Crystal Tomusiak

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari regarding his committal for trial on charges of criminal negligence causing death.

The charges arose from a tractor-trailer collision that resulted in three fatalities.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of wanton and reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others to justify the committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence, including the appellant's knowledge of the trailer's poor condition and tendency to lean, to meet the low threshold for committal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain, and careless storage of firearms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the warrantless entry into the appellant's home was not justified by hot pursuit or consent, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter and requiring the exclusion of the firearms evidence.

The driving convictions were upheld, but the total sentence was reduced to three years and the DNA order was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, uttering a threat, and pointing a firearm against his intimate partner, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and using evidence of discreditable conduct, and in finding a pellet gun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as narrative and the pellet gun met the definition of a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court noting that under s. 732(3) of the Criminal Code, the imposition of a conditional sentence alongside an intermittent sentence causes the intermittent sentence to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant appealed his five-year total sentence for bank robbery and attempted bank robbery.

The original sentence included two consecutive one-year terms for imitation firearm offences that the appellant had not actually been charged with.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, deleted the two one-year sentences, and varied the total sentence to three years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, mischief, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the reasonable doubt standard under W.(D.), improperly admitted bad character evidence, and erred in assessing his credibility based on his failure to plead guilty to mischief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, the character evidence was relevant to credibility without improper propensity reasoning, and the Kienapple principle did not apply as the offences were discrete acts.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to police without holding a voir dire or obtaining a clear waiver.

The Crown conceded the error, and the Court of Appeal found the Crown failed to demonstrate no substantial wrong was occasioned.

The Court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, noting that the trial judge's reasons suggested the appellant entered the building out of curiosity and only formed the intent to commit an indictable offence once inside, whereas the law requires intent to coincide with entry.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in denying the enhanced credit, noting the appellant served his pre-trial custody in segregation at his own request and had not engaged in rehabilitative programs.

The court upheld the sentence length given the offender's extensive record and high risk of re-offending.

However, based on a concession by the Crown, the court varied the parole eligibility period to half of the balance of the sentence imposed.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, errors in credibility assessment, and failure to establish the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation, proper application of the W.D. analysis for credibility, and ample evidence supporting the convictions.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and robbery arising from the Just Desserts café shooting.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury selection process by prioritizing the return dates of potential jurors from identifiable minority groups to ensure representativeness.

The Court of Appeal held that while the process departed from strict statutory requirements, it did not prejudice the appellant or undermine the jury's impartiality.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of surveillance videotapes, recognition witness evidence, the jury charge on identification, and the trial judge's refusal to compel testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and the sentence appeal was quashed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting their defences of duress and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to St. Louis's duress claim and that the Crown had rebutted Taillefer's duress claim.

The court also found sufficient differences in the evidence to explain the different verdicts, rejecting the inconsistent verdict argument.

The sentence appeals were dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give the jury a blended instruction on self-defence and accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's functional approach properly focused the jury on whether the stabbing was accidental.

The court noted that if the stabbing was purposeful, self-defence would have lacked an air of reality.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his long term offender designation.

On consent of the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission.

The appellant was declared a long term offender and sentenced to ten years and four months imprisonment, with six years of pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a further four years and four months of incarceration.

This is to be followed by an eight-year long term supervision order.