David D’Iorio

During a first-degree murder trial where identification was the sole issue, the defence sought to allow the jury a closer physical view of the accused's eyes.

The only eyewitness had described the shooter as having "colourful eyes" and the defence argued the current courtroom configuration prevented the jury from properly assessing this evidence.

The Crown opposed, contending the request was a formal "view" under s. 652 of the Criminal Code or amounted to calling new evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, clarifying that a jury's observation of an accused's physical appearance constitutes "real evidence" and is distinct from a formal "view." The court ruled that the jury should be permitted a closer view of the accused's eyes to ensure a fair trial and proper assessment of the evidence, noting that the accused's right to a fair trial should not be contingent on courtroom layout.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter and challenge the voluntariness of a statement.

The accused argued that a brief interaction with police in a stairwell months before the murder constituted an arbitrary detention, and that obtaining his phone number from Ontario Works violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the stairwell encounter was a brief, consensual interaction that did not amount to a detention, and the statement was voluntary.

The court also held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone number obtained from Ontario Works.

The applications were dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused, charged with homicide, brought an application to adduce evidence that a third party was the true perpetrator.

The defence argued the alternate suspect had opportunity, motive, propensity, and was identified as the shooter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient connection between the alternate suspect and the crime, as the evidence for opportunity, motive, propensity, and identification was seriously lacking or completely absent.

The applicant, Robin Badwah, sought an order to sever five counts of robbery into three separate trials, arguing that a single trial would be highly prejudicial due to the risk of impermissible propensity reasoning by the jury and weak identity evidence on some counts.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a strong legal and factual nexus between the counts, that potential prejudice could be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions, and that severance would lead to an inefficient use of judicial resources and potential violations of the accused's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c), which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offence.

The central issue was whether the 57-minute delay between the traffic stop and the first breath sample was reasonable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden by establishing that the police acted reasonably throughout the chain of events, including the time spent on booking procedures, facilitating contact with duty counsel, and preparing the approved instrument.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with possessing and making available child pornography.

The central issue at trial was the admissibility of evidence seized from his BlackBerry cell phone without a warrant, specifically whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

Police seized the phone after identifying the accused at a Tim Hortons, concerned about potential evidence destruction.

A search warrant was subsequently obtained to examine the phone, which revealed incriminating evidence on an attached memory card.

The court found that exigent circumstances existed, making the warrantless seizure reasonable and not a violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

Alternatively, even if a s. 8 violation occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, given the seriousness of the offense, the good faith of the police, and the minimal impact on privacy interests due to a subsequent warrant.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

The Crown applied for a ruling that a post‑arrest statement made by an accused during a police interview was voluntary and admissible at trial in a first‑degree murder prosecution.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged physical intimidation, suggestions that the accused needed to speak, implied threats regarding the accused’s girlfriend, and inducements suggesting a robbery admission could avoid a murder charge.

The court reviewed the full interview and applied the voluntariness principles from leading Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

It held that the accused had been properly cautioned, had consulted counsel, and chose to speak despite knowing his right to silence.

The court concluded the will of the accused was not overborne and that the statement, except for a later portion conceded by the Crown as induced, was voluntary and admissible.

The applicant sought a one-day extension of time to file a summary conviction appeal from an over 80 conviction and a stay of the driving prohibition and fine pending appeal.

The court reviewed the proposed grounds attacking the trial judge’s conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to assess whether the relied-upon indicia were actually present.

Applying the governing principles on arguable appeal and stay pending appeal, the court held the proposed appeal had no merit and no chance of success.

Both the extension motion and the stay application were dismissed.

Following a jury trial, two offenders were convicted of manslaughter arising from a group swarming attack outside a restaurant that resulted in the victim’s death.

The sentencing judge assessed aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the unarmed victim, the coordinated nature of the attack, the use of golf clubs and a golf club shaft as weapons, and the offenders’ flight from the scene.

Mitigating considerations included the offenders’ youth, limited or absent criminal records, expressions of remorse, and prospects of rehabilitation.

The court rejected submissions that harsh pre‑sentence custody conditions warranted additional mitigation beyond statutory credit.

Applying sentencing principles of proportionality, denunciation, deterrence, and parity, the court imposed identical penitentiary sentences.

During a jury trial for homicide arising from a restaurant assault, the court considered whether the defence of abandonment should be left with the jury for two accused alleged to be parties to the offence under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the Supreme Court’s formulation of the abandonment defence in R v. Gauthier and the “air of reality” test, the court examined whether the evidence could reasonably support findings that the accused intended to withdraw, communicated that withdrawal in a timely and unequivocal manner, and took proportional steps to neutralize their participation.

Evidence from one accused that he attempted to discourage the assault and physically intervened was capable of supporting the defence.

By contrast, the other accused’s single statement discouraging a fight and subsequent inaction did not satisfy the elements of abandonment.

The defence was therefore left with the jury for one accused but not the other.

During a jury trial for homicide-related offences, the accused sought a ruling preventing the Crown from arguing that marks on the deceased’s clothing were footwear impressions attributable to the accused.

The forensic investigator described several impressions on the clothing but did not identify them as footwear impressions and could not match them to the footwear of either accused.

The court held that the Crown’s proposed inference lacked the necessary foundational evidence and would amount to impermissible speculation.

Applying principles governing circumstantial evidence and inference‑drawing, the court concluded that the primary fact that the impressions were caused by footwear had not been established.

Crown counsel was therefore prohibited from inviting the jury to conclude that the impressions were footwear impressions or attributable to the accused.

During a jury trial for homicide, the Crown sought to cross‑examine an accused about a security video depicting two vehicles near the crime scene and to argue in closing that the vehicles belonged to the accused and a Crown witness.

Defence counsel objected, arguing there was no good‑faith basis for the proposed questioning and that the Crown had earlier indicated the video would not be relied upon.

The court found that defence counsel had reasonably relied on the Crown’s stated position and that the Crown’s belief linking the vehicles to the accused was not reasonably supported by evidence.

Allowing the questioning or submissions would create unfair prejudice and invite speculation by the jury.

The court therefore prohibited the Crown from cross‑examining the accused on the video or making submissions linking the vehicles to the accused or the witness.

The accused was charged with nine offences, including robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of an imitation firearm, following a violent home invasion.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's possession of stolen property shortly after the robbery, cell phone records, and DNA evidence linking the victim's blood to a jacket found in the accused's bedroom.

The accused raised an alibi defence through his girlfriend's testimony.

The court rejected the alibi evidence as not credible and applied the doctrine of recent possession and the test for circumstantial evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding he was a party to the common intention to commit the armed robbery and that the aggravated assault was objectively foreseeable.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on secondary grounds following charges involving drug trafficking, firearms, identity theft-related offences, and breaches of recognizance.

The reviewing judge found that the justice of the peace erred in principle by failing to properly assess the proposed supervision plan and by making a factual error regarding the amount of money found on the accused.

The court reassessed the detention decision under both the secondary and tertiary grounds of s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

Although the allegations were serious and involved drugs, firearms, and identity theft, the court concluded that the proposed surety and strict supervision plan sufficiently mitigated the risk of reoffending.

Detention was therefore not justified and release was ordered with strict conditions.