Daniel F. Chitiz

The appellants appealed an order finding they acted oppressively toward the respondent, a 10% minority shareholder in a landlord corporation, by leasing property to their own company at below-market rent.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of oppression regarding the failure to pay fair market rent after the initial lease term expired in 2010.

However, the court set aside the application judge's finding that the respondent reasonably expected triple rent for overholding, and reversed remedial orders directed at a non-party tenant corporation and for the period prior to 2010, finding that cash payments made to the respondent's principal had alleviated any unfair prejudice during that time.

The plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant Sandy DiFlorio, brought a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation against a property owned by Sandy's son.

The plaintiffs alleged that a $300,000 mortgage advance from Sandy to his son was a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat creditors.

The court applied the criteria under section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act and found the plaintiffs had a reasonable claim to an interest in the land.

The motion for a certificate of pending litigation was granted.

A secondary motion to strike a statement of defence for unpaid costs was dismissed with leave to renew if costs remained unpaid.

Following a dispute over costs after the underlying proceeding, the applicants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the respondents argued for a significantly reduced amount and objected to certain disbursements.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no reprehensible conduct in the litigation.

On a partial indemnity basis, the court reviewed the hours claimed by counsel and rejected arguments that the applicants’ legal team engaged in excessive duplication, although some preparation time was considered excessive.

The court also allowed disbursements for professional witnesses, finding that accountants called as fact witnesses were entitled to compensation for their time in preparing affidavits, attending cross‑examinations, and testifying.

Total costs payable were fixed at $58,034 inclusive of HST.

The applicants sought an order permitting their accountants to finalize draft closing statements following the sale of shares in a technology company.

The respondents argued that an adjustment for allegedly obsolete inventory should be considered and requested appointment of a third accountant under the purchase agreement.

The court found that the respondents failed to raise the inventory issue within the contractual 15‑day period for commenting on draft closing statements and had not engaged their own accountants to trigger the dispute‑resolution mechanism.

The court rejected arguments of waiver and declined to grant equitable relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding the respondents’ conduct unreasonable and unsupported by evidence of a valid claim.

The application was granted and the draft closing statements were ordered finalized.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to section 2.8 of an agreement.

The application judge dismissed the application because the appellant had already commenced an arbitration under section 8.18 on all issues, including working capital, and could not change course mid-way.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that jurisdictional issues were properly reserved to the arbitration, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought to exercise share options under the respondent's employee stock option plan and was required to execute an assumption agreement acknowledging receipt of the shareholders' agreement.

The respondent refused to provide the agreement, which the application judge found oppressive, ordering its production but allowing the redaction of Schedule A. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that Schedule A contained more than just shareholder identities and was integral to the agreement, making it unjust to compel the appellant to exercise options without seeing it.

The applicant, a 10% minority shareholder in a landlord corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholders.

The court determined preliminary issues, finding that the majority shareholders acted oppressively by leasing the corporation's property to their own related business at less than fair market value and failing to enforce the lease terms.

The court also found accounting irregularities, including the landlord corporation paying expenses that should have been paid by the tenant, and ordered remedies including the repayment of improper expenses and a buyout of the applicant's shares without a minority discount.

The applicant brought a motion seeking reconsideration and variance of a prior order requiring the respondent to produce a redacted shareholder agreement.

The applicant argued that Schedule “A” contained additional information about the type and number of shares held by shareholders which was necessary to assess corporate power dynamics and share value.

The court reviewed the schedule but held that the additional information did not justify altering the prior ruling.

The court found the information confidential to the private company and of little relevance to the applicant’s claims.

Concluding that the motion was an attempt to re‑litigate issues previously decided, the court dismissed the motion and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the decision of The Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board denying her 2012 application for licence eligibility to produce tobacco.

The Board denied the application on the basis that the appellant's son, who had a history of regulatory contraventions, was the de facto producer standing behind the application.

The Tribunal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board was entitled to treat the appellant and her son as one unit for the purpose of assessing the application, and that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory plan to ensure her son would not be involved in the tobacco production.

The appellant appealed the decision of The Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers’ Marketing Board denying her 2012 application for licence eligibility to produce tobacco.

The appellant sought an expedited decision so she could plant tobacco in time for the 2012 crop year.

The Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal, issuing its decision without reasons to accommodate the planting schedule, with full written reasons to follow.

The court determined costs following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity scale or alternatively on a partial indemnity scale, arguing the motion should never have been brought.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that summary judgment jurisprudence was still developing following amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and the decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

While the court found the time spent by counsel generally reasonable given the factual complexity and cross‑examinations, it concluded the amount sought exceeded what the defendant could reasonably have expected to pay.

The plaintiff was awarded $65,000 in fees and disbursements.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff’s action to recover funds advanced during a former romantic relationship was barred by the applicable limitation period.

The dispute concerned whether substantial funds used for the renovation of the defendant’s law office constituted a loan or a gift and whether the defendant, a lawyer who had professional dealings with the plaintiff’s business, owed and breached a fiduciary duty.

The court held that the nature of the parties’ personal and professional relationship, the characterization of the transactions, and the existence of any fiduciary duty or conflict of interest required credibility findings that could not be made on a summary judgment motion.

The court also noted that the resolution of these issues could affect whether a limitation period applied.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed.

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence.

The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues.

Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The moving parties brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal and for the costs awarded on a summary judgment motion.

The moving parties relied on the residual 'other good reason' category under rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no compelling reason to order security for the costs of the appeal or to require an advance payment of the summary judgment costs award, which was automatically stayed by the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they repudiated the respondent's consulting contract without cause by way of anticipatory breach.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking 24 months of payments instead of 12.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the respondent's responsibilities were implicitly taken away without warning, constituting anticipatory breach.

The court also agreed there was no duty to mitigate as the consulting agreement was part of a package deal for the sale of the respondent's business.

The cross-appeal was dismissed because the contract clearly limited payments to 12 months in the event of termination without cause.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's careful and thorough reasons on either of the points argued.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant ex-husband appealed a Master's order denying his request to amend his defamation claim against his ex-wife.

The proposed amendments related to statements the ex-wife made to a psychologist conducting a court-appointed custody assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made during a custody assessment are protected by absolute privilege to ensure full and free disclosure in family law proceedings.

The defendant appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff for the purchase price of a fiber optic measurement machine.

The defendant argued the machine was defective and that the Master erred in finding no genuine issue for trial.

The Divisional Court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the standard of review for a Master's final discretionary order, concluding the standard is correctness.

Applying this standard, the court upheld the Master's decision, finding the defendant had retained the machine for over a year without rejecting it, thereby accepting it under the Sale of Goods Act.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision interpreting an employment agreement to entitle the respondent employee to 13 months' notice upon termination.

The Court of Appeal found that the agreement was ambiguous, as the motion judge's interpretation effectively read out a six-month notice provision, while the appellant's interpretation required reading out other clauses.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, directing a trial on the interpretation of the notice period, but upheld the motion judge's decision that outstanding employee loans stood separate from the employment and required the appellant to prove they were due and owing.

The plaintiff, a tax consultant, sued the defendant for a contingency fee based on potential tax savings.

The defendant had retained other counsel to appeal a tax decision, and the plaintiff's claim was contingent on the success of that appeal.

The plaintiff sought a stay of its own action because the tax appeal was delayed and it could not proceed to trial without the contingent liability being established.

The court granted the stay, noting the plaintiff had no status to move the tax appeal forward and ordering the defendant to provide quarterly reports on the appeal's status.