Eric H. Siebenmorgen

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly credit pre-trial custody and consider his guilty plea and status as an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the pre-trial custody did not relate to the charge and was aware of the mitigating factors.

Given the seriousness of the offence, the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for historical sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict was not unreasonable despite inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, which were typical for historical sexual assaults.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's refusal to accept responsibility as an aggravating factor.

However, the Court held that the six-month custodial sentence was not unfit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge gave inadequate instructions on in-dock identification and the W.D. framework regarding defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the instructions sufficient given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering a death threat against a Crown Attorney and causing a disturbance, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the witnesses consistently described a threat to kill, the trial judge correctly inferred the requisite mens rea, and the appellant's yelling in court constituted a disturbance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit despite being at the high end of the range.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice witness and failed to properly instruct the jury on the frailties of both voice and eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the conviction rested mostly on unsavoury and frail evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that permitted an accused, found not criminally responsible and deemed a significant threat to public safety, to be transferred to Jamaica pursuant to a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the disposition unreasonable as it effectively abdicated the Board's jurisdiction over a dangerous offender without adequate safeguards in the receiving country.

The Court held that the existence of a deportation order does not grant the Board authority under the Criminal Code to permanently transfer an accused out of the country.

The appellant appealed his convictions, which included a charge of endangering the safety of an airplane.

The parties made a joint fresh evidence application on appeal.

Based on the fresh medical evidence, the Court of Appeal found the appellant was not criminally responsible.

The convictions were set aside, findings of not criminally responsible were substituted on all three counts, and the matter was referred to the Review Board for disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was defective.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. Rhee and found no reason to interfere with the majority of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the charge was in substantial compliance with the principles articulated in Lifchus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, anal intercourse, and uttering a death threat against his girlfriend.

At trial, the judge admitted similar fact evidence from a previous girlfriend detailing physical abuse.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the similar fact evidence by framing the issue too broadly as credibility, failing to appreciate the relative cogency of connecting factors, and failing to consider the significant potential prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, failed to adequately answer a jury question on intent, and erred in not instructing the jury that his rage could raise a reasonable doubt about intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were correct and adequate, noting that the mens rea for attempted murder is an intention to kill.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the severe nature of the domestic abuse.

The appellant, who acted as the getaway driver in two robberies, appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration.

He argued for a conditional sentence or a shorter reformatory term, citing his youth, lack of criminal record, and the lesser sentences of his accomplices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence but found the 18-month term failed to adequately reflect the disparity between the appellant's role and that of his accomplices, as well as his mitigating factors.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced to 12 months' incarceration.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder and denied bail under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the portion of s. 515(10)(c) permitting detention 'on any other just cause being shown' is unconstitutionally vague and violates s. 11(e).

However, the Court severed this phrase and upheld the remainder of the provision, which allows bail to be denied where necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought release from custody pending his new trial for first degree murder, having spent almost 10 years in custody.

The Court of Appeal had previously quashed his conviction due to errors regarding jailhouse informant testimony and bad character evidence.

The court found the applicant met his onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, noting the Crown's case was now considerably weaker, the applicant had strong community ties, a positive institutional record, and posed minimal risk to the public.

The application for release was granted subject to strict conditions, including a cash deposit and substantial sureties.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code by holding an in camera meeting with the federal Crown and an investigating officer to determine an informer privilege claim over RCMP records.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the 'other suspect' defence, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and the fact-finding process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the in camera meeting was part of a separate proceeding under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, not the trial itself, and that the appellant had expressly consented to the procedure.

The Court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the lower court's dismissal of the appellant's application for a stay based on unreasonable delay.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion and rejecting the possibility of a conditional sentence for the specific type of offence, contrary to the Supreme Court's guidance in Proulx.

The sentence was varied to a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence, including his foreknowledge that the murder weapon was a homemade gun.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit from his trial counsel, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because the lawyer did not testify at trial to explain that he had informed the appellant about the gun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to call the trial counsel did not result in a miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the appellant.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter in the asphyxiation death of a four-month-old infant.

The Crown had originally charged first degree murder, but the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on that charge.

The accused appealed the manslaughter conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding the sequence of events.

The Crown appealed the directed verdict of acquittal.

The Court of Appeal held that the manslaughter verdict was not unreasonable when considering all the evidence, including evidence of smothering that the trial judge improperly excluded.

However, the Court allowed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge erred in refusing to assist the jury with their question about the mother's evidence.

The Court also allowed the Crown's appeal, finding there was sufficient evidence of intent and smothering to leave the first degree murder charge with the jury, and ordered a new trial on that charge.

The appellant challenged her conviction on the basis that the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, unfairly assessed credibility, and erred in finding a document was concocted without independent evidence.

The court held that the impugned passage had to be read in context, that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, and that the credibility analysis was reasonable.

It further held that the finding of concoction flowed directly from the rejection of the appellant’s evidence regarding the exhibit and was distinguishable from prior authorities requiring independent evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was manifestly reasonable and, if anything, lenient.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the tertiary bail ground in s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code after being denied bail on the basis that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 11(e) of the Charter does not freeze constitutionally valid bail grounds to attendance in court and public safety, and that Parliament may enact additional grounds if they satisfy the constitutional standard of just cause.

Applying the Pearson and Morales framework, the court concluded that the provision limits detention to a narrow set of circumstances and serves the proper functioning of the bail system.

The court further held that the phrase concerning confidence in the administration of justice, especially when read with the enumerated statutory factors, is neither vague nor overbroad.

The appeal was dismissed.