HAMILTON COURT FILE NO.: 19-68877
DATE: 2019/09/25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Jodie Calvert Wang Professional Corporation and Jodie Wang
Timothy J. McGurrin and Jack Masterman, for the Respondents
Claimants (Respondents)
- and -
Baldeep Takhar, DJ11 Holdings Inc., P and A Holdings Inc., Dr. Takhar Inc., AZP Properties Inc., Dr. Takhar Medicine Professional Corporation and Jane Doe
Peter Wardle and Evan Rankin, for the Appellants
Respondents (Appellants)
HEARD at Hamilton, Ontario: September 18, 2019
The Honourable Justice D. L. Edwards
DECISION ON APPEAL
Overview
[1] This appeal relates to the termination of a business relationship between Dr. Takhar and Dr. Wang which led to an arbitration in which the arbitrator awarded Dr. Wang a total of $946,071.
[2] The appellant seeks leave to appeal and asks that I set aside a portion of the award and send that matter back to a different arbitrator.
[3] The respondent resists this. Her counsel asserts that there is no right of appeal, but if there is the right to seek leave, it should not be granted, and if leave is granted the appeal should fail. Further, if I should grant the appeal, the matter should be resubmitted to the original arbitrator for a determination of the issue in dispute.
Facts
[4] Dr. Wang and Dr. Takhar are practicing doctors who became friends and began practicing together in 2011.
[5] In November 2011 they entered into a business arrangement whereby they practiced together in one clinic, called “the Franklin”.
[6] Dr. Takhar had developed a very successful way of practicing and Dr. Wang hoped through the business arrangement to have the same success. Dr. Takhar was responsible for supervising financial aspects of the arrangement, including the preparation of financial statements. Dr. Wang left the financial matters to Dr. Takhar.
[7] The parties practiced, in part, through corporations. For the purpose of this appeal that is not a relevant fact.
[8] A draft contract was created with regard to the Franklin clinic where the parties initially practiced (“Draft Franklin Agreement”), but it was never executed. The arbitrator found that, although this agreement was not a binding agreement upon the parties, in fact some parts of that agreement were representative of the arrangements followed by the parties.
[9] One element of the Draft Franklin Agreement that the arbitrator found did reflect the parties’ agreement was the fact that Dr. Wang would pay to Dr. Takhar 25% of all of Dr. Wang’s gross billings as her share of overhead, in lieu of directly contributing towards the expenses of the operations. In practice Dr. Takhar made a deduction from Dr. Wang’s billings and forwarded the net to her.
[10] Dr. Takhar, at some point, raised this amount from 25% to 30%. This was a live issue before the arbitrator.
[11] The Draft Franklin Agreement did not deal with certain other matters such as the doctors’ private billings and the use of locum doctors at the clinic. These are not in issue in this appeal.
[12] Eventually the doctors decided to expand the business and to add new clinics. A new clinic was opened on Victoria Street North in Kitchener in September 2014. Dr. Wang was the main doctor seeing patients at that location.
[13] At some point, Dr. Takhar began charging Dr. Wang a share of the additional expenses related to the new clinics. These expenses were segregated from normal overhead expenses and 40% of these expenses were deducted from Dr. Wang’s gross billings.
[14] In 2014 and 2015 these amounts totalled $586,275 of which 40% was deducted from Dr. Wang’s gross billings.
[15] Also, beginning in late 2014 additional staff was hired because of an investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. These extra staffing costs were paid equally by the doctors, costing Dr. Wang $142,936 from 2014 to 2015.
[16] For the purpose of these reasons, I will call the extra staffing costs and the additional costs related to the new clinics, “Special Expenses”.
[17] Whether the deduction of these Special Expenses was made with Dr. Wang’s consent was a live issue before the arbitrator.
[18] In late 2015 the relationship broke down and ultimately an arbitration was held over eight days in May and June of 2018.
[19] The arbitrator released his arbitration award.
[20] The appellant takes issue with that portion of the award which commences under the heading, “F- IS DR. T’S DECISION TO INCREASE DR. W’S EXPENSE CONTRIBUTION FROM 25% TO 30% ENFORCEABLE?”
[21] The arbitrator concluded that the increase was not enforceable and made a calculation to arrive at what he called the “shortfall”. From Dr. Wang’s gross billings of $3,904,031 he deducted the amount Dr. Wang had been paid by Dr. Takhar and 25% of the gross plus HST. The amount remaining was $763,560. He awarded this amount to Dr. Wang and said it represented “the overhead expense or charges over and above the 25% figure”.
[22] In fact, 5% of Dr. Wang’s gross billings is $195,201.55. Therefore, $568,358.45 - which is the balance after deducting the 5% from the arbitrator’s calculated shortfall - represents the funds retained by Dr. Takhar over and above 30%. Dr. Takhar’s position was that this amount represented Dr. Wang’s share of the Special Expenses.
[23] The question of Dr. Wang’s entitlement to this $568,358.45 is the factor driving this appeal.
Issues
[24] This appeal raises a number of questions that I must answer:
a. Have the parties contracted out of s.45 of the Arbitration Act (“the Act”)?
b. If not, should leave be granted?
c. If so, should the appeal be granted?
d. If so, what is the remedy?
[25] I will first deal with whether the parties have contracted out of s.45.
Contracting Out of Section 45 of the Act
[26] The respondent submits that the parties have contractually agreed that the arbitrator’s award was to be final and binding and there was no right, with leave or otherwise, to appeal to the courts.
[27] The respondent asserts that the parties operated, at least in part, in accordance with the Draft Franklin Agreement and another draft agreement relating to the parties’ investments in real estate (DJ11 Agreement). Counsel notes that both of these draft agreements have arbitration provisions which state that the award is final and binding.
[28] The respondent’s counsel acknowledges that the parties and their counsel did execute the Kent Dispute Resolution Agreement, and that this agreement, in section 4, also deals with arbitration awards.
[29] Section 4(c) of that agreement states: “The award will be final and binding upon the parties and on all of the issues submitted to arbitration.”
[30] Section 4(d) of the same agreement states: “The award is subject to appeal under section 45 and maybe set aside under section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991…”
[31] The respondent’s interpretation of these two sections is that the parties have agreed that all issues which are submitted to the arbitrator, and upon which he makes an award, are final and binding pursuant to section 4(c). However, should the arbitrator exceed his jurisdiction, then section 4(d) permits appeal under s.45 of such issues.
[32] Further, he submits that the fact that, at the arbitrator’s suggestion, both counsel agreed that a transcript was not necessary is an indication that all parties and the arbitrator concluded that there was no right to appeal, and the award would be final and binding.
[33] Counsel for the appellant submits that it is clear that the Kent Dispute Resolution Agreement was the last agreement created and is, in fact, the only signed agreement. His view is that this agreement superseded any other agreements that the parties may have had, be it written or oral. Further he submits that the language is clear; the parties have contracted into s.45.
[34] As was noted in Highbury Estates Inc. v. Bre-Ex Ltd., 2015 ONSC 4966, there is no inherent right to appeal the award of an arbitrator. Any appeal right must come from either the statute or from the contract.
[35] For several reasons I find that the parties, by contract, agreed that there was an appeal, subject to leave, in accordance with s.45.
[36] First, I note that the Kent Dispute Resolution Agreement is the only signed document on this issue, and it is the last document created. Clearly this document is binding upon the parties and it sets the parameters for the arbitration.
[37] I note that in 6524443 Canada Inc. v. Toronto (City), 2017 ONCA 486, the court held that the arbitration agreement entered into by the parties prior to arbitration superseded the arbitration clause in the previously executed lease, which was the subject of the dispute. The court stated that there was no reason to conclude that after signing a comprehensive arbitration agreement that the parties intended that conflicting terms from the previously executed lease were to prevail over the more recently executed arbitration agreement.
[38] I find that on a plain reading of the two sections that section 4(d) modifies section 4(c) and gives the parties the right to appeal that are described in ss. 45 and 46 of the Act.
[39] I also do not accept the interpretation of the respondent that section 4(d) was intended to deal only with the situation where the arbitrator went beyond his jurisdiction and dealt with issues not submitted to him. Clearly, s.46 of the Act deals with that situation and is available to all parties to an arbitration, regardless of the terms of their arbitration.
[40] Therefore, I answer the first question, in the negative. The parties did not contract out of s.45 of the Act; indeed, they contracted into that section. The parties have a right of appeal on questions of law, subject to leave.
Should Leave be Granted?
[41] The parties agree upon the test that I must consider in determining whether to grant leave as set out in s.45 of the Act.
[42] It is a three-part test:
a. It must be on a question of law;
b. The importance to the parties of the matters at stake in arbitration must justify an appeal; and
c. The determination of the question of law issue must significantly affect the rights of the parties.
[43] The respondent concedes that the quantum of money at stake to the parties is important and justifies the appeal, but contests whether the appellant is raising a question of law and, even if it was a question of law, asserts that the determination of that question would not significantly affect the rights of the parties.
[44] The appellant submits that the written reasons of the arbitrator are insufficient as they prevent meaningful appellate review, and that this is an error of law.
[45] The respondent asserts that the issue is one of mixed law and fact as it involves the interpretation of a contract.
[46] As noted by Perrell J. in Murphy v. Murphy[^1]:
It is an error in law for a judge or tribunal member to fail to provide an explanation of his or her decision that is sufficiently intelligible to permit appellate review: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (S.C.C.); Law Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein, 2010 ONCA 193 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 61. 2013 ONSC 7015, 2013 CarswellOnt 17352, [2014] W.D.F.L. 722, [2014] W.D.F.L. 755, 117 O.R. (3d) 749, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 6, 39 R.F.L. (7th) 320
[47] I am satisfied that the law is clear on this point. Whether reasons are adequate or not is a question of law. The standard of review is a separate issue which will be addressed below.
[48] The appellant asserts that the arbitrator’s reasons are insufficient as they relate to the calculation of what the arbitrator referred to as a “shortfall” in the amount of $763,560. He notes that the arbitrator makes this calculation in his section headed: “F – IS DR. T’S DECISION TO INCREASE DR. W’S EXPENSE CONTRIBUTION FROM 25% TO 30% ENFORCEABLE?” However, a 5% differential is in fact only $195,201.55. He asserts that why the arbitrator awarded a further $568,358.45 has no findings logically linking them to this award. He submits that there is no finding as to who should bear the costs of the Special Expenses.
[49] I am satisfied that the appellant is raising a question of law.
[50] I am also satisfied that the determination of this question of law could significantly affect the rights of the parties. Whether the arbitrator (the same or different one) makes a finding that there was or was not a separate agreement regarding the Special Expenses will significantly affect the parties’ rights with respect to almost $600,000.
[51] I find that the issue raised is a question of law, the importance to the parties justifies the appeal, and the determination of the question may significantly affect the parties’ rights. I find that the appellant has satisfied the test and leave to appeal is granted.
Should the Appeal be Granted?
[52] The appellant submits that whether Dr. Wang should pay a portion of the Special Expenses was a live issue before the arbitrator. Indeed, the written closing submissions of the respondent note that is an issue.
[53] The appellant asserts that a review of the reasons of the arbitrator reveals that there are no findings of fact on this issue.
[54] He acknowledges that the arbitrator under the heading of “B—WHAT WAS THE “ARRANGEMENT” BETWEEN DR. W. AND DR. T?” does make a general comment, but makes no specific comments or findings on this issue:
Unfortunately, there were other aspects of the relationship where, it appears, and agreement was never achieved, although Dr. T. in particular took it upon herself to act in a manner that she considered appropriate and fair. For example, when overhead costs increase, she unilaterally increased Dr. W.’s contribution from 25% to 30%. Similarly, without consulting Dr. W., she took various steps and made decisions without any meaningful discussion with Dr. W. or without obtaining Dr. W.’s agreement. Such unilateral steps and decisions were possible because Dr. W. had become a friend who trusted Dr. T. and did not take any real interest in or participate in the administrative or business end of the operation… [emphasis added]
[55] The respondent asserts that the arbitrator’s statement in section F that the shortfall represented “the overhead expense or charges over and above the 25% figure” when connected back to the arbitrator’s reference to unilateral steps and decisions, make it clear that the arbitrator has decided that there was no agreement for Dr. Wang to share any of the Special Expenses.
[56] What then is the standard of review regarding the adequacy of reasons in these circumstances?
[57] The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the adequacy of reasons is no longer a stand-alone basis for judicial review of an expert tribunal:
Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir as standing for the proposition that the "adequacy" of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses -- one for the reasons and a separate one for the result …. It is a more organic exercise -- the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at "the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes" (para. 47).
It is true that the breach of a duty of procedural fairness is an error in law. Where there are no reasons in circumstances where they are required, there is nothing to review. But where, as here, there are reasons, there is no such breach. Any challenge to the reasoning/result of the decision should therefore be made within the reasonableness analysis. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, paras. 14 & 22
[58] The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that:
... Reasons that permit meaningful appellate review justify and explain the results, inform losing party why he lost, enable informed consideration as to whether to appeal and enable the public to determine whether justice has been done ... Gholami v. The Hospital of Sick Children, 2018 ONCA 783, at para. 63
[59] The Court continued at para. 64:
Even if the reasons of the trial judge do not on their face reveal “what” was decided and “why” it was decided, this court is obliged to consider the trial record to determine if the reasons are more comprehensible when read in that context ...
[60] Finally, in King’s Bay Development Corp. v. Cornerstone Custom Homes Ltd., 2009 ONCA 611, the court noted reasons are sufficient if they show why the judge arrived at the decision and that it is not necessary for the reasons to demonstrate how the judge reached a decision. However, the court quoted McLachlin C.J.C. from R v. M. (R.E.)[^2] where she stated, “the trial judge need not expound on evidence which is uncontroversial, or detail his or her findings on each piece of evidence or controverted fact, so long as the findings in linking the evidence to the verdict can be logically discerned”.
[61] The standard of review is therefore one of reasonableness.
[62] How then do these principles apply to this case?
[63] First, I am satisfied that one cannot read the phrase “representing the overhead expense or charges over and above the 25% figure” in the abstract. It must be read in the context of the decision and where it is located in that decision.
[64] That phrase is the last part of the first paragraph that begins the section of the award that was headed “F –Is Dr. T’s the Decision to increase Dr. W’s expense contribution from 25% to 30%”. Further, in the balance of that section, the arbitrator continues to analyze and explain his reasons for concluding that 25% rather than 30% was the appropriate deduction from billings for Dr. Wang’s share of overhead. Under section F, where are the calculation was made, not only does the title only refer to the 25% versus 30% issue, but throughout that entire section the only discussion that the arbitrator makes is with respect to the 25% verses 30% issue. Nowhere does he make a finding that Dr. Wang should not pay any portion of the Special Expenses, and yet he performs a calculation that results in all of these costs being borne by Dr. Takhar.
[65] Nowhere does the arbitrator address what was a live issue before him, namely, the sharing of the Special Expenses. At the arbitration, Dr. Takhar submitted that Dr. Wang should pay a portion of them, whereas Dr. Wang asserted in closing argument that she should not be responsible for any of it.
[66] There is no transcript here, so the record is limited to the exhibits that were filed.
[67] There is no disagreement regarding most of the actual numbers as reflected in those exhibits. There are findings by the arbitrator and no disagreement by the parties regarding Dr. Wang’s gross billings, what amounts were deducted by Dr. Takhar from the gross billings, what the normal overhead was, and what amounts Dr. Takhar treated as Special Expenses and deducted a portion thereof from Dr. Wang’s billings.
[68] The record is not therefore helpful to me to determine whether the reasons are more comprehensible when considered in light of the record.
[69] It is possible that the arbitrator concluded that there was no agreement on these Special Expenses, and that Dr. Takhar acted unilaterally and should pay back any of those amounts. He may have concluded that the simplest way to calculate that amount was to utilize the formula that he did, namely, deducting both what Dr. Wang was paid and 25% plus HST from Dr. Wang’s gross billings, to obtain what he termed the “shortfall”. This was the amount deducted from Dr. Wang’s gross billings that exceeded the 25% deduction.
[70] Alternatively, he may not have turned his mind to these Special Expenses, but by use of his calculation inadvertently obtained an amount that resulted in Dr. Takhar being ordered to repay to Dr. Wang the portion of the Special Expenses that she had deducted. His reasons reveal no findings of fact on this issue.
[71] As McLachlin C.J.C stated, there are no findings that link the evidence to the verdict on this issue that are logically discernable.
[72] From the reasons, Dr. Takhar is unable to determine why this order was made against her.
[73] I find that the reasons are not sufficient on the issue as to why Dr. Takhar is required to pay Dr. Wang the sum of $568,358.45 as those reasons do not show why the arbitrator reached that conclusion.
What is the Remedy?
[74] Under the statute, I may require a tribunal to explain any matter. I may confirm, vary or set aside the award, or remit the award to the arbitral tribunal with the court’s opinion on the question of law. Also, I may give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
[75] Under s.46(1) of the Act I have the power to set aside the award on various grounds.
[76] Under s.46(7) where I set aside an award, I may remove the arbitrator and may give directions about the conduct of the arbitration. Further, under s-s.8, rather than setting aside the award, I may remit it to the arbitral tribunal and give directions about the conduct of the arbitration.
[77] What is the appropriate remedy in these circumstances?
[78] I find that there are two issues which have been combined into one by the arbitrator’s reasons. There is the issue of the 25% versus 30% deduction from gross billings. There is a second question regarding the Special Expenses. These two questions must be dealt with separately.
[79] I am satisfied that there are sufficient findings of fact by the arbitrator to allow me to deal with the 25% versus 30% issue and to vary the award accordingly.
[80] The arbitrator found as a fact that there was no agreement to increase the deduction from 25% to 30% and that Dr. Takhar unilaterally raised the deduction to 30%. As well, he found that Dr. Wang’s gross billings were $3,904,031.
[81] Therefore, I am satisfied that I can vary the award, and perform the simple calculation of 5% of the gross billings of Dr. Wang. I vary that portion of his award contained in Section F of his reasons, and order that Dr. Takhar pay Dr. Wang the sum of $195,201.55, which represents the extra 5% of Dr. Wang’s gross billings retained by Dr. Takhar when she increased the deduction from 25% to 30%.
[82] The second question remains as to what to do with the larger issue; namely, the Special Expenses which constitute $568,358.45 of the arbitrator’s award.
[83] There are no findings of fact by the arbitrator that would allow me to vary the award.
[84] The appellant asks that I send the issue back to a new arbitrator. He submits that, as there is no transcript, it would be unfair to have the matter sent back to the original arbitrator. As he expressed it, he would have one hand tied behind his back.
[85] The respondent submits that the matter should be returned to the original arbitrator as he has all of his notes, he heard all of the evidence and he is in a position to make a finding on this issue without delay. Further, the arbitrator has advised that he is willing to do so.
[86] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Victoria University (Board of Regents) v. GE Canada Real Estate Equity, 2016 ONCA 646, at para. 143 enunciated the factors that I should consider when sending a matter back to the same or a different arbitrator. They include principles of efficiency, cost-effectiveness and fairness to the parties.
[87] In Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2007 NLCA 48, at para. 54, the court referred the matter back to a different arbitrator as the court stated that “an objective observer could perceive that the first arbitrator could not reconsider the matter with a completely open mind on its disposition”. In that case the allegation which was upheld was that the arbitrator made an error on a finding as to facts which were central to the issue.
[88] Further, in Economical Mutual Insurance Company, 2010 ONSC 7208, the judge held:
Given the lapse of time and the procedural difficulties of the initial arbitration, including the possible mistaken inclusion of the excluded June 10, 2008 transcript and the present dispute concerning the use that should be made of PC Brazier’s report and notes, the fairest manner of proceeding is to have the issues freshly determined by a new arbitrator. In that way, the parties can ensure that there is no confusion about what constitutes the arbitration record.[^3]
[89] How then do these principles apply to the instant case?
[90] Clearly, it would be most efficient and cost-effective to return the single issue to the original arbitrator. I am advised that he is willing to deal with the issue and that he has all of the exhibits and his notes.
[91] The question is whether that is fair to all parties.
[92] The appellant submits that first, there is no transcript so it will be difficult for him to make submissions on this point and, second, the arbitrator has already made credibility findings with respect to his client which may negatively impact upon the arbitrator’s decision on this issue.
[93] It is important to note that there are no allegations of impropriety on the part of the arbitrator. There is no allegation of any lack of natural justice during the arbitration. Both parties had the opportunity to provide their witnesses, cross-examine other witnesses and make appropriate closing submissions. There is no allegation that the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact.
[94] The sole deficiency is that his reasons were inadequate on the one issue.
[95] As well, should the matter be remitted to the original arbitrator, he is not being asked to reconsider an issue upon which he has already made findings. Rather, he is being asked to make findings upon matters not reflected in his reasons.
[96] I find that there is no need to relitigate the issue. What is needed is for the arbitrator to make findings of fact based upon the evidence that he heard.
[97] This is not, and should not be, an opportunity for either party for a “do-over”.
[98] The fact that the arbitrator may have made findings of credibility regarding the parties, adverse or otherwise, does not impact upon the fairness of the parties. There is no denial of natural justice or procedural fairness as the parties have already exercised those rights before the arbitrator. In the absence of any allegation of bias, procedural error or otherwise, the most efficient, cost-effective and fair solution to all is to remit this issue back to the original arbitrator.
[99] I remit back to the original arbitrator the issue of the money withheld from Dr. Wang’s gross billings beyond 30%, and which totalled $568,358.45. I direct that the arbitrator answer the following questions:
a. Was there an agreement that the Special Expenses (the extra expenses related to the new clinics and the extra staff required by the doctors’ College) were to be shared between Dr. Takhar and Dr. Wang?
b. If the answer to the first question is yes, on what basis were they to be shared?
c. Depending upon the answers to the above questions, what amount, if any, of the $568,358.45 should Dr. Takhar repay to Dr. Wang? That amount, if any, shall form part of the original arbitration award as amended.
[100] Should the arbitrator conclude that he requires additional evidence or submissions on this issue, he shall advise the parties and set forth the procedure and timetable to be followed.
Summary
[101] For the above reasons I find that:
a. The parties by contract agreed to incorporate the right of appeal as described in s.45 of the Arbitration Act;
b. Leave to appeal is granted;
c. The appeal is granted.
[102] Further, I vary the section F of the award and order Dr. Takhar to pay Dr. Wang the sum of $195,201.55 representing the 5% of her gross billings charged without agreement when Dr. Takhar increased the percentage from 25 to 30.
[103] I remit the issue of the money withheld from Dr. Wang’s billings beyond 30%, and which totalled $568,358.45, to Arbitrator Kent. I direct that he make the following findings:
a. Was there an agreement that extra expenses related to the Special Expenses (the extra expenses related to the new clinics and the extra staff required by the doctors’ College) were to be shared between Dr. Takhar and Dr. Wang?
b. If the answer to the first question is yes, on what basis were they to be shared?
c. Depending upon the answers to the above questions, what amount, if any, of the $568,358.45 should Dr. Takhar repay to Dr. Wang? That amount, if any, shall form part of the original arbitration award as amended.
[104] Should the arbitrator conclude that he requires additional evidence or submissions on this issue, he shall advise the parties and set forth the procedure and timetable to be followed.
[105] If the parties cannot agree upon costs of this appeal, the appellant shall provide me with written cost submissions within 14 days; the respondent within seven days thereafter and any reply within four days thereafter. Cost submissions shall be limited to three pages.
D. L. Edwards J.
Released: September 25, 2019
HAMILTON COURT FILE NO.: 19-68877
DATE: 2019/09/25
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Jodie Calvert Wang Professional Corporation and Jodie Wang
Claimants (Respondents)
- and –
Baldeep Takhar, DJ11 Holdings Inc., P and A Holdings Inc., Dr. Takhar Inc., AZP Properties Inc., Dr. Takhar Medicine Professional Corporation and Jane Doe
Respondents (Appellants)
DECISION ON APPEAL
D. L. Edwards J.
Released: September 25, 2019
[^1]: Murphy v. Murphy, 2013 ONSC 7015 [^2]: R. v. M. (R.E.), 2008 SCC 51, para. 20 [^3]: Para. 35