recent decision in *McKitty v. Hayani*, which addressed similar issues, the court found the application moot as there was no longer a live controversy and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the academic issues.

Alfrida Gina Trezzi sought a declaration that she was a 50% owner of Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) shares.

Albert Trezzi opposed, arguing her claim was statute-barred and that she was not a shareholder.

The court dismissed the limitation period argument.

However, the court found no evidence that ACC ever issued shares to Gina, despite unexecuted organizational documents suggesting a 50/50 split with Peter Trezzi.

The court rejected the application of statutory presumptions under the Business Corporations Act and Securities Transfer Act, concluding Gina failed to prove her ownership claim.

Albert's cross-application for a declaration that Peter's estate owned all shares was also declined as the hearing only addressed Gina's alleged ownership.

The applicants sought to stay a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board pending judicial review.

The Board had certified the respondent union, finding the applicants were the true employer of construction labourers on the application date, and had refused to admit post-application evidence regarding the workers' roles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, holding that the 'strong prima facie case' test applied and that the applicants failed to meet this threshold, as the Board's refusal to admit the evidence was a valid exercise of its statutory discretion rather than a denial of natural justice.

The University of Toronto Graduate Students’ Union (UTGSU) challenged a referendum on its continued membership in the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) and CFS-Ontario (CFS-O), arguing that the Chief Returning Officer (CRO) made unreasonable decisions regarding polling stations and mail-out ballots, which led to a failure to meet quorum.

The CFS sought a declaration that UTGSU remained a member.

The court found that the relationship between the organizations and their members was contractual, governed by bylaws.

The court declined to imply a term into the bylaws to alter quorum calculation for disenfranchised voters.

It also found that the CRO's decisions were within his discretion and not made in bad faith, applying a subjective standard to his judgment.

Consequently, the court granted the CFS's application, declaring UTGSU's continued membership, and dismissed UTGSU's counter-application.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims for damages arising from alleged breaches of an agreement of purchase and sale for a home for special care.

The trial judge found that the appellant failed to prove the septic system was defective, rejected her interpretation of a shared driveway agreement, and concluded that a clause regarding the number of residents merged in the deed on closing after she accepted an abatement.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's law firm due to a conflict of interest.

A partner at the firm had acted for one of the defendants in two unrelated mortgage transactions, receiving confidential financial information, while the firm was concurrently representing the plaintiff in an action against that defendant.

The court applied the bright line rule against concurrent representation of adverse interests and found that the firm failed to conduct a proper conflicts check.

The motion was granted and the law firm was disqualified from representing the plaintiff.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

The applicant, Nasjjec, brought applications to set aside several arbitration awards made by the Arbitrator regarding the dissolution of a partnership that owned a commercial office building.

Nasjjec argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, failed to treat the parties equally and fairly, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent, Nuyork, brought a cross-application to enforce the awards.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Nasjjec's applications, finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law and that the Arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, within his jurisdiction, and procedurally fair.

The court granted Nuyork's application to enforce the arbitral awards and awarded costs to Nuyork on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court declined to award costs to any party, citing the tragic circumstances of the case and the reasonableness of the appeal, which raised bona fide legal issues.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre.

He argued the Board erred by failing to consider an absolute or conditional discharge, and by refusing a provision that would allow him to live in 24-hour supervised accommodation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board did not err in refusing a discharge given the appellant's ongoing risk to the community.

However, the Court found the Board erred in law and misapprehended evidence by refusing the supervised accommodation provision, which was recommended for therapeutic reasons and to place the appellant on a waiting list.

Despite finding this error, the Court declined to alter the disposition due to fresh evidence and a pending hearing regarding a significant increase in the restriction of the appellant's liberty.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to extend the suspension of a declaration of invalidity to September 30, 2014.

The extension was requested because legislation responding to the court's previous decision was still proceeding through parliament.

As the request was reasonable and consented to by all parties and the amicus curiae, the Court of Appeal granted the motion.