Evan Rankin

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario brought applications to compel three physicians to cooperate with investigations into their practices, particularly concerning the issuance of COVID-19 vaccination exemptions and the dissemination of information.

The physicians refused to cooperate, asserting constitutional rights.

The court dismissed the respondents' adjournment requests and ordered them to comply with the investigations, including providing medical charts and patient information.

The court granted a publication ban on the identities of private physician sources and witnesses but denied a ban on the identities of the College's staff and the Medical Officer of Health, finding that social media comments directed at public officials, while vituperative, did not constitute actual threats of violence justifying such a ban.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which imposed a 12-month suspension and a general prohibition on prescribing and administering controlled substances.

The appellant argued the Committee erred by departing from a joint submission that would have allowed him to continue prescribing in an in-hospital setting, and by imposing a 12-month rather than 6-month suspension.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee provided adequate notice of its concerns, met the high threshold for departing from a joint submission, and imposed a fit and proportionate penalty given the appellant's severe clinical deficiencies.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The defendants, former solicitors for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence action on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged negligence in drafting condominium documents, leading to a substantial reduction in a prior award.

The court found that the plaintiff discovered or ought to have discovered its claim against the defendants no later than July 7, 2017, when a prior court endorsement specifically addressed the inadequacy of disclosure, which was attributable to the defendants' drafting.

As the action was commenced on November 19, 2019, it was barred by the Limitations Act.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved for certification of a class action on behalf of debenture holders of Discovery Air Inc., alleging oppression by the defendants in a series of transactions that transferred Discovery's primary asset to Clairvest at a material discount.

Clairvest consented to certification but disputed the common issues and sought discovery directions, while the remaining defendants argued the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against them.

The court found the pleadings sufficiently detailed to disclose a cause of action against the individual directors and the Top Aces entities.

The court certified the action, adopted a broad definition of the common issues with some additions proposed by Clairvest regarding causation and reasonable expectations, and declined to order non-party production or expanded discovery at this early stage.

The plaintiff, a debentureholder, sought to bring a class action for oppression against certain shareholders, directors, and officers of Discovery Air Inc. The defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing due to a 'no-action clause' in the trust indenture, which they claimed required trustee authority or satisfaction of specific preconditions.

The court found that the trust indenture, when read holistically, did not preclude the plaintiff's direct action.

Alternatively, the court determined that the plaintiff had met the preconditions, including the 25% debentureholder support and a reasonable offer of indemnity, despite the trustee's commercially unreasonable demands.

The plaintiff's motion was granted, allowing the oppression action to proceed.

Following an appeal of an arbitration award where success was divided, the appellants sought costs of $24,322.76.

The respondents argued that each party should bear their own costs or, alternatively, costs should be fixed at $3,500.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding that the appellants were successful in having the arbitrator's reasons deemed inadequate on one issue, while the respondents were successful in having the matter remitted to the original arbitrator, the court concluded that success was divided and made no order as to costs.

The appellants sought leave to appeal an arbitration award arising from the termination of a medical practice business relationship.

The arbitrator had awarded the respondents $946,071, which included a refund of overhead expenses and 'Special Expenses' deducted by the appellants.

The court found that the parties had not contracted out of the right to appeal under s. 45 of the Arbitration Act.

Leave to appeal was granted because the adequacy of the arbitrator's reasons constituted a question of law.

The court held that the arbitrator's reasons were inadequate regarding the Special Expenses, as they failed to explain why the appellants were ordered to repay those amounts.

The court varied the award to order repayment of a 5% overhead increase and remitted the Special Expenses issue back to the original arbitrator for determination.

The plaintiff physician brought an action against the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons after it determined he did not meet the eligibility requirements to sit the internal medicine national exam based on his US residency training.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the College's motion and dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding no genuine issue for trial as the plaintiff failed to establish any legal duty breached by the College or any damages suffered.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his 16-year-old counterclaim for solicitor's negligence due to delay.

The appellant argued the Master applied the wrong rule, made palpable and overriding errors regarding his explanation for the delay and the resulting prejudice, and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding his financial situation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding the Master correctly applied Rule 48.14, made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the delay or prejudice, and that the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for judgment against the respondent for $7,451,662.65 under a settlement agreement.

The parties had contracted for construction of the western portion of the Eglinton Crosstown Tunnel.

The respondent was required to obtain third-party liability insurance, with the appellant as an additional insured.

The appellant was responsible for paying 100% of deductibles for third-party claims.

After substantial performance, the parties settled outstanding contract disputes with mutual releases that included a clause preserving rights and obligations regarding insurance policies.

The respondent withheld $6.4 million from the final settlement payment, claiming it was due for outstanding deductible claims.

The appellant argued the settlement released it from deductible obligations.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the release did not release the appellant from its deductible obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding the release language clearly preserved all rights and obligations relating to insurance policies, including deductible payment obligations.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's administrative dismissal of their solicitors' negligence action for delay.

The action arose from a Ponzi scheme and had been dormant for years while the appellants were involved in other proceedings.

The Divisional Court found no error in the Master's application of the Scaini test, agreeing that the appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the respondents suffered significant prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

This addendum addresses procedural issues arising from the Court of Appeal's March 28, 2018 decision allowing both appeals and a cross-appeal.

The court clarified that: (1) a "no order as to costs" provision can apply to both parties and interveners; (2) conclusions regarding statutory interpretation and waiver applicability should not be reflected in the formal order but only in the reasons; and (3) separate formal orders must be taken out for the merits decision and the costs decision, each bearing the date of its respective release.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing both appeals and a cross-appeal in two consolidated ski resort injury cases.

The court set aside the orders of the Superior Court and remitted the matters back for further proceedings.

The primary issue on costs was whether any party should recover their appellate costs.

Blue Mountain Resorts and the respondents argued for no costs award due to the novelty of the legal issues, while Snow Valley sought partial indemnity costs of $25,000.

The plaintiff, a former Olympic alpine skier, brought a motion for summary judgment against her former tax lawyer and his firm for professional negligence.

The defendants had advised the plaintiff to participate in an aggressive offshore tax plan to wind up her amateur athletic trust, which the Canada Revenue Agency later deemed a sham.

The Superior Court of Justice granted summary judgment on liability, finding that the defendants breached their duty of care by failing to warn the plaintiff of the significant legal risks associated with the plan.

The court held that expert evidence was not required to establish the standard of care because the duty to warn was clear, and directed that the issue of damages proceed to trial.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission applied for an inter-jurisdictional enforcement order against the respondent under subsections 127(1) and (10) of the Securities Act.

The respondent had previously been found by the British Columbia Securities Commission to have engaged in fraudulent conduct and was subject to a permanent market prohibition in British Columbia.

The respondent did not appear at the written hearing.

The Commission found it was in the public interest to issue a reciprocal order permanently prohibiting the respondent from participating in Ontario's capital markets.

The respondents admitted to engaging in the business of trading and advising in securities without registration, in contravention of subsections 25(1) and 25(3) of the Securities Act.

The individual respondent also engaged in dishonest conduct by impersonating clients when dealing with registrants.

The Ontario Securities Commission approved the settlement agreement, finding it in the public interest despite the individual's history of regulatory misconduct, given his cooperation, remorse, and the efficiency of resolving the matter without a contested hearing.

The Ontario Securities Commission approved a settlement agreement with Sentry Investments Inc. and Sean Driscoll regarding failures to comply with National Instrument 81-105 – Mutual Fund Sales Practices.

The respondents admitted to sales practices involving prohibited payments and gifts to registered dealers, as well as systemic supervisory failures.

The settlement included a significant administrative fine for Sentry, a $100,000 reparation payment by Driscoll, and a ban on Driscoll acting as a director or officer of a registrant until completing regulatory compliance courses.

The Commission found the agreed sanctions were within a reasonable range of appropriateness and in the public interest.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission sought an inter-jurisdictional enforcement order against the respondents under subsection 127(10) of the Securities Act, based on a prior order of the Alberta Securities Commission.

The respondents had admitted to unregistered trading, illegal distribution, and fraud in Alberta.

The Commission found that the threshold criteria for a reciprocal order were met and that it was in the public interest to protect Ontario investors by imposing permanent trading and registration bans mirroring those imposed in Alberta.