David Elmaleh

A lawyer and human rights advocate sued for defamation after a charitable organization published articles accusing him of supporting terrorists.

The plaintiff had met with the father of an alleged Palestinian terrorist, expressed sympathy for the father whose home was demolished, and posted about the matter on social media.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the defendant had valid defences of fair comment, justification, and qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in applying the wrong legal standard and that the plaintiff had met his burden under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could conclude none of the defences would succeed.

The court also found the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a solar power installation company, sued the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) for misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiff alleged that the OPA unlawfully amended the microFIT Program rules without providing the required 90 days' notice, intentionally causing harm to the plaintiff's business.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the OPA did not engage in deliberate unlawful conduct or act with bad faith.

The court held that the OPA acted in good faith to balance ratepayer interests and implement Ministerial directives regarding renewable energy procurement.

Although the court assessed potential damages at $470,250, no liability was found.

The statutory third party, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The moving party claimed that plaintiffs' counsel provided legal advice to the unrepresented defendant driver, objected to questions on his behalf, and met with him behind closed doors during a discovery break.

The court found that counsel's actions did not amount to a solicitor-client relationship with the unrepresented defendant and that no confidential information was exchanged.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

Following a largely unsuccessful motion by the plaintiff to amend his claim and add defendants in a putative class action, the successful respondents sought costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Independent Electrical System Operator ($24,000), the Solart-associated entities ($12,500), Melanie Lacroix ($2,500), and Sunny Natalia ($2,500).

The court declined to award the plaintiff costs against the unsuccessful respondent Nikhil Toshniwal regarding the unopposed document service relief.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from a fall at a bus terminal in Montréal, Québec.

The moving defendants (the bus terminal operator and its shareholder) sought to dismiss or stay the action, arguing that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and that Québec was the more appropriate forum.

The court applied the two-stage Van Breda test for jurisdiction.

It found that while a contract for transportation was entered into in Ontario, the connection between this contract (based on alleged implied terms) and the tortious fall in Québec was too weak to establish a real and substantial connection for Ontario to assume jurisdiction simpliciter.

The court emphasized that requiring non-resident commercial operators to litigate claims wherever customers reside, based on implied contractual terms to which they are not privy, would impose an undue burden.

Consequently, the court ruled that jurisdiction simpliciter was not established.

Although not strictly necessary, the court also stated that had jurisdiction been found, Québec would have been clearly the more appropriate forum.

The action was permanently stayed against the moving defendants.

The defendant, B’nai Brith Canada, brought a motion under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action initiated by the plaintiff, Alexander Dimitri Lascaris, as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff claimed damages for an article and tweet published by the defendant.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (the conflict in the Middle East and the BDS movement).

The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate substantial merit, no valid defence, and that the harm outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court concluded that the plaintiff could not overcome the defence of fair comment, as it was arguable that a person could honestly believe the plaintiff's actions constituted support for terrorists, even if unreasonable.

Consequently, the defendant's motion was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a putative class action regarding unfulfilled solar panel installation contracts brought a motion to amend the statement of claim, add 17 new defendants (including the IESO), and extend the time for service on several existing defendants.

The court dismissed the motion to add the IESO and 15 Solart-associated entities, finding the claims against them were statute-barred as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the claims more than two years prior.

The court partially granted leave to amend the claim against existing defendants, striking certain proposed paragraphs that improperly pleaded evidence or lacked material facts.

The court granted the extension of time for service on several defendants, finding no actual prejudice to the defence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion to amend its amended statement of claim to add particulars of additional equipment allegedly damaged by defective hydraulic lubricant manufactured by the respondent, Greenland Corporation.

The motion judge had rejected the amendments on the basis that they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in misinterpreting the pleadings and in conflating the discovery of the claim with the discovery of the extent of damages.

The court held that all alleged damage stemmed from a single cause—the defective hydraulic lubricant—and therefore constituted particulars of one claim rather than separate causes of action.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation claim against a hotel and its night manager.

The claim arose from a log entry made by the manager describing the appellant and her husband as 'very intoxicated' and belligerent during a late-night dispute over a hotel room.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was not intoxicated, the description of her belligerent behaviour was justified and the log entry was protected by qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions on justification, qualified privilege, and the absence of malice.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a commercial parking lot, the defendants tendered an expert to give opinion evidence on winter maintenance standards.

The plaintiff opposed the qualification.

Following a Mohan voir dire, the court found that the proposed expert had acquired special knowledge in winter maintenance through his post-graduate training and extensive work experience.

The court qualified the witness as an expert, noting that any deficiencies in his training compared to the plaintiff's expert went to weight rather than admissibility.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a parking lot, the defendants (the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor) conditionally settled their crossclaims.

The plaintiff sought disclosure of the settlement agreement.

The court ordered the agreement disclosed to the court and then to the plaintiff, finding that it altered the adversarial landscape.

Consequently, the court ruled that the defendants were no longer adverse in interest and prohibited defence counsel from asking leading questions during the cross-examination of each other's witnesses, except on narrow issues where adversity remained.

The plaintiff in a slip and fall action moved to strike the jury following the defendants' opening statements, arguing that defence counsel made improper arguments, impugned plaintiff's counsel, and injected personal opinions.

The court reviewed the impugned statements and found that while some comments crossed the line into argument and unfairly bolstered credibility, the transgressions were minimally prejudicial.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the jury, concluding that a short curative instruction would adequately address the issues without compromising the plaintiff's right to a fair trial.

In a slip and fall action arising from an incident in a grocery store parking lot, the parties raised evidentiary issues regarding the admissibility of business records before the commencement of a jury trial.

The plaintiff sought to introduce Ministry of Transportation records regarding weather and road conditions, while the defendants sought to introduce daily work sheets to establish their snow and ice clearing system.

The court found both sets of records to be logically relevant to the live issues of prevailing weather conditions and the defendants' response.

The court admitted both sets of records, noting that any potential prejudice from the MTO records could be addressed with a limiting instruction to the jury.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellants could have raised their allegation of being specifically targeted in prior judicial review proceedings regarding the FIT program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to issues that could have been determined in earlier administrative processes, and found no error in the motion judge's refusal to exercise her discretion to allow the action to proceed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action after a seven-day trial, the defendants sought costs of approximately $88,000, arguing for substantial indemnity costs from the date of their Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiff argued no costs should be awarded.

The court found the Rule 49 offer defective as it did not specify costs, rejecting the claim for substantial indemnity.

Applying principles of proportionality, the court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against a hotel and its night manager arising from statements recorded in an internal “Midnight Log” describing the plaintiff as intoxicated and belligerent during a dispute at the hotel’s front desk.

The court held that the statements were capable of referring to the plaintiff and were defamatory.

However, the court found the substance of the account was substantially true except for the characterization that the plaintiff was intoxicated.

The court further held that the preparation and internal circulation of the log and its use in an employee discipline meeting were made on occasions of qualified privilege, and there was no proof of malice.

As a result, the defamation claim failed, although the court indicated that damages would have been assessed at $25,000 if liability had been established.

The plaintiffs, comprising 118 limited partnerships, brought an action against the Ontario Power Authority and Ontario for misfeasance in public office and unjust enrichment, seeking $450 million in damages related to changes in the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) program.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process because it attempted to relitigate the lawfulness of the FIT program changes, which had already been upheld by the Divisional Court in a prior judicial review application.

The court also held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for either misfeasance in public office or unjust enrichment.

The moving parties sought to dismiss an application challenging a continuing power of attorney and seeking various related remedies on the basis of res judicata.

They argued that similar issues had already been raised in related proceedings and resolved through minutes of settlement.

The court held that the doctrine of res judicata requires a final judicial determination between the same parties or their privies, and that a private settlement agreement without a court order does not constitute such a determination.

Because the responding party was not a party to the settlement and no judicial decision resolved the issues, the prerequisites for cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel were not met.

The motion to dismiss the application was therefore denied.

A receiver appealed from summary judgment dismissing its claim for indemnity under a trustee's errors and omissions policy after obtaining judgment against the insured trustee for breach of trust.

The court held that the insurer was entitled to rely on the dishonest acts exclusion because the trustee deliberately breached the trusts, knowingly exposed the beneficiaries to risk, and misappropriated trust funds for its own benefit.

The court further held that a prior order assigning to the receiver the 'proceeds from insurance coverage' did not assign the insured's separate cause of action for breach of the insurer's duty of good faith.

The receiver also had no direct good faith claim against the insurer, although it could return to the motion judge to seek directions on any other remedy if the insurer had deliberately frustrated the prior order.