Ewa Krajewska

This application concerned the legal definition of death and the withdrawal of life support for Shalom Ouanounou, a devout Orthodox Jew, who was declared brain dead but whose family believed he was alive under Jewish law.

The applicant sought an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of life support, rescission of the initial death certificate, and a declaration that the Consent and Capacity Board had jurisdiction over such disputes.

Following Ouanounou's natural death, the court considered whether the application was moot.

Citing a recent decision in *McKitty v. Hayani*, which addressed similar issues, the court found the application moot as there was no longer a live controversy and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the academic issues.

Alfrida Gina Trezzi sought a declaration that she was a 50% owner of Across Canada Construction Ltd. (ACC) shares.

Albert Trezzi opposed, arguing her claim was statute-barred and that she was not a shareholder.

The court dismissed the limitation period argument.

However, the court found no evidence that ACC ever issued shares to Gina, despite unexecuted organizational documents suggesting a 50/50 split with Peter Trezzi.

The court rejected the application of statutory presumptions under the Business Corporations Act and Securities Transfer Act, concluding Gina failed to prove her ownership claim.

Albert's cross-application for a declaration that Peter's estate owned all shares was also declined as the hearing only addressed Gina's alleged ownership.

The applicants sought to stay a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board pending judicial review.

The Board had certified the respondent union, finding the applicants were the true employer of construction labourers on the application date, and had refused to admit post-application evidence regarding the workers' roles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, holding that the 'strong prima facie case' test applied and that the applicants failed to meet this threshold, as the Board's refusal to admit the evidence was a valid exercise of its statutory discretion rather than a denial of natural justice.

The University of Toronto Graduate Students’ Union (UTGSU) challenged a referendum on its continued membership in the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) and CFS-Ontario (CFS-O), arguing that the Chief Returning Officer (CRO) made unreasonable decisions regarding polling stations and mail-out ballots, which led to a failure to meet quorum.

The CFS sought a declaration that UTGSU remained a member.

The court found that the relationship between the organizations and their members was contractual, governed by bylaws.

The court declined to imply a term into the bylaws to alter quorum calculation for disenfranchised voters.

It also found that the CRO's decisions were within his discretion and not made in bad faith, applying a subjective standard to his judgment.

Consequently, the court granted the CFS's application, declaring UTGSU's continued membership, and dismissed UTGSU's counter-application.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims for damages arising from alleged breaches of an agreement of purchase and sale for a home for special care.

The trial judge found that the appellant failed to prove the septic system was defective, rejected her interpretation of a shared driveway agreement, and concluded that a clause regarding the number of residents merged in the deed on closing after she accepted an abatement.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's law firm due to a conflict of interest.

A partner at the firm had acted for one of the defendants in two unrelated mortgage transactions, receiving confidential financial information, while the firm was concurrently representing the plaintiff in an action against that defendant.

The court applied the bright line rule against concurrent representation of adverse interests and found that the firm failed to conduct a proper conflicts check.

The motion was granted and the law firm was disqualified from representing the plaintiff.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

The applicant, Nasjjec, brought applications to set aside several arbitration awards made by the Arbitrator regarding the dissolution of a partnership that owned a commercial office building.

Nasjjec argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, failed to treat the parties equally and fairly, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent, Nuyork, brought a cross-application to enforce the awards.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Nasjjec's applications, finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law and that the Arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, within his jurisdiction, and procedurally fair.

The court granted Nuyork's application to enforce the arbitral awards and awarded costs to Nuyork on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court declined to award costs to any party, citing the tragic circumstances of the case and the reasonableness of the appeal, which raised bona fide legal issues.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to extend the suspension of a declaration of invalidity to September 30, 2014.

The extension was requested because legislation responding to the court's previous decision was still proceeding through parliament.

As the request was reasonable and consented to by all parties and the amicus curiae, the Court of Appeal granted the motion.

The Person in Charge for Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, finding it trustworthy and relevant to the issue of risk to public safety.

Concluding that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the Board's decision, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing before the Board.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for threatening to kill his sister, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention in a forensic unit with limited community privileges.

He sought a conditional discharge or discretion for community living.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety was supported by the evidence, and the disposition was appropriate.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a claim alleging negligence in the conduct of a federal tender process relating to hydroelectric facilities.

The plaintiff sought damages, declarations, and injunctive relief, alleging that a profit‑sharing requirement in the Request for Proposals was ultra vires the governing federal legislation.

The court held that Parks Canada was acting as a federal board, commission, or tribunal within the meaning of the Federal Courts Act and that the relief sought fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s. 18.

The court distinguished Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., finding that the action effectively challenged administrative decisions and sought traditional judicial review remedies.

The statement of claim was struck for lack of jurisdiction.

Following a motion hearing concerning a significant advance payment request in complex estate-related litigation, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the importance and novelty of the issues and the reasonable expectations of experienced litigants.

The plaintiff was successful and entitled to substantial costs for the motion.

The court also addressed the entitlement of the estate trustee during litigation to costs payable from the estate under a prior order.

A surviving spouse sought an advance equalization payment of $4.5 million from the estate of her deceased husband under the Family Law Act or, alternatively, partial summary judgment.

The motion was opposed by several defendants asserting potential claims against the estate and challenging their standing and the appropriateness of the advance.

The court held that the equalization entitlement between spouses is personal under the Family Law Act and that the defendants were neither proven creditors nor beneficiaries.

Applying the three-part test for advance equalization payments from Laamanen v. Laamanen, the court found a reasonable need for litigation funding, little doubt of entitlement to at least the requested amount, and that granting the advance was just in the circumstances.