Craig Parry

The accused appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged misapprehension of the evidence and inadequate reasons by the trial judge regarding the central issue of consent and the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The reviewing court found that the trial judge relied on a theory of incapacity to consent unsupported by the complainant’s own evidence, misinterpreted post‑offence conduct as circumstantial evidence of guilt, and failed to analyze significant contradictory evidence relevant to credibility and consent.

The reasons were also insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review because they summarily rejected the accused’s testimony without explanation.

The court concluded that these errors amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple serious drug trafficking and production offences, including six counts of trafficking in cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, seven counts of possession of proceeds of crime, two counts of production of cannabis marihuana, and one count of possession of cannabis marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences occurred between July and November 2011 and involved significant quantities of controlled substances.

The accused was a mid to high-level dealer operating as a commercial enterprise.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years and two months imprisonment after crediting pre-trial custody and strict bail compliance, balancing principles of general deterrence and denunciation with rehabilitation and restraint.

The young person appealed a sentence of 12 months' closed custody and supervision followed by 12 months' probation for sexual interference.

The appellant, who had intellectual limitations and a high risk to re-offend, argued the trial judge erred by denying pre-sentence custody credit and imposing a sentence focused on incapacitation contrary to the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding this was an exceptional case where denying pre-sentence credit was justified, and the sentence appropriately prioritized rehabilitation and accountability in a highly structured setting.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified under s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

At the time of the offence, he was subject to both a Criminal Code driving prohibition and a provincial licence suspension.

The Crown conceded that the notice requirements of s. 260(1) of the Code were not met for the Criminal Code prohibition, but relied solely on the provincial suspension to prove the disqualification.

The appellant argued that compliance with s. 260(1) was mandatory even when relying on a provincial suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 260(1) applies only to court-ordered prohibitions under the Code and is not engaged when the Crown relies on a provincial driving suspension.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to address contradictions between police witnesses regarding the timing of breath demands.

The appellate court held that the trial judge reasonably accepted the evidence that a valid roadside screening demand was made and unequivocally refused at 1:51 a.m.

Any discrepancies concerning a later second demand were not material to the conviction.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence, illogical reasoning, or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after the trial judge rejected a joint submission and imposed a significantly higher sentence.

By the time the appeal was heard, the appellant had already been released from custody after serving the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to address the merits of the appeal in these circumstances and dismissed the appeal as moot.

The applicants, charged with unlawful production of marijuana, brought a pre-trial application alleging breaches of their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights following a warrantless police search of their apartment.

Police had responded to a report of a domestic disturbance and, despite the applicants' explanations and lack of apparent distress, entered and searched the apartment based on a general police policy, discovering a small marijuana grow operation.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe anyone else was in the apartment requiring assistance, rendering the search unreasonable and the detention arbitrary.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his presence in the group surrounding the victims, disregarded evidence that he was separate from the robbers, and misapprehended evidence about his hat.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence, including the appellant's own admissions, to support the conclusion that he was part of the circle of intimidation and that the conviction was safe.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results obtained following a roadside screening device demand.

The court found that although the officer unnecessarily provided rights to counsel at a time when none were legally required, this did not constitute a Charter breach.

The "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied, as there was no reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel before providing the sample.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was admitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant contended that the circumstantial evidence, specifically regarding whether he touched moulding after the break and enter, did not support the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and concluding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have rendered the same verdict based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claim for damages arising from their detention and search by police officers.

The officers had detained, handcuffed, and searched the appellants while investigating a break and enter, despite the appellants not matching the suspect descriptions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in concluding there were reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The court also found the appellants were de facto arrested, not merely detained.

The court awarded each appellant $500 in damages for false arrest and imprisonment.

The appellants appealed a small claims court decision dismissing their claim for damages arising from their detention and search by police officers.

The officers were investigating a break and enter and detained the appellants as they walked past the scene.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in concluding there were reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The court also found the appellants were de facto arrested, not merely detained.

However, the court upheld the finding that the search for weapons was reasonable.

The appellants were each awarded $500 in damages for false arrest and imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while disqualified.

He argued that the Crown could not rely on a provincial license suspension to prove disqualification because he had not been informed of the penal consequences of driving while disqualified, as required by section 260(1) of the Criminal Code for court-ordered prohibitions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the notice requirements in section 260(1) apply only to court-ordered prohibitions under section 259(5)(a) and do not apply when the Crown proves disqualification via a provincial suspension under section 259(5)(b).

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The convictions were based on the testimony of a single complainant regarding historical sexual activities.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the criminal standard of proof, noting her inadequate treatment of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her problematic formulation of her ultimate conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their eight-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the appellants' ages, and their prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentences were reduced to six years.

In a subsequent addendum, the Court clarified that the two months of pre-trial custody credit granted by the trial judge applied to the reduced six-year sentences, leaving five years and ten months to be served.

The appellants appealed their 8-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the 8-year sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the ages of the appellants, and their prospects of rehabilitation.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to 6 years for each appellant.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varied the sentence to time served, and vacated the restitution order.

The probation order was extended to two years with an added condition prohibiting the appellant from attending specific locations.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that quashed the youth respondent's convictions for sexual offences against a four-year-old child and ordered a new trial.

The appeal judge had found the trial judge misapprehended evidence of opportunity and applied an adult standard to the youth's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, did not apply an inappropriate standard to the youth's testimony, and did not impermissibly assume the youth lied simply to avoid jail.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The respondent was convicted at trial of prowling at night after being found hiding in a residential backyard.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown must prove the respondent intended to commit a specific evil act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, clarifying that section 177 of the Criminal Code only requires proof of intentional prowling (stealthy traversing) without lawful excuse, and does not require proof of an underlying intent to commit a further specific offence.