David A. Harris

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice convicted the appellant after he pled not guilty to the charge.

The appeal court found multiple serious errors: the trial justice effectively directed the appellant to testify, improperly intervened during examination, made inappropriate comments suggesting bias, and provided reasons for judgment that failed to demonstrate application of the proper legal test for credibility assessment.

The trial justice relied on inadmissible expert evidence from a witness not qualified to express the opinions given.

The court found the appellant did not receive a fair trial and that the reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexual interference with a female victim.

The victim was 12 years old at the time of the offence, and the accused was 18 years old.

The offence involved sexual activity including full intercourse on multiple occasions.

The court imposed a sentence of time-served (eight days pre-sentence custody credited as 12 days) plus six months imprisonment, followed by one year probation.

A 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order was imposed.

The court applied Gladue principles under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, considering the accused's status as a member of a First Nation, his youth, and his lack of prior criminal record.

The court also considered the joint submission from Crown and defence counsel.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by the accused, specifically a prior conviction for assault, threatening death, and failing to comply with bail conditions.

The accused was charged with assault, unlawful confinement, choking, threatening death, and mischief involving the same complainant.

The court considered whether the probative value of the similar fact evidence outweighed its potential prejudice under the framework established in R. v. Handy.

The court found that while there were similarities between the prior conduct and current allegations, the five-year time gap, the presence of mental health issues at the time of the prior incident (which were not evident in 2013), and the inference being based on a single prior act rendered the probative value insufficient to outweigh potential prejudice.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault involving the same complainant.

The Crown called the complainant as a witness, but she testified that she had no memory of the assaultive behaviour.

The Crown sought to introduce a videotaped statement made by the complainant to police, which contained detailed descriptions of the alleged assaults.

The Crown also sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including prior assaults and property damage.

The trial judge admitted the videotaped statement as hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability, but rejected the application to introduce evidence of prior conduct, finding insufficient probative value.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000, having stolen $86,234 from Grace United Church in Caledonia over a four-year period (2009-2012) while serving as Treasurer of Mission and Service Funds.

The Crown sought imprisonment of six to nine months, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding that denunciation and general deterrence were the primary sentencing principles applicable to this breach of trust involving repeated theft and fabricated financial reports.

The court imposed six months imprisonment followed by three years probation with conditions including financial counselling and restrictions on employment involving positions of trust with financial matters.

A stand-alone restitution order of $86,234 was made in favour of the Church.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and assaulting a police sergeant with intent to resist arrest.

The Crown proceeded summarily and sought 90 days imprisonment served intermittently, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected the conditional discharge as inappropriate and contrary to the public interest, finding that the accused's conduct—fleeing from police at speeds exceeding 120 km/h and resisting arrest—posed serious risks to public safety.

Instead, the court imposed a conditional sentence of 90 days to be served in the community, followed by two years probation, with strict conditions including house arrest, a driving prohibition, community service, and a DNA order.

Two young men pleaded guilty to armed robbery and related offences.

The Crown sought seven years imprisonment; defence counsel sought four years.

The court imposed a sentence of five years and six months (60 months total), comprising 18 months credit for pre-sentence custody at an enhanced 1.5:1 ratio plus 42 months additional imprisonment.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors—including the use of a loaded shotgun that was discharged during the robbery, targeting a vulnerable convenience store clerk, and the offenders' lack of firearms licenses—against significant mitigating factors including youth, genuine remorse, guilty pleas, positive pre-sentence reports, and the offences being out of character.

Lifetime firearms prohibitions and DNA orders were imposed.

The applicant sought a variation of a section 161 Criminal Code order imposed at sentencing for possession of child pornography and careless storage of ammunition.

The order prohibited him for 10 years from attending public parks, swimming areas, daycare centres, schools, playgrounds, and community centres where persons under 16 were present, except when accompanied by his wife; from seeking employment or volunteering with minors; and from using computer systems to communicate with persons under 16 other than his children.

The applicant requested three modifications: removal of the requirement to be accompanied by a named adult when attending children's activities, permission to attend an arena for adult hockey, and permission for other named individuals to accompany him to prohibited locations.

The court found limited changed circumstances and granted a partial variation, expanding the list of approved companions from his wife alone to 19 named family members and relatives, while maintaining the requirement for supervised attendance at locations where children are present.

The applicant sought to overturn a firearms officer's decision to revoke his licence to possess and acquire firearms.

The firearms officer revoked the licence based on concerns about the applicant's responsibility and discipline as a gun owner, citing a pattern of aggressive and irrational behaviour, multiple criminal harassment charges, a bitter feud with his cousin, threatening communications with a former girlfriend, and a suicide attempt.

The court upheld the revocation, finding the firearms officer's decision was clearly reasonable and that the applicant lacked the responsibility and discipline required of gun owners.

The court found the applicant's credibility severely compromised by his inconsistent statements and pattern of refusing to accept adverse decisions.

Three consolidated appeals of driving while suspended charges.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of charges against three respondents where the trial judge excluded documentary evidence of licence suspension under section 210(7) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge rejected the documents on the basis that they were incomplete copies and that driving records would be prejudicial to fair trial interests.

The appellate court found these exclusions constituted reversible error, holding that section 210(7) mandates receipt of properly certified documents and that driving records are admissible evidence of an essential element of the offence.

The court allowed the appeals, ordering a new trial for Lamanna and substituting convictions with minimum fines for Jane and Caldwell.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a Fentanyl Patch contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused elected trial in the Ontario Court of Justice and pled not guilty.

The Crown sought to introduce an analyst's certificate regarding the substance found.

The defence argued that proper notice of the certificate had not been given to counsel because the documents were served on counsel's agent but never reached counsel personally.

The court ruled that service on counsel's authorized agent constitutes valid service on counsel, and the failure of the agent to deliver the documents to counsel does not invalidate the service.

The certificate was admitted into evidence.

The Crown applied for an order under section 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to access sealed youth records from 2002 relating to the respondent's prior charges of sexual assault and sexual interference when he was 16 or 17 years old.

The Crown sought access to determine whether a similar fact evidence application could be brought in connection with current sexual assault charges.

The respondent opposed the application, asserting his right to privacy under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and his entitlement to a fresh start as an adult.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the Crown had a valid and substantial interest in the records and that access was necessary in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

The court balanced the respondent's privacy rights against the public interest in having serious prior behaviour placed before the court.

The respondent was charged with driving a commercial vehicle not equipped with a working speed limiting system contrary to section 68.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario.

At trial, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of the legislation, arguing it infringed his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by preventing him from accelerating to avoid dangerous driving situations.

The trial justice found in favour of the respondent and struck down the provision.

The Crown appealed.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the speed limiter legislation deprived him of security of the person, and that the legislation was not arbitrary.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of continuing the appeal following the respondent's death, substituting his widow as respondent in the interests of justice.

The offender pled guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking a pedestrian while speeding.

The victim suffered serious injuries including a compound fracture.

The Crown sought 60 to 90 days intermittent imprisonment, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, sentencing the offender to 60 days of intermittent imprisonment, three years of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a three-year driving prohibition.

Following conviction for assault with a weapon and guilty pleas to common assault and breach of undertaking, the court sentenced an Aboriginal offender from Pikangikum First Nation to a global custodial sentence with probation.

The sentencing decision extensively applied Gladue principles, considering the offender's background of family trauma, substance abuse, and systemic disadvantage within an isolated First Nation community.

The court imposed a sentence of nine months pre-sentence custody credited plus six months additional imprisonment for the assault with a weapon, three months consecutive for common assault, and one month consecutive for breach of undertaking, followed by three years probation.

The decision emphasizes that while Gladue factors do not provide automatic sentence reductions, they require a different analytical approach and consideration of restorative justice alternatives.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing marijuana and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

She was caught at the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie with 62 pounds of marijuana hidden in vehicle panels.

The Crown sought two years imprisonment; the defence sought a conditional sentence or blended sentence.

The court rejected a pure conditional sentence but imposed a blended sentence consisting of a 90-day intermittent sentence (served on weekends over approximately seven months) for the importation offence and a 21-month conditional sentence with strict conditions for the possession for trafficking offence.

The court balanced the seriousness of the offence against the offender's personal circumstances, including her lack of prior record, financial desperation, role as a courier, and family responsibilities.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of 15 months imprisonment, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence followed by probation.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding it inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, particularly given the seriousness of drug trafficking offences and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a sentence of time served (six days pre-sentence custody credited as 12 days) plus 258 additional days of imprisonment (equivalent to nine months), followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture order.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident and render assistance, contrary to section 252(1.3) of the Criminal Code, after his tractor-trailer struck a van on the Queen Elizabeth Way, resulting in the death of an eleven-year-old child and injuries to eight other occupants.

The Crown sought 90 days imprisonment; the defence sought a suspended sentence, conditional sentence, or intermittent sentence.

The court rejected both suspended and conditional sentences as inconsistent with the principles of denunciation and general deterrence required for this offence.

The court imposed an intermittent sentence of 90 days, probation for three years with conditions including 150 hours of community service, and a driving prohibition.

Following conviction for arson (causing damage by fire to property not wholly owned by the accused), the court rejected the defence submission for a conditional sentence and imposed six months imprisonment followed by two years probation.

The court found that while the first four prerequisites for a conditional sentence were met, the sentence would not be consistent with fundamental sentencing principles given the seriousness of arson, the absence of documented mental health issues (unlike comparable cases), and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a DNA order and restitution order of $31,741.96 to the insurance company.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision where the trial judge rejected a joint submission for 30 days imprisonment on two counts of driving while suspended contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, instead imposing 18 months probation.

The appellate court found that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard by finding the proposed sentence "excessive" rather than determining whether it was contrary to the public interest and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court held that the 30-day sentence was within the reasonable range and that the trial judge erred in undercutting the joint submission.

The appeals were dismissed as the accused had completed the probation period.